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Abstract 
With three major stock market crashes in less than two decades, understanding the forces at 
work in the modern stock market is more important than ever before. The anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic has often been described as one of the psychological forces influencing 
investment decisions but little research has been done to support this belief. The aim of the 
present dissertation is to empirically study the presence of anchoring and adjustment in 
stock market decisions. To do this, a small group of equity analysts from South African 
investment firms were used for a pilot study before a survey was presented to a sample of 
295 fourth year actuarial and finance students from the University of Cape Town. An 
experimental research design was used with a salient peak or trough on a share chart (the 
anchors) as the independent variable and participants’ estimates of a firm’s fundamental 
value as the dependent variable. 
No significant relationship between the anchor and participants’ estimates of fundamental 
value was found. More specifically, the research results suggested that participants 
experienced an anchoring effect but were debiased before providing an estimate of 
fundamental value. This is believed to have occurred due to the inclusion of multiple salient 
anchors in the research materials consistent with the nature of information available to 
analysts in real-world investment decision-making contexts. As these findings contradict 
those of most studies in anchoring and adjustment, it is recommended that more research is 
conducted on the relationship between the anchoring bias and stock market decisions in 
realistic investment settings. Additional research is also needed to clarify the effect that 
multiple anchors have on the anchoring bias. 
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1. Introduction 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic (or mental shortcut) was first identified by Tversky 
and Kahneman in 1974. According to their theory, when making an estimate, people anchor 
on a relevant or salient value and then adjust this value to reach a final answer (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring and adjustment allows individuals to quickly produce 
reasonably accurate estimates to difficult questions (Gilovich, 2002). However, using mental 
shortcuts can also lead to systematic biases. Specifically, it was found that people adjust the 
anchor insufficiently to account for the difference between the anchor and the required value 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This leads to estimates which are systematically biased 
towards the anchor value (Plous, 1993). This bias is exacerbated when individuals anchor 
on irrelevant but highly salient values (Chapman & Johnson, 2002) such as past share 
prices in the stock market (Mussweiller & Schneller, 2003). 
The anchoring bias has been studied in relation to various topics in behavioural economics, 
including advertising (Chandrashekaran & Grewal, 2006; Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 1998), 
consumer preferences (Ariely, Lowenstein, & Prelec, 2003) and stock market investing 
(Marsat & Williams, 2009; Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). The present study will focus on 
the effect that the anchoring bias has on share valuations. 
1.1 Research problem 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic is often described in investing literature as a 
psychological bias which stock market investors should be aware of (see Anufriev & 
Hommes, 2007; Bhandari, Hassanein, & Deaves, 2008; Busetti, 2009). However, very few 
studies have directly investigated the impact of anchoring and adjustment on investors 
(Marsat & Williams, 2009; Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003), and no study to date has been 
conducted with a sufficiently large sample. Instead, literature on the topic has tended to 
either infer the presence of the anchoring bias from its presence in other populations (for 
example, Busetti, 2009), or to rely on small student samples to draw their conclusions (for 
example, Kaustia, Alho & Puttonen, 2008; Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). Furthermore, it is 
felt that research to date has not provided participants with sufficient information to make 
educated decisions, forcing participants to rely more strongly on heuristics. The purpose of 
the present study is therefore to investigate the presence of the anchoring bias in investors 
while making use of a large sample and providing participants with the information needed to 
make informed decisions. This purpose leads directly to the present study’s research 
question: 
Does the anchoring and adjustment heuristic affect investment decisions? 
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As the purpose of the present study is to either confirm or deny the existence of anchoring 
and adjustment as a potential bias affecting investment decisions, the focus is placed on 
decisions made in a realistic (but simulated) investment environment rather than on abstract 
judgements. This allows the research to focus on improving investor behaviour without 
making inferences from unrelated fields. 
One secondary question will be investigated by the present paper: Are investors affected by 
anchors which they consider irrelevant? This question will allow the researcher to determine 
whether the bias is caused by the subconscious use of the anchor or by a belief in the 
validity of the anchor. 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
In the wake of one of the biggest financial crises since the great depression (Pendery, 2009), 
and the third major stock market crash in as many decades, improving the tenuous grasp 
that economists have on the psychology of investing is crucial. Investigating the anchoring 
bias allows economists and social scientists to not only confirm or disprove the existence 
and prevalence of such biases, but also provides investors with methods of mitigating the 
effects of these biases. This may prove to be a difficult task, however, as research by 
Chapman and Johnson (2002) has shown that anchoring is a remarkably robust 
phenomenon. As such, it is important to not only understand the anchoring phenomenon, but 
also the processes that cause it. With this in mind, this study has the following three 
purposes: 
1. To explore the presence of anchoring and adjustment in investment decisions. 
2. To determine whether an anchoring effect will occur in a realistic simulated 
investment environment.  
3. To examine whether participants who consider the anchor uninformative will still 
display an anchoring effect. 
Answering these questions will provide future researchers with empirical evidence on which 
to base further research, including research on the ways in which the anchoring bias can be 
moderated in investment situations. Furthermore, examining the way in which investors react 
to anchors they consider relevant and irrelevant will enrich our understanding of the 
anchoring mechanisms and processes. 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation will begin with the literature review. Because of the complexity of the 
anchoring bias, it is important that the literature on anchoring and adjustment is understood 
before the research method is discussed. The literature review will include sections on the 
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historical context of anchoring and adjustment, how anchoring works, its characteristics and 
limitations, how anchoring relates to investors, and finally, how anchoring could potentially 
be debiased in an investment context. 
The literature review will be followed by an in-depth look at the research method that was 
used for the dissertation. The research method section will examine the research design and 
hypotheses, how the sample was obtained and how the data were gathered and analysed. It 
will conclude with a brief discussion of the ethical considerations of the experiment. 
Following the research method will be a section on the results and findings. In this section, 
the data will be analysed and conclusions will be drawn. The findings will also be discussed 
and compared with other research in the field, and the implications of the findings will be 
investigated. The dissertation will be concluded with recommendations for future research. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Blaikie (2010), the purpose of the literature review is to provide “background to 
and context for the research and to establish a bridge between the project and the current 
state of knowledge on the topic” (p. 68). For Marshall and Rossman (2010) the purpose of 
the literature review is to “refine and redefine the research questions by embedding them in 
larger traditions of inquiry” (p. 39). 
Building on these definitions, the goals of the present literature review are fourfold: First, the 
literature review aims to provide a conceptual and theoretical framework for the research 
question (Roberts, 2010). Doing so will allow readers to critically analyse the present 
research. Second, the literature review aims to clarify anchoring and adjustment by 
presenting the literature in an organised and concise fashion that guides the reader through 
this confusing and often contradictory field. Third, the literature review will aim to show links 
and highlight relationships between anchoring and adjustment and investors. Much research 
has been done on investors and on anchoring and adjustment separately, but very little on 
how anchoring and adjustment affects investors. As such, correlations with research inside 
and outside of anchoring and adjustment will be drawn to show the potential impact of 
anchoring on investors. Finally, it is a goal of the literature review to cast light on further 
avenues of exploration and questions that need to be answered. 
The aim of this literature review is thus to provide a clear but broad framework that brings to 
light connections between disparate fields of research. Consistent with the exploratory 
nature of the study, these connections will pave the way for future research while 
simultaneously providing a context for the present research questions. 
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In order to best achieve these goals, the literature review examines the literature in broad 
strokes with only select articles being analysed in detail. The dynamic and contested nature 
of anchoring and adjustment research makes a broad overview of anchoring research the 
most impartial approach to the literature review. By focusing the review on too few articles 
the researcher risks presenting a one-sided perspective on a multi-faceted process (Epley, 
2004). 
To ensure that the overview is comprehensive, emphasis is placed on understanding the 
implications of the literature rather than on specific findings. The continually changing 
understanding of anchoring processes has led to a continuous change in the interpretation 
of findings, making a strict analysis of findings ineffectual. Furthermore, due to the fine 
distinction between different anchoring mechanisms (brought on by methodological 
differences; see Epley & Gilovich, 2001) the research method used is an important part of 
each study and will be discussed where relevant. 
The literature is discussed under four primary headings: History and context, anchoring and 
adjustment, investors and debiasing. 
In the first section, history and context, the paradigmatic assumptions of anchoring and 
adjustment are examined. The history and context re discussed chronologically, starting 
with the rational choice theory, continuing through bounded rationality and concluding with 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) work on heuristics and biases. More than just providing 
readers with an understanding of the origins and historic context of anchoring and 
adjustment, this topic examines important distinctions between the economic man and a 
heuristic and biases conception of investors. 
The second section focuses on literature specific to anchoring and adjustment. As this topic 
forms the bulk of the literature review, it is divided into four subsections. The first subsection 
looks at the psychological mechanisms of anchoring and adjustment. Many different 
anchoring mechanisms have been suggested and research into the anchoring processes is 
ongoing (for a summary, see Chapman & Johnson, 2002). This will be followed by a review 
of research on the categorization of anchors. The present study makes use of a distinction 
between self-generated, externally-provided, and basic anchors and the literature review will 
investigate these categories in more detail. The third subsection looks at the characteristics 
of anchoring, specifically focusing on the robustness and durability of anchoring effects. 
These characteristics have significant implications for investors which will be examined in 
the text. In the final subsection, the limitations and boundary conditions of anchoring are 
investigated. As there are multiple mechanisms that produce an anchoring bias, very few 
limitations have consistently been shown in anchoring research. As such, this subsection will 
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examine the conditions affecting the strength of the anchoring effect. 
In the third topic, the research on anchoring and adjustment is applied to investors. The topic 
starts by briefly looking at the characteristics of the investment environment relevant to 
anchoring. Following this will be a detailed review of all the research directly linking 
anchoring and adjustment and investing. This is followed by a broader look at studies in 
finance-related fields, such as negotiations and consumer pricing. The investor topic is 
concluded by examining potential anchors in the investment environment. 
The final topic looks at the possibility of mitigating the anchoring bias in investment 
situations. While most experiments have failed to debias anchoring and adjustment (Epley, 
2004), there is evidence from within and outside of anchoring research that suggests that the 
anchoring bias might be overcome in specific situations. These techniques, and their 
practical use in an investment environment, will be discussed in the debiasing topic. 
At this point it is important to reiterate that the literature review will focus almost exclusively 
on the psychological underpinnings of anchoring and how anchoring and adjustment affects 
investment decision making. The literature review will not examine the financial effects of the 
anchoring bias. While these are certainly important and accordant with the present study’s 
goal of improving financial decision making, it is beyond this study’s scope. 
2.2 History and context 
2.2.1 The origins of heuristics and biases 
Since the seminal work by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) on heuristics and biases, 
researchers have made use of heuristics to explain biased behaviour in a wide range of 
settings. In order to understand the foundations of such research, as well as its limitations, it 
is important to take a brief look at the history of economics leading up to heuristics and 
biases. Central to the development of the heuristics and biases approach are the theories of 
rational choice and bounded rationality: Rational choice theory formed, and still forms, the 
basis of most economic decision making theories while the theory of bounded rationality 
caused a shift from a purely rational theory of decision making to a behavioural theory of 
decision making. 
2.2.1.1 Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory is the most commonly used framework for understanding economic 
behaviour. Central to it is the economic person—an entity assumed to be perfectly rational at 
all times (Simon, 1955). The economic person is assumed to weigh up the benefits and 
costs of their behaviours before choosing the behaviour with the greatest utility. As such, the 
maximisation of utility is the central precept of economic rationality (Blume & Easley, 2007) 
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and thus of rational choice theory. 
Rational choice theory makes three important assumptions about individuals and the 
decisions they make: (1) Each decision has a limited number of options available which are 
all known to the rational person (Simon, 1955, 1987); (2) the rational person has a stable 
and logically consistent set of preferences (Mas-Collel, Whinston, & Green, 1995); and (3), 
the rational individual can rank all alternatives available to him or her according to these 
preferences. The rational person thus makes consistent decisions based on the expected 
value of the subjective utility of the available actions. These assumptions do not imply that 
people always make the best decisions but rather that people always make rational 
decisions after attempting to weigh up all possible alternatives. Mistakes occur, but they 
occur because people make unsystematic errors in weighing up the rewards and risks 
inherent in their actions (Gilovich, 2001). Even with this constraint, however, rational choice 
theory remains unrealistic as both a measure and description of human decision making. 
One criticism of rational choice theory is that there is a lack of evidence supporting the 
conscious weighing up of options it assumes, especially in situations of complexity (Simon, 
1955). Experiments in which rational choice theory was explicitly tested failed to support a 
strict adherence to rational decision making procedures (Leontief, 1971). An even stronger 
criticism questions the assumptions fundamental to rational choice theory. The assumption 
of choice consistency—that a similar environment would lead to a similar behaviour—
contains a distinct possibility that much of what is “within the skin of the biological organism” 
(Simon, 1955, p. 101) is defined as part of the environment. Changes in the mood or 
motivation of an organism can lead to distinct changes in behaviour, changes which cannot 
be explained by stable and consistent preferences (Jones, 1999). This is underscored by 
preference shifts that occur due to minor alterations to the environment such as the order in 
which alternatives are presented (i.e. framing effects; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). Such 
preference shifts are not in accordance with the assumed consistency of people’s choices. 
A further problem is that models of “unbounded rationality,” such as the rational choice 
model, assume unlimited search (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). In models of unbounded 
rationality people continue searching until an optimal solution is found. This is only feasible 
when there are few alternatives available and becomes unrealistic when there are a large 
number of alternatives (for example, choosing how much money to invest in which stocks). 
Considering all alternatives in complex situations can be incredibly time consuming which 
makes it impossible in situations with time constraints. Optimisation under constraints, a later 
decision making theory, hypothesised that people first determine the optimal amount of 
resources, including time, to expend on a search before beginning the search (Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999). However, it has been shown that this may require even more cognitive 
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resources than an exhaustive search (Vriend, 1996). As such, rational choice theory’s 
description of searches is fundamentally flawed. 
Unbounded rationality further assumes that individuals have perfect knowledge regarding 
the opportunities available to them and the outcomes of their behaviours (Simon, 1989; 
Stobëner, 2008). This is a questionable assumption even in simple situations (Simon, 1997). 
A mundane task such as choosing a chocolate bar to purchase would require knowledge of 
all chocolate bars manufactured in the world. While many of these options can intuitively be 
discarded (such as chocolate bars sold in another city or country), the advantages and 
disadvantages involved in purchasing these bars can only be weighed up if the options are 
known. To complexify the decision making process further, optimal solutions are often 
unknowable in everyday situations (Simon, 1987). 
As these criticisms highlight, rational choice theory provides a normative theory of decision 
making but fails to include the limitations of human decision making. Even more problematic 
is that it fails to describe how people really think (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). As such, 
rational choice theory has difficulty accurately describing and predicting behaviours in 
everyday decision making. Simon concludes that “actual human rationality-striving can at 
best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind of global rationality that 
is implied” (Simon, 1955, p. 101). 
2.2.1.2 Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality attempts to remedy the problems of rational choice theory by including 
the decision maker’s shortcomings (Simon, 1997). Simon (1947) argues that, in contrast with 
rational choice theory, there are practical limits to human rationality which are determined by 
the individual’s environment. This argument signifies a distinct shift away from the 
comprehensively rational position of rational choice theory. 
Environmental factors and cognitive limitations form the two pillars of bounded rationality 
research. Because the mind has certain limitations, decision makers make use of shortcuts 
to handle most tasks (Simon, 1990). Heuristic research attempts to determine what these 
shortcuts are and when they are used. However, as the heuristic chosen (and its suitability) 
depends on the structure of the environment (Simon, 1956), the environment is as important 
as the cognitive limitation. 
While bounded rationality excelled at explaining why deviations from strictly rational 
behaviour occur, the question of how a search is stopped when little structure exists 
remained. To answer this, Simon (1956) proposed a stopping rule called satisficing (a word 
combining satisfy with suffice; Mankletow, 2000). According to the satisficing rule, individuals 
continue searching for a solution until they find one that meets a minimum level of 
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satisfaction. To determine what level of satisfaction they should be content with, people rely 
on their experience (Simon, 1990). There are multiple advantages to using satisficing as a 
stopping rule: (1) it allows decisions to be made when there are an undefined number of 
options; (2) it allows a decision to be made when the question has so little structure that all 
alternatives would need to be examined to determine the best solution; and (3) it allows a 
decision to be made when the available choices differ on more than one dimension (Simon, 
1990). When alternatives have differences on multiple dimensions, a decision is made once 
an option which is satisfactory on all the dimensions is found. 
Bounded rationality thus argues that perfect rationality is an unrealistic standard for humans 
(Simon, 1957). Instead, theories of decision making need to take the limitations of the 
human mind, as well as the characteristics of the environment, into consideration. Heuristics 
and biases research developed based on these principles with the aim of investigating the 
limitations of the human mind and how these limitations lead to biases. 
2.2.2 Heuristics and biases 
Heuristics and biases research examines how heuristic use leads to systematic biases 
(Gilovich, 2001). The following section will briefly look at the definition of heuristics and 
biases, criticisms of the heuristics and biases research direction and the relevance of 
heuristics and biases to economics and finance. 
2.2.2.1 Definition of heuristics and biases 
Langley (2004) calls heuristics rules of thumb that allow people to simplify complex 
computational tasks which would normally be too difficult. Epley (2004) refers to heuristics 
as mental shortcuts which are used when problems are exceedingly difficult, while 
Mussweiler and Epstude (2009) emphasise the way in which heuristics “transform complex 
tasks into simple judgements” (p. 2). The different definitions of heuristics all highlight that 
heuristics are simple tools used to answer complex questions, but they also suggest why 
heuristics go hand in hand with biases—as with all shortcuts, there is a risk that the shortcut 
will not be efficient. It is for this reason that behaviour sometimes deviates from the rules of 
perfect rationality: When the environment is ill-adapted to the heuristic being used, actual 
behaviour differs from rationally intended behaviour, and bounded rationality ‘shows through’ 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Jones, 1999). 
It is important to note that with heuristics and biases, the error made is not random or 
unsystematic. Instead, similar situations and experiences result in similar mistakes. 
Heuristics thus represent a qualitatively different style of thinking which results in systematic, 
predictable biases (Gilovich, 2001). The predictability of errors is what makes it meaningful 
to study the characteristics of, and the processes behind heuristics. 
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2.2.2.2 Principles of heuristics and biases model 
Five principles of the heuristic and biases model can be identified: First, heuristics are not 
irrational. Instead, they are sensible decision making strategies which work in a different way 
from purely rational decision making processes. Simon (1947) describes human decision 
making as intendedly rational, as the purpose of heuristics is to make rational decisions in 
complex situations of uncertainty.  
Second, although heuristics are designed to give quick and simple answers, they do so by 
using complex processes which are already in place (Gilovich, 2001). These complex 
processes often occur outside of conscious awareness, making them resistant to change 
(Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke, 1996). This becomes very important when searching for 
ways to mitigate or remove the bias. 
Third, heuristics are not only used when faced with excessively difficult situations. Instead, 
heuristics are incorporated in everyday decision making (Gilovich, 2001). 
Fourth, heuristics research has both a positive and a negative agenda. The positive agenda 
is to examine and describe how people make decisions in difficult and uncertain situations. 
The negative agenda of heuristic research is to discover the situations and conditions in 
which heuristic use deviates from the rules of probability (Gilovich, 2001). Finding the 
conditions under which bias occurs (and exceptions to these conditions) allows researchers 
to obtain a better understanding of human decision making. 
Finally, heuristic use can be either automatic or deliberate (Gilovich, 2001). Because of their 
ability to simplify complex decisions, heuristics are often used consciously. 
2.2.2.3 Conditions for heuristic use 
Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases is the title of both the first article 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and the first book on heuristics and biases (Kahneman, Slovic, 
& Tversky, 1982). The title stresses the first, and most important, condition for heuristic use: 
uncertainty. Almost all research to date has focused on how participants make judgements 
when outcomes are uncertain. This makes intuitive sense, as participants who already know 
the answer to a question will rely on their memory, not heuristics, to obtain it. However, the 
exact effect of uncertainty on heuristic use is complex. 
In research on anchoring and adjustment, Wilson et al. (1996) found that the more certain 
participants were about an answer the less likely they were to be influenced by heuristics. A 
contrasting study found that familiarity with a situation (Wright & Anderson, 1989) and 
expertise (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Northcraft & Neale, 1989) had little effect in 
diminishing the anchoring effect. In fact, these factors increased subjective feelings of 
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certainty without improving accuracy (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006). A rule of thumb 
proposed by Simon (1999) is that knowledge and expertise do not lead to optimal solutions 
but rather to solutions that are better than average. 
Other conditions required for heuristic use have been investigated (for example, Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997), but these conditions are typically heuristic-specific. As such, the only 
shared condition for heuristic use is uncertainty. 
2.2.2.4 Representativeness, availability, and anchoring 
In their seminal research article, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) discuss three heuristics 
which can be identified through the biases they result in: Anchoring, availability, and 
representativeness. 
The representativeness heuristic is used to answer probability questions regarding the 
categorisation of an object (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), for example, what is the probability 
that object A (Johan) is part of class B (artist)? According to the representativeness heuristic, 
these judgements are based on how representative object A is of class B. The more A is 
representative of B, the higher the probability is judged to be. While it is an effective shortcut 
for making probability assessments, representativeness often leads to substantial errors 
because it ignores factors that should influence these assessments such as the base rate, 
sample size, and predictability of the target. 
The availability heuristic is used when people judge the frequency or probability of an event 
occurring based on the ease with which occurrences of it spring to mind (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). This is an effective strategy in most situations, as occurrences of large 
classes are easier to recall. However, the availability of information is affected by factors 
other than its frequency (such as the salience of the information), which leads to systematic 
biases. 
The third heuristic identified in the research paper, and the focus of the present dissertation, 
is the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. When people make numeric estimates, they rely 
on highly salient or relevant numbers as starting points which they then adjust toward the 
final answer (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Bias occurs because the adjustments from the 
anchor are usually insufficient which results in answers that are skewed towards the anchor. 
As will be argued in the section on investors, anchors abound in the investment 
environment. When investors anchor on irrelevant anchors (such as a salient past share 
price) it could lead to biased decision making. 
2.2.2.5 Criticisms of heuristics and biases 
Despite its success at showing biased decision making, or perhaps because of it, the 
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heuristic and biases movement has been criticised fiercely by researchers from both inside 
and outside of decision making research. Understanding the criticisms and the context of 
these criticisms is important if the present research is to avoid the same criticisms.  
One of the most common early criticisms of heuristics and biases research is that it paints 
the human mind in an overly negative light (Cohen, 1981; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Lopes, 
1991). This goes directly against what is believed by many scientists in the heuristics and 
biases movement. For example, Gilovich (2002) states that heuristics are adaptive tools in 
most situations. However, most heuristics and biases research chooses to focus on 
situations where heuristics are not adaptive because these situations best reveal the 
underlying cognitive processes. 
A second criticism often made is that heuristics and biases are parlour tricks with little impact 
outside of the laboratory (Berkley & Humphreys, 1982; Hogarth, 1981). In a series of articles, 
Gigerenzer argues that the biases shown in the research of Kahneman and Tversky are 
cognitive illusions that only occur in laboratories. To support this statement, Gigerenzer 
makes the following points: 
1. Subjective probabilities cannot be used to diagnose judgements as biased because 
subjective probability is an unresolved topic among statisticians. As such, there can 
be no normative standard with which answers can be compared (Gigerenzer, 1991). 
2. Heuristic research disregards context and the way in which problems are 
represented (Gigerenzer, 1993; Gigerenzer, Hell, & Blank, 1988). 
3. Errors of judgement disappear when questions are asked as frequencies 
(Gigerenzer, 1991). 
4. Errors of judgement disappear when the role of random sampling is emphasised 
(Gigerenzer, 1991). 
5. Heuristics are vague and largely undefined. Because of this, they can be applied to 
explain almost any behaviour (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996). 
6. Errors cannot be said to occur in a between-subjects design where no one individual 
is shown to deviate from his or her ‘unbiased’ answer (Gigerenzer, 1996). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1996) rebut the first four criticisms by highlighting studies 
contradicting Gigerenzer’s claims regarding the prevalence and pervasiveness of heuristics 
and biases (for example Grether, 1993; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1982; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973, 1974). As many biases had been shown in circumstances that Gigerenzer 
hypothesised would make them disappear, these criticisms are not significant. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
12 
 
The fifth criticism focuses on the lack of a formal definition for the representativeness and 
availability heuristics. As Gigerenzer (1991) focuses primarily on representativeness, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1996) do the same. While Kahneman and Tversky effectively argue 
that representativeness does not need a formal definition, this lack of formal definitions for 
most heuristics has hampered research in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. The 
vagueness of anchoring’s definition has led to a wide array of phenomena being categorised 
as anchoring and adjustment (Epley, 2004), and characteristics from one form of anchoring 
being erroneously applied to a different form of anchoring. 
For the final criticism, Kahneman and Tversky (1996) concede that research on heuristics 
and biases has depended on between-subjects designs, especially in cases where there is a 
formal probability rule to compare judgements to. However, since these deviations represent 
a systematic deviation from a normative standard, they require explanation, regardless of 
whether any single decision can be shown to be biased or not. 
2.2.2.6 Relevance to economics and finance 
As shown by some of the criticisms, heuristics and biases and behavioural finance have not 
always been accepted by investors and economists (Hirshleifer, 2001). Edward Mason 
described the behavioural theory of the firm as being inferior for purposes of economic 
analysis (1952), while Friedman (1953) criticised behavioural theories for focusing too much 
on ‘realism’ and not enough on accurately predicting behaviour. This has changed in recent 
years, however, as evidenced by the myriad books emphasising the psychological side of 
investing (for example, Nosfinger, 2005; Pompian, 2006; Shefrin, 2002). 
In his 2001 survey of the literature, Hirshleifer looks at how heuristics and biases affect 
investors. Some common investor biases he discusses include the gambler’s fallacy in which 
investors believe that a string of bad results make a good result more likely (Andreassen & 
Kraus, 1990), and the related hot hand fallacy (Ayton & Fischer, 2004), where investors 
believe that certain shares are “on fire” and start following trends. Hirshleifer also discusses 
conservatism, a bias where investors stubbornly hold on to their beliefs when confronted 
with contradicting evidence (Edwards, 1968). Conservatism has been associated with 
anchoring and adjustment (for example, LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2006), often to explain why 
participants adjust insufficiently. Other commonly discussed biases include overconfidence 
(Odean, 1998), risk aversion (e.g. Bekaert, Hodrick, & Marshall, 1997), and the sunk-cost 
fallacy (Arkes, & Blumer, 1985). 
Very little research has been done on the anchoring bias and the stock market, with an 
article by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) being the most prominent study in the field to 
date. The remainder of the literature review will provide an in-depth analysis of the anchoring 
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and adjustment bias and how it relates to stock market investors.  
2.3 Anchoring and adjustment 
The principle behind anchoring and adjustment was first investigated in a series of 
experiments by Slovic and Lichtenstein on preference reversals (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; 
Slovic, 1967; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968). In their experiments, participants changed their 
preferences depending on how the bet was framed. For example, participants in one 
condition based their decisions almost entirely on how much money they stood to lose with 
the bet (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968). Participants anchored their decisions on the salient 
feature of the bet (the amount to lose) which then had a disproportionate effect on their final 
decisions. By highlighting different features of the bets, the researchers changed 
participants’ anchors and as a result their preferences. 
Although very important to the development of anchoring, these studies lacked in both a 
theoretical framework to describe the phenomenon they studied, and in scope, as all the 
studies were done on preference reversals and bets. It was not until the seminal work done 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) that anchoring and adjustment was formulated as a 
fundamental bias that could affect decisions in a wide array of situations. They demonstrated 
how the bias occurs in bets (similar to Slovic and Lichtenstein), but also in questions of 
general knowledge, subjective probability assessments, and absolute estimates. As such, 
their research set the groundwork for all subsequent studies on anchoring and adjustment. 
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) article on anchoring and adjustment the field has 
developed significantly. Researchers have studied anchoring effects in situations outside of 
the laboratory, including stock markets (Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003), real estate 
(Northcraft & Neale, 1989), auditing (Joyce & Biddle, 1981), courts (Englich & Mussweiler, 
2001; Englich et al., 2006) and car shops (Mussweiler et al., 2000). It has further been used 
to influence consumer’s purchase quantity decisions (Wansink et al., 1998) as well as 
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept decisions (Ariely et al., 2003; Simonson & 
Drolet, 2004; Wu, Cheng, & Li, 2008). Research on university rankings (Bowman & Bastedo, 
2010), negotiations (Galinsky, Ku, & Mussweiler, 2009; Ritov, 1996), and self-perception 
(Kruger, 1999) all found evidence of an anchoring effect. More than just showing the 
prevalence of anchoring effects, these studies all give valuable insight into the anchoring 
process and its characteristics. 
The scope of anchoring research has led to different researchers interpreting the word 
anchoring differently. In broad terms, anchoring and adjustment refers to the assimilation of 
an uncertain judgement towards a salient anchor. However, the word anchoring is also used 
to refer to different aspects of anchoring and adjustment research (Chapman & Johnson, 
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2002). Many researchers use it to refer to an experimental procedure where an 
uninformative number is presented to participants as an anchor before an absolute estimate 
is made. This procedure was first used by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and has since 
been used in most studies on anchoring. The typical anchoring procedure is often referred to 
as the classic anchoring paradigm (Wilson et al., 1996). Anchoring also refers to a 
phenomenon in which a salient but uninformative anchor leads to the assimilation of related 
judgement. Researchers often refer to this as the anchoring effect or the anchoring bias. 
Finally, anchoring can refer to the psychological process through which an anchor affects a 
judgement. When the process is referred to, it is common to refer to the specific process, 
such as selective accessibility (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) or serial- or insufficient 
adjustment (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). 
The following topic will begin by looking at how the anchoring process works. This will be 
followed by an examination of the different anchoring biases. The topic will conclude with a 
look at the characteristics and limitations of the anchoring bias. 
2.3.1 The anchoring process 
Heuristics and biases research typically identifies a systematic bias before proposing a 
mechanism to explain it. The proposed heuristic is based on the bias shown in a set of 
mapping experiments. For anchoring and adjustment, there were four experiments leading to 
the hypothesised anchoring process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, as research on 
anchoring continues, new experimental results cast doubt on the accepted mechanism (for 
example, Wilson et al., 1996) which leads to new processes being developed. 
Understanding the exact nature of the heuristic process is crucial in research on biases. By 
understanding the process, limitations and boundary conditions can be identified. This, in 
turn, can lead to potential debiasing techniques (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). As such, the 
following section is crucial as it shapes our interpretation of all subsequent research. Three 
important stages in the development of the anchoring process will be investigated: 
Insufficient adjustment, selective accessibility, and different anchors–different processes. A 
final section will look at processes that do not fit into these sections. 
2.3.1.1 Insufficient adjustment 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described the anchoring process as follows: 
In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted 
to yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be suggested by the 
formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation. In either case, 
adjustments are typically insufficient. (p. 1128) 
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This concise description contains all the important information by Tversky and Kahneman 
regarding the anchoring process. First, people anchor on a value. This value can either be 
externally provided to participants or it can be self-generated. Second, people adjust from 
this value towards the target judgement. Finally, adjustment tends to be insufficient. 
In the first of four experiments by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), participants were given an 
anchor by spinning a wheel of fortune. Participants then had to guess if the percentage of 
African nations in the United Nations was higher or lower than their anchor. As hypothesised 
by the researchers, participants who received a high anchor gave higher estimates than 
participants who received a low anchor. 
In the second experiment, participants in two groups were given too little time to calculate 
the answer to the same mathematical function (  ) expressed in two ways (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Participants in the high anchor condition received             
    while participants in the low anchor condition received                . 
The researchers hypothesised that participants would calculate the first few steps of the 
function before using their intermediary answer as an anchor. The results confirmed this, 
with participants whose first few steps resulted in a higher anchor giving significantly higher 
estimates than participants whose first steps resulted in a lower answer. Furthermore, 
because the anchor was lower than the target, both groups provided answers significantly 
lower than the target. 
The third experiment discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) was based on an 
experiment conducted by Bar-Hillel (1973) and examined people’s difficulty in estimating 
conjunctive and disjunctive probabilities. A conjunctive proposition is true only if all its 
propositions are true, while a disjunctive proposition is true when any one of its propositions 
is true. In the experiment, participants had to choose whether to bet on a conjunctive, 
disjunctive, or simple proposition. The conjunctive proposition had an overall probability of 
     and the probability of each event was    . The disjunctive proposition had an overall 
probability of      and the probability of each event was    . The simple event had a 
probability of    . As participants were aware of the probability of each event but not the 
overall probability, the conjunctive single-event probability acted as the high anchor while the 
disjunctive probability acted as the low anchor. As expected, when researchers asked 
participants to bet on the events, participants most often bet on the conjunctive event and 
least often on the disjunctive event, even though the disjunctive event was the most 
probable and the conjunctive event the least. Because participants anchored on the 
probability of the initial propositions and then adjusted insufficiently for the number of times 
they needed to occur, they incorrectly estimated the overall probability and thus made 
biased decisions. 
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The fourth and final experiment showed how participants could be internally anchored 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Two groups of participants were used. The first group was 
asked to provide estimates that they were either 10% or 90% sure would be larger than the 
target quantity (for example, the air distance from Delhi to Peking). As people do not adjust 
enough from an anchor, the researchers expected participants’ answers to be too close to 
the actual values. This was confirmed, as the mean quantity provided by the participants in 
the 10% subjective probability condition was larger than the target quantity 24% of the time. 
The second group of participants were provided with the median estimates from the first 
group and asked to estimate how likely it was that these estimates would be larger than the 
target quantities. As the first group gave values with a subjective probability of either 0.1 or 
0.9, the second group should have given similar odds. Instead, the second group gave odds 
of 3:1 rather than 9:1. Tversky and Kahneman hypothesise that this occurred because 
participants used a 1:1 internal anchor which they then adjusted insufficiently to reach a final 
estimate. As such, neither group was explicitly provided with an anchor. Participants in the 
first group were anchored on a value they estimated, while participants in the second group 
were implicitly anchored on a 0.5 probability. 
With these experiments, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) provided evidence for their 
proposed process of anchoring and adjustment. Participants all had an initial value (either 
self-generated or externally-provided) which served as an anchor. Judgements were 
influenced by these anchors and tended to be skewed towards the initial anchors, 
suggesting a process of adjustment. What the experiments by Tversky and Kahneman fail to 
address is why adjustment is insufficient (Lopes, 1982). Since 1974, multiple explanations 
for insufficient adjustment have been proffered, with most revolving around the conservation 
of cognitive effort or the uncertainty of the final answer (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). 
Theories on the conservation of cognitive effort assume that obtaining an anchor is 
automatic while adjustment from the anchor is effortful (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). When 
participants are provided with an anchor, they automatically fixate on the anchor before 
adjusting it. However, as adjustment is effortful, participants attempt to conserve cognitive 
energy (because they are cognitive misers; Fiske & Taylor, 1984) by halting the adjustment 
prematurely. 
The cognitive effort explanation of insufficient adjustment often made use of studies that 
focus on anchors being given too much weight (for example, Kruger, 1999), rather than on 
irrelevant anchors. According to these studies, the integration and weighting of anchors 
require more effort than is given by, or available to the judge. Research by Gilbert (e.g. 
Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988) on cognitive busyness is usually cited as supporting this 
explanation, but no study has explicitly tested the relationship between Gilbert’s work on 
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cognitive busyness and insufficient adjustment (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). 
There are three problems with the cognitive effort explanation of insufficient adjustment. 
First, incentives have little to no influence on the anchoring effect (Wilson et al., 1996). If lack 
of cognitive effort leads to insufficient adjustment, incentives should increase the cognitive 
effort and thus decrease the bias. Second, forewarnings and information regarding the 
anchoring effect fail to reduce the bias (George, Duffy, & Ahuja, 2000; Wilson et al., 1996). If 
a lack of effort leads to an anchoring effect, specifically informing participants of a way to 
decrease the bias should have decreased the bias. As this did not occur, it is unlikely that 
anchoring and adjustment is an effortful process. Third, experts are as affected as non-
experts are by the anchoring effect (Englich et al., 2006). Since experts are better able to 
conserve cognitive effort (Chapman & Johnson, 2002), research comparing experts to lay-
people should have displayed smaller anchoring effects. For these reasons, it is unlikely that 
the insufficient adjustment is caused by a lack of cognitive effort. 
A second line of reasoning focuses on the uncertainty of the abs lute judgment. The most 
popular hypothesis posits that adjustment is insufficient because participants adjust until 
they reach an answer that falls within an acceptable range of answers (Quattrone, 
Lawrence, Finkel, & Andrus, 1981). If participants adjust from an implausible anchor until a 
plausible answer is reached, high anchors would lead to higher judgements and low anchors 
to lower judgements. 
What the uncertainty hypothesis fails to address is how anchoring occurs when the provided 
anchor is within the plausible range (for example, Northcraft & Neale, 1987). According to 
the uncertainty hypothesis, no adjustment should take place when the anchor is plausible. 
However, research has shown that anchoring effects occur with both plausible and 
implausible anchors. Furthermore, extreme anchors lead to more extreme anchoring effects 
(Chapman & Johnson, 1994), and the uncertainty hypothesis fails to explain this finding. 
According to the uncertainty hypothesis, as long as the range of plausible answers remains 
the same, the extremity of the anchor should not affect the estimate. While it is possible that 
extreme anchors could lead to uncertainty in participants (because they assume it is 
relevant; Grice, 1975) thus increasing their probability distribution for possible answers 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b), no research has been conducted to support this theory. This 
explanation seems unlikely, however, as experiments are often overtly designed so as to 
make the anchor uninformative (such as using a wheel of fortune; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, participants who are forewarned about anchoring 
effects show no decrease in anchoring effects. Forewarned participants should be able to 
adjust beyond the first plausible answer, leading to smaller anchoring effects. The failure of 
the uncertainty hypothesis to address these concerns led to researchers proposing alternate 
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mechanisms to explain the anchoring effect. 
2.3.1.2 Selective Accessibility Model 
Because of the shortcomings of the insufficient adjustment model of anchoring and 
adjustment, researchers in the 1990s proposed alternate mechanisms to explain the 
anchoring bias. The most convincing of the proposed mechanisms were the theories 
focusing on semantic priming caused by anchors (see Chapman & Johnson, 1999; 
Kahneman & Knetsch, 1993; Mussweiler & Strack, 1997). Semantic priming occurs when 
thinking about one topic acts as a prime for semantically related topics, allowing them to be 
accessed more readily (Reisberg, 2007). Foremost among these theories is the model of 
selective accessibility proposed by Mussweiler and Strack in 1997. 
In their research, Strack and Mussweiler (1997) investigated how anchoring occurs when 
plausible anchors are used. They hypothesised that if the anchoring bias occurs due to a 
priming effect rather than insufficient adjustment, it would explain ho  anchoring occurs for 
both plausible and implausible mechanisms. Semantic priming would also explain the 
resilience of anchoring. In Strack and Mussweiler’s theory there are three strategies that 
participants use to answer questions in the classic anchoring paradigm: (1) Participants 
know or believe that they know the answer to the question and the anchor has no impact on 
the answer they provide; (2) participants disregard the anchor based on categorical 
knowledge (used when anchors are very implausible, Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a), for 
example “no river is longer than 20,000 km;” and (3) participants create a complex mental 
model (Johnson-Laird, 1983) in which a plausible anchor is tested as a possible answer. 
When an anchor is implausible, participants use insufficient adjustment until a plausible 
anchor is reached (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Once participants have a plausible anchor, 
they make use of complex decisional models (which include hypothesis testing) to obtain a 
better estimate (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). Because hypothesis tests make use of a 
positive test strategy where confirmatory evidence is searched for (Klayman & Ha, 1987; 
Wason, 1960), testing the anchor increases the accessibility of anchor-consistent 
information leading to a knowledge base which is biased towards the anchor. When 
participants subsequently make absolute judgements they depend on easily accessible 
knowledge (Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989) which leads to answers being assimilated to 
the anchor. 
Based on this hypothesis, the researchers argued that research done on priming effects 
should be applicable to the model of selective accessibility but not to the insufficient 
adjustment model (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). To test this, the three characteristics of 
priming effects were tested: (1) Priming effects are only effective if the primed information is 
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applicable to the question; (2) priming effects can lead to contrast effects if the primed 
information is dissimilar enough from the target judgement; and (3), priming effects improve 
the response latency (the time between receiving the question and giving an answer) when 
answering primed questions. 
To test the first characteristic of priming effects, Strack and Mussweiler (1997) conducted an 
experiment with two groups of participants. For the first group, the anchor was semantically 
applicable to the target judgement (height and height). For the second group, the anchor 
was not applicable to the target judgement (height and width). If insufficient adjustment was 
the mechanism of anchoring, the anchor would have had a similar effect on both of these 
questions. However, if selective accessibility took place, the information made accessible by 
the comparative question would only be applicable to the first question and not the second. 
As such, the anchoring effect would only occur in the first question and not in the second. As 
hypothesised, the answers were most biased when the comparative and absolute task had 
the same focus. When the focus of the question changed, the anchoring bias was either 
considerably weaker or non-existent. A similar result was obtained by Chapman and 
Johnson (1994). They found that anchoring effects only occurred when the anchor and 
target were compatible. 
To examine the second characteristic of priming effects, Strack and Mussweiler (1997) 
tested whether anchors could produce contrast effects. Contrast effects occur when highly 
accessible content is used as a comparison standard for a contrasting judgement. This leads 
to answers being biased away from the prime (see Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 
1985). The researchers once again used two conditions, one in which the anchor was 
relevant to the target (Hawaii and Hawaii), and one in which the anchor contrasted with the 
target (Hawaii and Antarctica). If insufficient adjustment was used, the anchor would have 
the same effect regardless of the semantic content. However, if semantic priming was used, 
participants primed with the contrasting anchor would show contrast effects. The results 
confirmed the presence of the selective accessibility mechanism: when the anchor and 
target had the same focus a significant anchoring effect occurred but when the anchor 
contrasted with the target the answer was biased away from the anchor (Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997). 
The final experiment conducted by Strack and Mussweiler (1997) examined the latency of 
participants’ responses to anchoring questions with plausible and implausible anchors. 
Research on semantic priming has shown that highly accessible information leads to lower 
response latencies on related questions (Neely, 1977, 1991). According to the semantic 
priming theory, the response latency for the absolute and comparative questions should be 
negatively correlated. The longer a participant considers whether an anchor is larger or 
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smaller than the target during the comparative question, the more relevant information is 
accessed for the absolute question. The researchers tested this hypothesis using multiple 
common anchoring questions with either plausible or implausible anchors. As plausible 
anchors can be contradicted using categorical knowledge (thus accessing very little 
applicable knowledge), they were expected to have a low response latency for the 
comparative question and a high response latency for absolute questions. In contrast, 
plausible anchors which require complex models were expected to have a high response 
latency for comparative questions and a low response latency for absolute questions. The 
results from the experiment supported this, with a strong negative correlation being found 
between the response latencies on comparative and absolute questions. All three 
experiments conducted by Strack and Mussweiler (1997) thus supported a semantic priming 
model of anchoring, rather than an insufficient adjustment model. 
According to the selective accessibility model of anchoring there are two phases of 
anchoring (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b). The first phase is the selection of an anchor. In the 
classic anchoring paradigm selection is simplified as participants are provided with an 
anchor by the researchers. However, the selection of an anchor may play an important role 
in everyday situations (Mussweiler et al., 2004). Anchors may be selected because 
conversational inferences suggest that they are relevant (Grice, 1975), because they are 
easily accessible, or because they are generated during an insufficient adjustment process 
(as with implausible anchors). In the second phase, participants compare the anchor to the 
target judgement, leading to the heightened accessibility of anchor-consistent information. 
To test if anchoring activates anchor-consistent information, Mussweiler and Strack (2000a) 
made use of a lexical diction task. Their results showed that participants who were provided 
with a high car price had lower latencies when identifying words associated with expensive 
cars (for example, BMW), than those provided with a low car price, and vice versa. This 
further supports the theory that anchors lead to the activation of anchor-consistent 
information. 
This model has a few important implications. First, prompts to consider anchor-consistent 
information should have no effect on the anchoring bias (as that information is already 
activated), while prompts to consider anchor-inconsistent information should debias the 
effect (supported by Chandon & Wansink, 2007; Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler et 
al., 2000). Second, since activation is an automatic process, random or irrelevant anchors 
will have as significant an effect as informative anchors (supported by Cervone & Peake, 
1984; Chapman & Johnson, 1994, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b; Russo & Shoemaker, 
1989; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Third, any factor that allows more anchor-consistent 
information to be made accessible will lead to larger anchoring effects (Chapman & 
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Johnson, 1999). Chapman and Johnson (1999) tested these hypotheses and their results 
supported the presence of a semantic priming model of anchoring. 
The model of selective accessibility also provides an explanation for the robustness of the 
anchoring bias found in earlier studies. When participants answer the absolute question 
using a biased information pool, providing forewarnings that participants should “adjust 
more” is unlikely to be effective (Wilson et al., 1996). In a study on decision support systems 
(George et al., 2000), participants who provided answers too close to the anchor were 
informed that their answers were biased and given an opportunity to change them. However, 
because participants’ judgements were supported by their available knowledge, participants 
were unaware of the direction and size of the bias. This led to participants in both the high 
and low anchor conditions adjusting their estimates downwards. 
Similarly, because knowledge accessibility effects are primarily automatic processes, they 
are unaffected by effortful thought (Higgins, 1996). As such, incentives to engage in more 
effortful thought are unlikely to affect the anchoring bias. The only way in which effortful 
thinking could reduce the anchoring bias is if the content of the additional thinking was 
systematically different from the content accessed earlier (Epley & Gilovich, 2005). However, 
there is no reason to believe that this will be the case. In research on incentives, Arkes 
(1991) concluded that incentives had very little impact on assimilation effects. 
Due to the strong weight of evidence in support of the selective accessibility model of 
anchoring it is the primary model used to explain the anchoring bias. Some research has, 
however, contested the pervasiveness of the selective accessibility model of anchoring. The 
following section will look at the work by Epley and Gilovich which argues that different 
anchors result in different processes. 
2.3.1.3 Different anchors, different processes 
In 2000, Mussweiler and Strack stated that “it seems unlikely that—given the diversity of 
paradigms—all assimilation effects that have been labelled anchoring effects are mediated 
by the same mechanism” (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a, p. 1050). Shortly thereafter, Epley 
and Gilovich (2001) hypothesised that different anchors would lead to different psychological 
mechanisms.  
When participants are given externally-provided anchors, they have to consider the 
possibility that the anchor itself could be the correct answer, no matter how fleetingly (Epley 
& Gilovich, 2001). This leads to the activation of anchor-consistent information and thus the 
selective accessibility process. By contrast, when participants generate the anchor 
themselves they never consider the possibility that the anchor is the correct answer. Instead, 
they engage in a process of continuous adjustment where they adjust from the anchor, 
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examine the adjusted value, and then adjust it more until they feel that it is accurate. 
Epley and Gilovich (2001) tested this hypothesis in three experiments. In the first 
experiment, participants were asked to verbalise their thoughts while completing anchoring 
questions. Participants who were provided with anchors were significantly less likely to 
describe a process of continuous adjustment than participants who generated their own 
anchors. This provided preliminary support for the researchers’ hypothesis. 
The second and third experiments (Epley & Gilovich, 2001) used the same questions as the 
first experiment but asked participants to engage in behaviours designed to make them more 
likely to accept or reject their adjusted answers (for example, nodding their heads; Wells & 
Petty, 1980). The results showed that when participants nodded their heads they had a 
lower response time and a stronger bias, but only with self-generated anchors. When the 
anchor was experimenter-provided there was no significant difference in participants’ 
response times or answers. These findings were repeated in another experiment by Epley 
and Gilovich (2004). This effect can be explained by insufficient adjustment but not by 
selective accessibility. As such, it supports Epley and Gilovich’s hypothesis that different 
anchors lead to different processes. 
In a follow-up study, Epley and Gilovich (2005) found that financial incentives affected self-
generated anchors but not externally-provided anchors. This is in line with their hypothesis 
that different anchors lead to different processes, as motivation and effortful thinking should 
affect adjustment (which is an effortful process; Epley & Gilovich, 2001) but not selective 
accessibility (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). A second experiment from the same study tested 
the effects of forewarnings on self-generated and experimenter-provided anchors (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2005). As in previous studies, self-generated and experimenter-provided anchors 
responded differently to the manipulation, with only self-generated anchors being affected by 
the warnings. This, together with the research by Epley and Gilovich (2001), provides 
convincing evidence for different anchors effecting different processes. 
As Mussweiler and Strack wrote in their article on the semantics of anchoring and 
adjustment: 
With such a perspective on psychological processes rather than judgmental effects we 
may well find that what has previously been considered as instantiations of one 
judgmental heuristic called ‘anchoring’ is actually a conglomeration of fairly diverse 
phenomena whose similarity rests solely on the net outcome they produce. (Mussweiler & 
Strack, 2001, p. 253) 
The research by Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004, 2005) confirmed this. Research on 
anchoring and adjustment has continued to find situations in which mechanisms other than 
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selective accessibility and insufficient adjustment are used. 
2.3.1.4 Other mechanisms 
One of the earliest anchoring mechanisms proposed that participants base their answer on 
the anchor because it is mentioned by the researcher. According to Grice (1975), people 
assume that any contribution to a conversation is relevant and appropriate to the 
conversation at that stage. In anchoring experiments, participants assume that the 
information that researchers give is relevant to the question at hand leading to answers 
which are biased towards the anchor (Schwarz, 1994). An experiment by Chapman and 
Johnson (1999) showed that anchors which were perceived as more informative led to larger 
anchoring effects, which provides some support for a conversational account of anchoring. 
However, in all the studies conducted on uninformative anchors (including Chapman & 
Johnson, 1999) clearly uninformative anchors—such as the last two digits of participants’ 
social security numbers or numbers obtained by spinning a wheel of fortune—still lead to a 
significant anchoring effect (for example, Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Mussweiler & Strack, 
2000b). 
A second suggested mechanism focuses on numerical priming. Kahneman and Knetsch 
(1993) suggested that anchoring could occur due to a “backward priming” mechanism where 
people consider any number in short-term memory as a possible answer. Wilson et al. 
(1996) expanded on this theory by suggesting that attention to a numerical anchor increases 
the accessibility of the number itself and of the numbers surrounding it. This leads to an 
increased probability of those numbers being selected in subsequent estimates. To test the 
numerical priming model (which they called basic anchoring; Wilson et al., 1996) the 
researchers conducted a series of experiments where the anchor was never consciously 
compared to the target. Instead, these experiments first entered the anchor into participants’ 
short term memory (for example, by having participants write down pages of similar numbers 
as part of a handwriting experiment) before seeing if the anchor affected absolute 
judgements. Their experiments showed clear evidence of a basic anchoring effect. However, 
a basic anchoring effect was only present if participants paid sufficient attention to the 
anchor. In Wilson et al.’s experiment, only participants who performed computations on the 
number or who copied multiple pages of the number showed a basic anchoring effect. The 
need for sufficient attention was confirmed in an experiment by Wu et al. (2008). 
Wong and Kwong (2000) added to the theory of basic anchoring by proposing that the 
numerical anchor is stored only as an absolute value while prefixes (such as the negative 
sign) and affixes (such as the unit of measurement) are stored separately. This led to the 
hypothesis that the absolute value of the number, not its real value, will serve as an anchor. 
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The researchers also argued that basic anchoring, rather than selective accessibility, is the 
primary anchoring process. These hypotheses were supported in a series of three 
experiments where semantically identical but numerically different anchors (such as 7300m 
and 7.3km) were given to participants. Their results showed that the numerically higher 
anchor (when prefixes and affixes are ignored) led to significantly higher estimates that the 
semantically identical anchor. 
Wong and Kwong’s (2000) experiments make three claims that contradict the selective 
accessibility model: (1) the absolute value rather than semantic value influences the 
subsequent numeric judgement; (2) the affix of the anchor (such as the unit) is often ignored 
in anchoring; and (3) one number can serve as both a high and low anchor depending on 
the unit the judgement is expressed in. However, Wong and Kwong’s findings are yet to be 
repeated and most studies on numeric priming have found the results to be less convincing 
(for example, Brewer & Chapman, 2002; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). 
Brewer and Chapman (2002) found that random numbers do not consistently lead to basic 
anchoring effects. They also found that more extreme anchors did not lead to bigger 
anchoring effects, as the numerical priming account would expect. In another study, Englich 
(2008) found that participants who had target-relevant information were unaffected by basic 
anchoring but not by semantically related anchors. There is also research that suggests that 
basic anchors might still lead to a selective accessibility process. Specifically, an experiment 
on subliminal anchors (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005) found that subliminally presented 
anchors led to the activation of anchor-consistent information (measured by response speed 
in a lexical diction task). While there has been no further research on the topic, it does 
suggest that basic anchoring could be mediated by selective accessibility.  
There is also significant evidence to contradict Wong and Kwong’s (2000) assertion that 
numerical priming is the primary anchoring process. Research on the durability of anchoring 
has shown that anchoring effects in the standard anchoring paradigm could be present for 
more than one week (Mussweiler, 2001). This is conceivable with the selective accessibility 
model where information relevant to the question can remain activated and relatively 
unaffected for such a duration (Srull & Wyer, 1979), but cannot be explained by basic 
anchoring effects where the multitude of numbers encountered in everyday life will replace 
the numerical anchor. Further research by Mussweiler and Strack (2001) used Wong and 
Kwong’s (2000) research method to test if basic anchoring effects can co-occur with 
selective accessibility. The researchers conclude that basic anchoring effects can occur, but 
only in situations where semantic influences are deliberately minimised. As such, it is likely 
that numerical priming is an exception rather than the rule, with most anchoring effects being 
explained by selective accessibility.  
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Another anchoring process, known as physical anchoring, was discovered by LeBoeuf and 
Shafir in 2006. In a series of creative experiments based on the classic anchoring paradigm, 
the researchers replaced the anchor and target judgement with physical measurements such 
as weights or lengths. In the first experiment, for example, participants were provided with 
either a long or short line which they were asked to extend or shorten until it was 3.5 inches 
long. As is typical in studies on anchoring and adjustment, participants who were provided 
with a long line (or high anchor) provided a longer estimate than participants who were 
provided with a short line. These findings were repeated in multiple experiments, including 
experiments on weight and volume. Although possible, it is unlikely that these effects are 
explained by semantic priming. Instead, the researchers suggest a “psychological tendency 
to adjust insufficiently in tasks that involve such estimation via adjustment” (p. 403). 
Closely related to physical anchoring effects is research on magnitude priming 
(Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf & Brewer, 2008). Magnitude priming occurs when physical anchors 
cross-modally bias numerical judgements. This is to say that large or small anchors in one 
mode (for example, lengths) can lead to large or small judgements in another mode (such as 
numbers). In one experiment by Oppenheimer et al., participants who were instructed to 
draw short lines gave lower numerical answers to subsequent questions than participants 
instructed to draw long lines. 
Magnitude priming, as with physical anchoring effects, is difficult to attribute to either 
selective accessibility or insufficient adjustment. It is impossible to adjust from the length of a 
line to the mean temperature in Germany, and similarly, the length of a line is unlikely to 
activate information on the mean temperature of Germany (Oppenheimer et al., 2008). 
Instead, it appears that these anchors prime general notions of largeness or smallness 
which in turn influence subsequent judgements. 
2.3.2 Types of anchors 
As the research by Epley and Gilovich (2001) shows, the type of anchor provided 
determines the anchoring mechanisms used, which has important implications for the 
anchoring effect. As such, readers should be aware of the anchor type when interpreting any 
research on anchoring and adjustment. The following section will look at the original 
categorisation of anchors into externally-provided anchors and self-generated anchors 
(Epley & Gilovich, 2001) before examining more recent research by Epley and Gilovich 
(2010) which expands the different anchor types to five. The section will conclude with a 
discussion on how anchor types will be used in the present study. 
2.3.2.1 Externally-provided and self-generated anchors 
The most common division of anchors separates self-generated anchors from externally-
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provided anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). These two anchor types have received 
considerable research and their effects are well documented. As the underlying processes 
for these anchor types are well understood, they present the most useful categorisation for 
research on anchoring and adjustment. Almost all research on anchoring and adjustment to 
date has, however, made use of externally-provided anchors. Only a few studies by Epley 
and Gilovich (2001, 2004, and 2005) have specifically examined the effect of self-generated 
anchors. 
Externally-provided anchors are typically used in the two-stage experimental design 
pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). In the first stage, called the comparative 
question, participants are asked to compare the anchor to the target judgement. This is done 
by asking if the anchor is higher or lower than the target judgement. The aim of the 
comparative question is to make the anchor salient to the participant (Strack & Mussweiler, 
1997). In the second stage, called the absolute question, participants are asked to estimate 
the target value.  
Not all externally-provided anchors are provided using the two-stage design, however. In a 
one-stage design, the anchor is provided (typically as part of an information bundle) but 
there is no comparative question. As there is no comparative question, studies using a one-
stage design rely on the anchor being a salient piece of information. Just as important as the 
anchor being salient, however, is that the anchor must be uninformative. Any effect that an 
uninformative anchor has on a judgement is necessarily a bias. In a study on real estate 
agents, the estate agents were provided with a full dossier on a house before being taken to 
see it (Northcraft & Neale, 1989). Included in the dossier was the house’s listing price, a 
value which is uninformative according to normative theory but highly salient. Some 
participants were given a high listing price, others a low listing price, and the effects of these 
anchors on the absolute judgement were analysed. This is one of the first examples of a 
one-stage experimental design. 
It is important to note that the mechanism leading to the anchoring bias in one-stage designs 
has not yet been studied. When the anchor is a salient comparison standard, such as the 
listing price of a house or the past price of a share (Northcraft & Neale, 1989; Mussweiler & 
Schneller, 2003), participants are likely to compare the anchor with the target judgement, 
resulting in the selective accessibility process. However, not all externally-provided anchors 
are salient comparison standards. For example, in an experiment on value estimates, Wu et 
al. (2008) provided participants with multiple numerically similar, but unrelated numbers (890 
professionals worked on the product, it had been purchased by 900 clients, and it was going 
on sale in 850 sales offices worldwide) before asking them to estimate the value of a 
product. In this experiment, the anchoring process used is less clear. Mussweiler et al. 
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(2004) suggest that an anchor might be selected because it is easily accessible and comes 
to mind when the target is being evaluated. Numerical priming, caused by the repetition of 
the anchor, could lead to salient numbers which are not comparison standards being 
selected as anchors. These anchors would then lead to selective accessibility. An alternative 
explanation is offered by basic anchoring effects. The study by Wu et al. (2008) shares many 
similarities with research on basic anchoring effects, including a need for the anchor to be 
repeated multiple times for anchoring to occur. As such a pure numeric priming mechanism 
might also lead to the anchoring bias. This study shows the risk of assuming that all 
externally-provided anchors make use of the same mechanism. 
According to Epley and Gilovich (2001), self-generated anchors differ from externally-
provided anchors in that they are never considered as potential answers. As such, no 
activation takes place and selective accessibility cannot occur. Instead, participants serially 
adjust from the anchor until they find a plausible answer. To test this, the researchers 
evoked self-generated anchors by asking questions which had a salient, but incorrect, 
starting point (for example, “what is the freezing point of vodka?” which evokes an anchor of 
0°C). Self-generated anchors are not only present in general knowledge questions, however. 
In a study on physical anchoring effects, participants were asked to draw a 3.5 inch line 
(LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2006). The researchers found that while the short anchor resulted in 
shorter lines than the long anchor, not providing participants with any anchor led to the 
shortest lines, which implies that participants anchored on a “zero-anchor.” The short and 
long anchors were thus externally provided, but the zero-anchor was self-generated. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) also made use of a zero-anchor condition in their experiment 
on subjective probabilities. In this experiment, the researchers suggest that participants 
anchor on odds of 1:1 from which they adjust insufficiently. Yet another example of a self-
generated anchor used by Tversky and Kahneman is found in their second experiment, 
where participants were asked to estimate the value of   . By completing some of the 
computations, participants generated an anchor which they knew was wrong. 
When determining which anchoring process will be used, the most important characteristic of 
self-generated anchors is that they are incorrect beyond consideration (Epley & Gilovich, 
2001). The moment participants need to test the hypothesis that the anchor might be correct, 
no matter how unlikely it is, anchor-consistent information is activated and the selective 
accessibility process biases the judgement. However, not all self-generated anchors are 
beyond consideration. For example, Epley and Gilovich (2001) asked participants to name 
the year in which George Washington was elected president. Participants were assumed to 
anchor on the year that the United States declared independence (1776) before adjusting 
upwards. However, in contexts where American history is not as well known, participants 
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might consider the year of independence as a viable alternative, leading to selective 
accessibility. Similarly, the incomplete computation and zero-line anchors mentioned earlier 
might be beyond consideration, but 1:1 odds on a confidence interval are certainly not. 
Similar to externally-provided anchors, self-generated anchors do not guarantee the 
occurrence of a specific anchoring process. Because of this, it is necessary to look at 
alternative methods of categorising anchors. 
2.3.2.2 Five types of anchors 
Epley and Gilovich (2010) examine potential ways in which anchoring and adjustment 
research can be broadened. One of the ways in which the researchers suggest that 
anchoring research can expand is by examining different anchor types. The researchers 
discuss five anchor types currently being researched: 
Intuitive approximations 
Best- and worst-case scenarios 
Incidental anchors 
Environmental suggestions 
Magnitude priming 
Intuitive approximations, also called self-generated anchors in previous research (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2001), are approximations that individuals use before making a final decision. 
Individuals know that these approximations are incorrect so they are used as starting points 
from which serial adjustment occurs. Adjustment typically stops once individuals reach a 
plausible answer (Epley & Gilovich, 2004). 
Best- and worst-case scenarios concern individuals’ difficulties in evaluating probabilities. 
When participants anchor on a best-case scenario, the anchoring bias leads to estimations 
the underestimate delays or difficulties. When participants anchor and adjust from the worst 
possible outcome, their final expectations tend to be pessimistic (Rosenzweig, Epley and 
Gilovich, 2009 as cited in Epley and Gilovich, 2010). This area links up with Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1974) initial research on conjunctive and disjunctive probabilities. 
Incidental anchors are anchors found in everyday life which are completely unrelated to the 
judgement to be made (Epley & Gilovich, 2010). For example, research has shown that the 
name of a restaurant (“Bistro 19” or “Bistro 97”) can serve as an anchor that affects the price 
individuals are willing to pay for food (Crichter & Gilovich, 2008). Although the effects of such 
incidental anchors are small, they are not insignificant. Incidental anchors might be related to 
basic anchoring where mere exposure to a number is enough to bias estimates (Wilson et 
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al., 1996). 
Environmental suggestion anchors are anchors which participants believe to be meaningful 
or informative. A house’s listing price (as used in Northcraft & Neale, 1989) can, for example, 
be an environmental suggestion, because people believe the listing value to hold a clue to 
the house’s worth. The sentence proposed by a lawyer in a criminal case (as examined by 
Englich & Mussweiler, 2001) is another example of an environmental suggestion. 
The final anchor type, magnitude priming, is found when participants are anchored on small 
or large magnitudes. This anchor significantly affects participants’ judgements in unrelated 
matters of magnitude. For example, in a study by Oppenheimer et al. (2008), participants 
were asked to draw lines of differing lengths before judging the mean temperature in July in 
Honolulu. The length of the line was shown to act as an anchor of magnitude for the 
subsequent absolute judgements. 
While the five categories proposed by Epley and Gilovich (2010) are more up to date and 
precise than the original categorisation (Epley & Gilovich, 2001), the processes at work in 
these categories have not yet been tested or researched. As such, it is difficult to predict 
how these anchors would affect judgements in situations of uncertainty. 
As none of the taxonomies are able to categorise the anchor according to the resultant 
anchoring process, it becomes crucial to understand the conditions which lead to the 
different anchoring mechanisms. Unfortunately, research on the processes is itself filled with 
contradictions and uncertainty. With these shortcomings in mind, the present paper will refer 
to anchors based on the process they are expected to evoke. In the literature review, when 
no process is mentioned, the selective accessibility model will be assumed as current 
research suggests it is the most commonly used mechanism.  
2.3.3 Characteristics of anchoring  
With the anchoring processes and anchor types understood, it is possible to look at the 
characteristics of anchoring. Perhaps the most studied attribute of anchoring is its 
robustness. Uninformative anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), extreme anchors 
(Chapman & Johnson, 1994), awareness of the anchoring bias (George et al., 2000), 
motivation to provide accurate answers (Wilson et al., 1996), expertise and familiarity 
(Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Wright & Anderson, 1980), and information-rich settings 
(Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003) have all failed to diminish the anchoring bias. As such, the 
robustness of anchors will be the first characteristic discussed. Following the section on 
robustness will be a discussion on the durability of anchoring. The final characteristic 
examined will be the malleability of anchoring. 
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2.3.3.1 Robustness 
Epley and Gilovich (2010) describe the first wave of anchoring research as focusing on the 
anchoring phenomenon and its limitations. However, most research on the limitations of 
anchoring and adjustment found it to be remarkably robust, rebuffing any attempts at 
manipulation. Research on the robustness of anchoring can be divided into six categories: 
Uninformative anchors, extreme anchors, forewarnings, motivation, expertise, and the 
availability of information. These will be looked at separately. 
Uninformative anchors 
Uninformative anchors have formed part of anchoring research since its beginning. In the 
first study on anchoring, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) provided participants with an anchor 
chosen by spinning a wheel of fortune. This was done to highlight that the anchor was 
random and not informative in any way. Since this study, most researchers have attempted 
to emphasise the uninformativeness of their anchors in some way. This stops participants 
from inferring that the anchor is relevant (Grice, 1975), and also makes any effect of the 
anchor nonnormative. 
Researchers have used many different techniques to make anchors uninformative. Russo 
and Shoemaker (1989) used participants’ telephone numbers as anchors, while Chapman 
and Johnson (1999), Simonson and Drolet (2004), and Ariely et al. (2003), used participants’ 
social security numbers. Mussweiler and Strack (2000b) and Englich et al. (2006) had 
participants roll a die to determine the anchor. All these studies obtained significant 
anchoring effects. 
A further way of making the anchor uninformative is to choose an anchor that is 
uninformative according to prevailing theories and norms. Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) 
made use of this strategy by having stock market investors anchor on past share prices. 
According to the efficient markets hypothesis, past price changes have no influence on 
future price changes and should be ignored (Fama, 1970). Northcraft and Neale (1987) 
made use of a similar uninformative anchor by having participants anchor on a property’s 
listing price. According to normative theory, what the seller is asking for real estate should 
have no effect on the value and thus the appraisal of the property. Yet both the study by 
Northcraft and Neale and the study by Mussweiler and Schneller found a significant 
interaction between the anchor and the absolute estimate, even with participants who 
declared that the anchor was irrelevant to their judgement. 
When an informative anchor is used, researchers occasionally undermine the source of the 
anchor to make it less informative. In a study by Englich and Mussweiler (2001) conducted 
on judges, the researchers informed the judges that the prosecutor’s demand (which served 
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as the anchor) was made by a first-year computer-science student. The anchor, which could 
normally be seen as informative, was thus turned into an uninformative anchor by 
undermining the validity of the source. As in all previous studies, the anchoring bias was 
unaffected by the informativeness of the anchor. 
Extreme anchors 
A second approach used to test the limits of anchoring is to make use of extreme anchors. 
There are two reasons for this: First, extreme anchors are typically implausible which 
researchers assumed would make them less likely to be used. Second, extreme anchors 
were expected to have a proportionately smaller impact on the anchoring effect. 
In line with research on uninformative anchors it was found that extreme anchors led to an 
anchoring effect (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Quattrone et al., 1981). In a study by 
Chapman and Johnson (1994) the researchers used the price of lottery tickets as an anchor. 
The anchor was either higher than the lottery’s maximum prize or lower than the lottery’s 
minimum prize, making it extremely unrealistic. The researchers found that the extreme 
anchors still resulted in a significant anchoring effect  
Of greater import to this study is the size of the anchoring effect. Research by Quattrone et 
al. (1981) found that extreme anchors do not lead to a proportionately extreme bias. The 
researchers asked participants if the number of Beatles albums that reached the top 10 were 
more or less than 100,025 before eliciting an absolute judgement. As expected, the 
anchoring effect was not proportionate to the size of the anchor. This finding was supported 
by Chapman and Johnson (1994). This is not, however, to say that extreme anchors have no 
effect. In the study by Chapman and Johnson, extremely high anchors resulted in the same 
estimates as high anchors, but extremely low anchors resulted in significantly smaller 
answers than non-extreme low anchors. Chapman and Bornstein (1996) found that both 
high and low extreme anchors led to a more significant bias, a finding which was repeated 
by Mussweiler and Strack (1999b). 
A combination of the serial adjustment and semantic priming models provides the best 
explanation for these results. In situations with extreme anchors, categorical knowledge is 
used to make the comparative judgement leading to the activation of very little information 
(Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Instead, participants serially adjust from the extreme anchor 
until an anchor is reached which cannot be disqualified using categorical knowledge. 
Participants then compare the more plausible anchor with the target assessment, resulting in 
selective accessibility. The explanation suggests that extreme anchors might lead to a larger 
(but not proportionately larger) bias. Since participants serially adjust from the extreme 
anchors until a plausible anchor is reached, there will be little to no difference between 
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different extreme anchors. However, there will be a difference between the extreme anchor 
and a plausible anchor, since participants with the extreme anchor will continue adjusting 
until they reach the edge of the distribution of plausible answers. Using this anchor (which 
should be further from the target judgement than any other plausible anchor) they engage in 
hypothesis testing. 
In research on basic anchoring, Brewer and Chapman (2002) found that more extreme basic 
anchors did not lead to larger anchoring effects. This finding is difficult to explain using a 
pure numeric priming account, as an extreme anchor will not prime the same numbers as a 
plausible anchor. 
Forewarnings 
As neither uninformative nor extreme anchors decreased the anchoring bias, researchers 
tested the effects of forewarnings on the anchoring effect. As researchers believed that 
anchoring was caused by insufficient adjustment, they assumed that warning participants 
would lead to a purposeful increase in the adjustment and thus a decrease in the anchoring 
effect. However, since most anchoring effects are caused by the selective accessibility 
process, forewarnings had little effect. 
The first study on the topic was by Quattrone et al. (1981) which showed that forewarnings 
had little or no impact on subsequent judgements. In a later study, Wilson et al. (1996) 
tested the effect of different warnings at different times during the classic anchoring 
paradigm. The researchers found no evidence that forewarnings significantly diminished the 
anchoring effect. The most powerful forewarning effect was found in the after-initial estimate 
condition where participants first gave an estimate before being warned of the anchoring 
effect and, importantly, its direction. Afterwards, participants were given an opportunity to 
provide a new answer. However, even after the warnings participants still showed a highly 
significant anchoring effect. Furthermore, as participants were explicitly informed of the 
direction of the bias, their subsequent adjustment can best be explained as a demand effect 
(Wilson et al., 1996). 
Wilson et al.’s (1996) results were repeated in a study on decision support systems (George 
et al., 2000). Participants who gave an estimate too close to the anchor were provided with a 
warning. The results showed that although participants adjusted away from the anchor after 
the warning, the adjustment was not statistically significant. Furthermore, because anchoring 
occurs unintentionally and outside of conscious awareness, it was difficult for participants to 
know how much to adjust (George et al., 2000). This problem was exacerbated by the 
anchor being unclear (it was embedded in a dossier filled with potential anchors) as 
participants were unaware of both the size and the direction of the adjustment required. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
33 
 
Before concluding that forewarnings are generally ineffective at reducing the anchoring bias 
it is important to note that they are effective in certain situations. Specifically, forewarnings 
have effectively reduced the bias when participants made use of self-generated anchors 
rather than externally-provided anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2005). Because self-generated 
anchors are consciously adjusted, warning participants that this adjustment will be 
insufficient results in participants adjusting the anchor more before reaching an estimate. 
Motivation 
The idea that motivation might influence the anchoring bias stems directly from the 
insufficient adjustment theory. According to this theory, participants conserve cognitive 
energy by adjusting only until a plausible answer is reached (Quattrone et al., 1981). As 
such, motivating participants to provide more accurate answers should motivate participants 
to expend more cognitive energy and thus adjust more. Another theory proposed that 
participants who are low on motivation are more likely to see the anchor as a hint of an 
expected answer (Schwarz, 1994). 
An experiment by Ariely et al. (2003) had participants make purchase offers for certain 
consumer products. Participants showed a significant anchoring effect using irrelevant 
anchors (participants’ social security numbers) even though participants knew they would be 
held accountable for their offers. As the objects were fairly expensive ($70 average), it is 
safe to assume that participants were motivated to provide accurate answers. Wilson et al. 
(1996) also tested the effects of motivation on anchoring and adjustment. Before the 
experiment started, participants were told that the person who gave the most accurate 
answer to a specific question would win a prize. Participants in the incentive condition were 
told that the relevant question was the anchoring question, while participants in the no-
incentive condition were told the relevant question was an unrelated question. Participants in 
the incentive condition reported being less influenced by the anchor. However, the results 
showed that motivation did not lead to a diminished anchoring bias. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), and Chapman and Johnson (2002) report similar findings. 
In contrast with these results, Wright and Anderson (1989) found incentives to have a 
marginally significant effect on anchoring and adjustment. Their questions differed from 
Wilson et al.’s (1996) in that they asked for judgements of event probabilities. Given this 
difference, it is possible that different questions are differently affected by motivation. For 
example, the questions asked by Wright and Anderson lend themselves more to systematic 
calculation. One question asked participants to estimate the probability that a randomly 
chosen Fortune 1000 CEO earns more than $300,000 a year. Unmotivated participants 
might rely on intuitive estimates to provide an answer, while motivated participants could 
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start by reasoning that the top 250 CEO’s certainly earn more than $300,000 a year, which 
means that, at the very least, there is a minimum probability of 0.25. Both systematic 
reasoning and intuitive assumptions are affected by anchoring, but they may have different 
probability distributions for certain answers. According to Mussweiler and Strack (2000b), an 
estimate’s probability distribution depends on the knowledge of a participant, and, as such, 
additional computations should lead to a tighter probability distribution and thus a smaller 
bias. 
Epley and Gilovich (2005) found that motivation only affected responses on questions with 
self-generated anchors but not questions with externally-provided anchors. This is in-line 
with research showing that self-generated anchors are less robust than experimenter-
provided anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). 
Expertise 
Perhaps one of the most significant characteristics of anchoring and adjustment is that it is 
unaffected by expertise. Because experts make greater use of specialised heuristics and are 
typically more knowledgeable, researchers predicted that experts would be resistant to 
anchoring effects (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). However, multiple studies have since 
rebuffed this assumption. Research on auditors (Joyce & Biddle, 1981), realtors (Northcraft 
& Neale, 1989), school teachers (Caverni & Pris, 1990) automobile mechanics (Mussweiler 
et al., 2000), investors (Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003), and judges (Englich & Mussweiler, 
2001; Englich et al., 2006) have shown that experts in all fields of expertise are affected by 
the anchoring bias. In Englich et al. (2006), the researchers found no significant difference 
between the answers of experts and non-experts, except that experts felt more confident in 
their judgements. They conclude that experts mistakenly think that they are less susceptible 
to the anchoring effect. 
Mussweiler and Strack (2000b) argue that general expertise has no effect on the anchoring 
bias while specific knowledge does. This is to say that experts can use their field-specific 
knowledge to decrease the range of answers, but within this range experts are as affected 
as non-experts. This explains why Wilson et al. (1996) found no bias in participants high on 
expertise, as the researchers confounded general expertise and knowledge of the answers. 
The effects of knowledge on the anchoring effect will be discussed in greater detail in a later 
section. 
Availability of information 
A final way in which the robustness of the anchoring effect has been tested is by making use 
of an information-rich setting. With more information presented to participants, researchers 
hypothesised that participants would depend less on the anchor and more on the relevant 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
35 
 
information. 
Northcraft and Neale’s (1987) research on estate agents was one of the first studies to make 
use of an information-rich setting. Participants were presented with information on the real 
estate sales for an entire city and the neighbourhood in which the property was situated, 
information about the property such as its size and condition, information on other properties 
in the neighbourhood, information on properties that failed to sell and information on other 
properties in the neighbourhood that were for sale. Participants were also taken to view the 
property in person. Even with all this information, the researchers found a significant 
anchoring effect for both amateurs and experts. 
Chapman and Johnson (1999) experimentally tested the effect of information-rich settings on 
the anchoring effect. Participants were manipulated to have more or less information 
available on a given topic. The researchers surprisingly found that participants with more 
information available displayed a greater, rather than smaller, anchoring effect. This finding 
is explained by hypothesis-consistent testing (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b). Because people 
search for evidence confirming, rather than contradicting, their hypotheses (Klayman & Ha, 
1987, Sanbonmastu, Posavac, Kardes, & Mantel, 1998), information-rich settings may lead 
to a larger bias as they include more anchor-consistent evidence for people to draw from. A 
similar finding was obtained in a study on the effects of mood on the anchoring bias (Englich 
& Soder, 2009). The researchers found that participants who engaged in more elaborate 
thinking showed a larger rather than smaller bias. 
Taken together, the robustness of anchoring presents a considerable threat to stock market 
investors. It implies that investors would, for example, anchor on the prediction of a future 
growth made by a firm’s publicist, regardless of the implausibility or extremity of the anchor. 
This anchor would be expected to influence amateur and expert investors alike, and the 
financial incentive for accurate assessments inherent in investing is unlikely to affect the 
anchoring bias. Furthermore, this anchor could have a significant impact even when there is 
a substantial amount of unbiased information available. In fact, the bias could be larger 
specifically because of the information-rich nature of investing. Perhaps the most 
problematic finding, however, is that warning investors about the anchoring effect is unlikely 
to reduce the bias. 
2.3.3.2 Durability 
Anchoring and adjustment is not only robust and impervious to external manipulations, it is 
also temporally robust, or durable (Mussweiler, 2001). This is to say that anchoring effects 
can persist over long periods of time with little to no change to the bias. This result is not 
surprising as experiments on priming have shown that knowledge accessibility effects can 
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last for up to a week (see Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). Tulving, Schacter, and Stark (1982), 
found that participants who were given a list of 96 words as primes had forgotten most of the 
words after a week, but still showed a significant priming effect. In contrast, Srull and Wyer 
(1980) found priming effects to become significantly weaker over time. The difference 
between these results could have to do with the frequency with which the primes are 
encountered in everyday life. Srull and Wyer primed participants with hostility towards a 
specific person rather than on words. Priming effects are only maintained if the primed 
individual has little interaction with the primed target before the effects are measured. If the 
individual frequently interacts with the target, new interactions serve as new priming events, 
undermining the effects of the experimental prime (Wyer & Srull, 1989). New primes only 
lessen the original priming effect if the interactions contradict the experimental prime. As 
such, it is unlikely to occur with primed words as any interactions with the primed word 
should reinforce the prime. 
Mussweiler (2001) tested the durability of anchoring effects and compared it with the 
durability of other knowledge accessibility effects. Importantly, the researcher hypothesised 
that anchoring effects would be more durable than other knowledge accessibility effects 
because of the different way in which knowledge is activated by anchoring and adjustment. 
In priming studies, the activated knowledge is externally provided (such as the word list used 
by Tulving et al., 1982) while in anchoring studies, participants activate the knowledge on 
their own. This distinction is significant as priming loses its effect once individuals become 
aware of the external influence (Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kübler, & Wänke, 1993). It has also 
been shown that self-generated beliefs are less affected by discrediting evidence (Davies, 
1997). The result is that anchoring effects should be considerably more robust than typical 
priming effects (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b). 
To test whether anchoring effects are more durable than priming effects, Mussweiler (2001) 
made use of three experiments. In the first experiment, the researcher tested the durability of 
anchoring effects related to a fictitious target. Two conditions were used: In the first, there 
was no pause between the comparative and absolute questions. In the second, the 
researchers asked participants the absolute question a week after the comparative question. 
The researchers found a significant anchoring effect in both the no-delay and one-week 
delay conditions and there was no significant difference between the two conditions. 
In the second experiment, Mussweiler (2001) obtained the same result for non-fictitious 
targets with which people rarely interacted. The third and most ecologically valid experiment 
tested the durability of anchoring effects for subjects people commonly encounter. As 
mentioned earlier, priming effects typically collapse when participants interact with the 
primed targets (Srull & Wyer, 1980). However, as in both the previous experiments, 
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Mussweiler observed a highly significant anchoring effect in both the time-delay conditions, 
and no significant difference between them. This finding highlights the remarkable durability 
of the anchoring effect as participants were likely to encounter a significant amount of 
information relevant to the target during the week, all of which could have counteracted the 
activated information. 
This characteristic has important implications for investors. In many investment situations 
there is a time window between encountering an anchor and acting on it. However, because 
of the durability of anchors, investors who encounter anchors could be biased for significant 
periods of time. The durability of anchoring also undermines the ability to debias investors. 
Most debiasing techniques require an awareness of the anchor, and while this is possible in 
laboratory settings, it will not be possible for an investor to debias every anchor encountered 
in the weeks before a purchase decision is made.  
It is important to note that not all anchoring effects are as durable as those studied by 
Mussweiler (2001). Basic anchoring effects, for example, have been shown to be fragile 
(Brewer & Chapman, 2002), with Mussweiler and Strack (2001) describing them as 
“transitive and short-lived” (p. 241). In this aspect, basic anchoring effects are more similar to 
pure priming effects than selective accessibility anchoring. 
2.3.3.3 Malleability 
The original description of anchoring as a number from which individuals serially adjust 
affected future research in more ways than just determining the process: It shaped the idea 
of the anchor as a static concept—a pure numeric representation devoid of meaning. As 
such, minor changes made in the presentation of the anchor were expected to have little 
effect on anchoring and adjustment. Once anchoring was reconceptualised as a selective 
accessibility effect this was no longer true. Changes to the way in which target-knowledge is 
searched for should affect the implications of the knowledge activated, and thus the 
subsequent anchoring effect (Mussweiler, 2002). This is to say that changes in the 
hypothesis that is tested (or the way in which it is tested) would lead to changes in the 
anchoring effect. 
This hypothesis was tested by Mussweiler (2002). Mussweiler either primed participants to 
look for differences or similarities before presenting them with typical anchoring questions. 
He hypothesised that participants primed to search for differences would be less affected by 
anchoring than participants primed to search for similarities. The results supported this, with 
a significantly weaker anchoring effect obtained in the group primed to search for 
differences. In another study by Mussweiler (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b), the researchers 
made use of subtle changes in the wording of questions to change the hypothesis that was 
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tested. Specifically, the comparative question asked half the participants if the anchor was 
larger than the target and the other half if the anchor was smaller. The researchers argued 
that the different comparative questions would lead to participants testing different 
hypotheses. The results confirmed this, with participants giving higher estimates for the 
“larger” questions and lower estimates for the “smaller” questions. The difference in the 
direction of search thus led to the same anchors resulting in different estimates. 
The malleability of anchors could have important implications for investors. One of the most 
successful ways to debias anchors is the consider-the-opposite technique (Mussweiler et al., 
2000) where people are encouraged to think of reasons why the anchor might be too high or 
low. Anchoring effects’ malleability implies that people might automatically search for 
contradictory evidence with certain conversational anchors, for example “Do you think 
40000c is too expensive for SASOL?” However, a more reliable way to debias investors 
might be to change the way in which hypothesis tests are conducted, as was shown by 
Mussweiler (Mussweiler, 2002). Teaching investors to search for differences rather than 
similarities might achieve a more sustainable result. 
A more pessimistic interpretation of the malleability of anchors is that it could lead to 
investors following price trends. When a share price shows a strong trend, it could change 
the focus of investors’ hypothesis tests from whether the current price is accurate to whether 
the trend will continue, leading to a more pronounced anchoring effect. 
2.3.4 The limits of anchoring  
As the previous sections showed, anchoring and adjustment is a robust, durable, and 
prevalent bias which influences a wide array of decisions. However, not all studies on the 
limitations of anchoring have failed to find limitations. Researchers have identified a number 
of factors which diminish the anchoring bias. Some factors, like attention to the anchor, 
anchor-target compatibility, and uncertainty, are conditions which need to be met for the 
anchoring bias to occur, while other factors, like emotions, persuasiveness and the number 
of anchors, influence the magnitude of the anchoring bias. The following section will look at 
these factors. 
2.3.4.1 Attention to the anchor 
One of the core conditions of anchoring and adjustment is that individuals must pay attention 
to the anchor (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). Experiments in the classic anchoring paradigm 
ensure this by including a question where participants actively compare the anchor with the 
target judgement. This question not only ensures that participants pay attention to the 
anchor, it also ensures that participants link the anchor to the target judgement. However, 
including a comparative question is not a requirement. One-stage designs, such as those 
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used by Northcraft and Neale (1987), make use of anchors which are included in the text. 
For one-stage anchors to be effective, it is crucial that the anchor is a salient value. One-
stage anchors should also be logical comparison standards, such as a past share price 
compared with a future share price (Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003), or the market 
capitalisation of a company compared with its fundamental value (Marsat & Williams, 2009). 
Because judgement is fundamentally comparative (Eiser, 1990) participants automatically 
compare the anchor value to the target judgement without being asked to. 
Another form of anchoring that does not use a comparative question is basic anchoring. 
Because basic anchors are not comparison standards, these experiments focus on making 
the anchor as salient as possible through repetition. Wilson et al. (1996) obtained basic 
anchoring effects by having participants copy five pages of similar numbers. In another 
experiment, Wilson et al. obtained a basic anchoring effect by manipulating the depth at 
which the anchor was processed. The more participants had to process a number, the 
stronger the anchoring effect.  
From these studies it could be concluded that an anchoring effect is only found if participants 
pay attention to the anchor. However, as with most research on anchoring, there are studies 
that contradict this rule. Critcher and Gilovich (2008) found a small but statistically significant 
anchoring effect for anchors that were not processed, were not compared to the target 
judgement, and were not a salient comparison standard. For example, the number on a 
linebacker’s jersey (94 or 54) influenced participants’ estimates of his probability of sacking 
the quarterback. Similarly, Mussweiler and Englich (2005) and Reitsma-van Rooijen and 
Daamen (2006) both found that subliminally presented anchors could produce an anchoring 
effect. However, these anchoring effects (including those by Crichter and Gilovich) were very 
weak and short-lived. 
That participants must pay attention to the anchor is the single biggest limitation of the 
anchoring effect. Investors come across hundreds of numbers in a typical day, but only 
those numbers which they pay attention to and are comparison standards for the target 
judgements are likely to serve as an anchor. Furthermore, anchors only result in biased 
judgements if they are uninformative or overweighted, which excludes many informative data 
sources in an investment context. 
2.3.4.2 Anchor-target compatibility 
Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) identified three forms of compatibility in priming: scale 
compatibility, strategy compatibility, and semantic compatibility. Semantic compatibility 
occurs when the prime and target are meaningfully related in some way. According to the 
selective accessibility model of anchoring, as long as the anchor elicits information 
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semantically compatible with the absolute judgement, it should lead to an anchoring effect 
(Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Other research has suggested that anchors need to be on the 
same response scale as the target judgement (Chapman & Johnson, 1994). Meanwhile, 
research on basic anchoring effects has shown that neither semantic nor scale compatibility 
is a necessity (Wilson et al., 1996). 
Chapman and Johnson (1994) first tested the importance of scale compatibility. The 
researchers found a significant anchoring effect only when the anchor was on the same 
scale as the target judgement. Kahneman and Knetsch (1993) obtained a similar finding. 
However, the conclusions that scale compatibility is required have been undermined by the 
use of anchors and targets which were also semantically incompatible. As such, the 
experiments generally show that the anchor and target need to be compatible, but they fail to 
specify the type of compatibility that is important. 
The importance of semantic compatibility was first shown by Strack and Mussweiler (1997) 
in their study on the height and width of the Brandenburg Gate, and their findings were 
repeated in the same year (Mussweiler, Förster, & Strack, 1997). These findings make 
sense from a priming perspective, as compatibility between the activated knowledge and the 
target judgement is crucial for priming effects to occur (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). 
Selective accessibility further suggests that scale compatibility is not important for anchoring 
effects (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) as long as the anchor activates information that is 
meaningfully related to the target judgement. 
In contrast with the assumptions of selective accessibility, Carroll, Petrusic, and Leth-
Steensen (2009) found that semantic compatibility alone is not enough to obtain anchoring 
effects. In a series of experiments, participants answered comparative questions and 
absolute questions on different scales. The researchers concluded that the information 
activated on one type of scale is not necessarily applicable to judgements made on another 
scale even if semantic compatibility is held constant. As such, both semantic and scale 
compatibility might be required for anchoring to occur. To further complexify the situation, 
Wilson et al. (1996) suggest that semantic compatibility is not a requirement for anchoring 
effects. Participants who answered a comparative question on the number of African 
countries in the UN before giving an estimate of the number of doctors in the phone book 
displayed a small but statistically significant anchoring effect. 
These experiments present a complex picture of anchor-target compatibility. It is clear that 
anchor-target compatibility is important for anchoring and adjustment, but few studies agree 
on the kind of compatibility that is important. Furthermore, it is uncertain if anchor-target 
compatibility is a requirement of anchoring effects or if it just strengthens anchoring effects. 
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At the very least, the research agrees that the anchoring bias is considerably diminished, 
often to the point of statistical insignificance, by a lack of compatibility. 
As with attention to the anchor, the anchor-target compatibility limitation greatly reduces the 
scope of the anchoring effect in an investment context. It implies that anchors should only 
have large effects on judgements with which they are compatible, both semantically and on 
scale. For example, the total value of a past transaction is unlikely to serve as an anchor for 
the future value of the share, as the two values are not semantically linked. At the same 
time, P/E ratio (the ratio of the price of a company’s shares to the company’s earnings per 
share), which is arguably semantically linked to the future value of a share, should not serve 
as an anchor for the share’s future value as the scales are not compatible. 
2.3.4.3 Knowledge and uncertainty 
The role of knowledge and uncertainty in anchoring and adjustment has been touched upon 
in earlier sections. Uncertainty is a precondition for any anchoring effects to occur (Chapman 
& Johnson, 2002). As investment decisions necessarily require predictions they are 
inherently uncertain (Shiller, 1999). 
In order to describe the effect of knowledge on anchoring, Mussweiler and Strack (2000b) 
conceptualise uncertain judgements as a probability distribution. The position of the 
distribution is determined by the content of an individual’s knowledge. For example, an 
investor with only positive knowledge about SASOL might have a probability distribution for 
the future value of the share with an expected value of 40,000c while a person with only 
negative knowledge about SASOL might have a probability distribution with an expected 
value of 25,000c. Selective accessibility anchoring affects this position by activating positive 
or negative information about the target. 
The dispersion of an answer’s probability distribution is determined by the amount and 
quality of knowledge that an individual has (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). Individuals with 
very little investment knowledge could conceive of SASOL’s share price varying from 
10,000c to 50,000c in the next two months, while experienced investors might have a 
probability distribution ranging from 30,000c to 40,000c. The dispersion of an individual’s 
probability distribution will also determine whether an anchor lies inside or outside of the 
probability distribution (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). As discussed in the section on 
selective accessibility, plausible and implausible anchors lead to different anchoring 
processes (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a), making this an important distinction.  
In line with these hypotheses, Mussweiler and Strack (2000b) found that participants with 
less knowledge showed a significantly larger anchoring bias (see also Jacowitz & 
Kahneman, 1995). The experiments also showed that the position of a participant’s 
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probability distribution can be affected by the anchor. Participants who knew very little about 
the target relied more heavily on the anchor for information, even when the anchor was 
clearly random and under the participants’ control. The researchers hypothesise that the 
anchor might make anchor-consistent categorisations more accessible leading to the 
reliance on anchors in situations of uncertainty. 
In a study by Englich (2008), the effects of knowledge on plausible anchors were 
investigated more closely. Englich hypothesised that participants with a large knowledge 
base will have more potential anchors available for use. However, because these anchors 
are not explicitly linked to the target judgement, while the externally-provided anchor is 
linked, these individuals should exhibit anchoring effects of the same magnitude as 
participants with little available knowledge. In an experiment where participants were 
provided with different amounts of target-specific information, this was confirmed. More than 
just confirming that knowledge does not always lead to a smaller anchoring effect, Englich 
(2008) found that an increase in knowledge could lead to a larger anchoring effect. Based on 
the work by Chapman and Johnson (1999), it is believed that participants with significant 
general knowledge on a topic can find more anchor-consistent information in their 
knowledge. This leads to a stronger assimilation effect. 
These findings are not reassuring for investors as investors are likely to be high on general 
knowledge and expertise but also high on uncertainty (Shiller, 1999). Generalised 
uncertainty, as is likely to pervade many investment scenarios, leads to an increased 
anchoring effect (Nelson, 2005). Mussweiler and Strack’s (2000) research on estimates and 
probability distributions implies that investors will be less influenced by anchors in the 
investment context than amateurs, as investors should have a narrower probability 
distribution and thus fewer plausible answers, but research indicates that many investment 
decisions would be highly susceptible to anchoring. Within investment decisions, decisions 
particularly high on uncertainty (such as predictions of AltX share prices or returns) will be 
more prone to anchoring effects. 
2.3.4.4 Multiple anchors 
To date, few experiments have examined the impact of multiple anchors on anchoring and 
adjustment; instead most experiments make use of a single anchor. In the classic 
experimental paradigm, participants are presented with a question and one anchor before 
being asked for an estimate. As a result, participants have no choice but to rely on the 
anchor provided. These experiments are not, however, ecologically valid. In experiments 
where the anchoring bias is tested in real life situations, multiple anchors are often present 
(e.g. Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). For example, Northcraft and 
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Neale (1987) provided real estate in investors with ten pages of information on a property 
which included anchors such as the price of properties that recently sold in the area, the 
listing price of the property, and the listing price of other properties in the area. In most 
experiments with multiple anchors, only one anchor differs between the high and low anchor 
conditions (the property’s listing price in Northcraft and Neale, 1987). These studies, while 
including multiple anchors, do not specifically test the effect of multiple anchors. As such, 
only three studies have specifically investigated how multiple anchors affect anchoring and 
adjustment. 
Whyte and Sebenius (1997) hypothesise that multiple anchors can influence the anchoring 
effect in two ways: (1) By decreasing the likelihood that participants will rely on any one 
anchor for their decision; and (2) by diluting the influence of an unreliable anchor. This is to 
say that in situations with multiple anchors, where at least one anchor is considered a 
biasing influence, multiple anchors can improve decision making by making it less likely that 
participants will rely on informative anchors. Furthermore, even when participants anchor on 
the biasing anchor, as long as they also make use of other anchors the influence of the 
biasing anchor will be diminished. A third potential way in which multiple anchors could affect 
the anchoring bias is by forcing participants to test a hypothesis that contradicts another 
anchor. This would result in participants automatically considering-the-opposite, a technique 
which has been effective in debiasing anchoring and adjustment (Mussweiler et al., 2000). 
In order to test the effect of multiple anchors, Whyte and Sebenius (1997) conducted two 
experiments. In the first experiment, MBA students were provided with significant information 
on a product’s value and price in a negotiation before being provided with an unreliable 
anchor. The researchers found that, even with reasonable anchors available, the unreliable 
anchor still resulted in a significant anchoring effect. The second experiment repeated the 
first but used a sample of experienced managers instead of MBA students. As with the first 
experiment, a significant anchoring effect was found. It is important to note, however, that 
the manipulated anchor was presented immediately before participants were asked to make 
a judgement, similar to anchors in the classic anchoring paradigm, while the informative 
anchors were embedded in the text. As such, it is possible that the manipulated anchor was 
more salient than any embedded anchors. The researchers also did not test if the anchoring 
effect was diminished by the presence of multiple anchors, simply whether it occurred. 
Support for Whyte and Sebenius’s (1997) hypotheses can be found in an older study by 
Switzer and Sniezek (1991). In their experiment, participants were asked to estimate the 
number of sentences they could unscramble and transfer from a scrambled document to the 
correct source document in a five minute session. All participants were provided with an 
anchor (a low or high goal of sentences to sort), but only some participants were provided 
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with a second anchor (information about other participants’ performance) which was chosen 
to be inconsistent with the first anchor. As hypothesised by Whyte and Sebenius, the second 
anchor diminished the anchoring bias significantly. However, as with the research by Whyte 
and Sebenius, no measure of the informativeness of the anchors was included. As such, it is 
difficult to say whether the mitigating influence of the second anchor is as a result of 
participants anchoring on the second anchor or because participants consciously used 
information on other participants’ performance to moderate their own estimates. 
A final experiment on the impact of multiple anchors was conducted by Ariely et al. (2003). In 
their experiment, students participated in three trials in which they listened to an unpleasant 
noise for thirty seconds. After each trial, participants were anchored on a value for the 
experience before being asked to state the minimum payment they would accept in order to 
listen to the noise again. The anchor changed in between each trial. Participants in the 
increasing condition were anchored on 10c after the first trial, 50c after the second trial, and 
90c after the third trial, while participants in the decreasing condition were anchored on 90c 
first before being anchored on 50c and then 10c. The researchers discovered that while 
subsequent anchors can diminish the anchoring effect, the initial anchor (10c in the 
increasing condition and 90c in the decreasing condition) had a significantly stronger effect 
that any subsequent anchors. Ariely et al. (2003) suggest that, since the experience is novel 
to participants, the first anchor assigns a basis value to the experience while all subsequent 
anchors adjust the value from this basis. The result is thus a form of conservatism where, 
once an opinion is formed, subsequentl  presented information is underweighted (Edwards, 
1968). 
Taken together, these studies do suggest that the exact effect of multiple anchors depends 
on the context in which the anchors are experienced. Research by Whyte and Sebenius 
(1997) found a recency effect, where the most recent anchor had the greatest impact, while 
participants in Ariely et al.’s (2003) experiment showed a primacy effect where the anchors 
presented first had the greatest influence. Switzer and Sniezek (1991) did not test the effect 
that the order of anchors had. Ariely et al. (2003) and Switzer and Sniezek (1991) found that 
multiple anchors diminish the anchoring bias, while Whyte and Sebenius did not test how the 
anchoring bias was affected. More research on the effect of multiple anchors is clearly 
needed, especially considering the relevance of such research to anchors in everyday life. 
Even so, the research on multiple anchors is heartening for investors. While participants in 
all three studies showed an anchoring effect, the effect was significantly smaller when a 
second contradictory anchor was included. Furthermore, in all three studies the anchor was 
specifically made salient by the researchers. It is uncertain how a less prominent, 
uninformative anchor will influence the results when there are informative anchors available 
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to investors. As many informative anchors are present in the investment environment (such 
as the share price), it is possible that the anchoring effect from uninformative anchors will be 
significantly diminished. 
2.3.4.5 Emotions 
Happiness significantly impacts the way in which individuals process information. People 
who are happy tend to rely more strongly on heuristics and intuitive judgements than people 
in neutral affective states (see Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 1998). Negative affect, on the other 
hand, leads to more careful and systematic processing of information (Edwards & Weary, 
1993). 
Recently, multiple studies have investigated the effect of mood on the anchoring bias. First 
of these is Bodenhausen, Gabriel, and Lineberger (2000), which investigated the interaction 
between sadness and the anchoring effect. Because happiness leads to a stronger reliance 
on heuristics, it typically leads to larger cognitive biases. However, because elaboration 
increases the accessibility of anchoring consistent information (Chapman & Johnson, 1999), 
happiness might lead to a decrease in anchoring effects while sadness might lead to an 
increase. This was tested by Bodenhausen et al. (2000). The results confirmed their 
hypothesis, with sad participants giving more anchor-consistent answers than participants in 
the neutral-mood condition. In a second experiment, the researchers found that questions 
with a positive affective tone showed larger anchoring effects than questions with a negative 
tone. Bodenhausen et al., hypothesise that this occurred because people elaborate more 
readily  on positive than negative topics. 
In another study, the interaction between mood, expertise and anchoring was investigated 
(Englich & Soder, 2009). Specifically, the researchers were interested to see if the results 
reported by Bodenhausen et al. (2000) occur with people high in expertise, as the decision 
making processes of experts are less likely to be affected by their moods (Schwarz & Clore, 
2007). The researchers concluded that happiness only influences anchoring effects for non-
experts—experts show a significant anchoring effect regardless of mood. Importantly, they 
found that non-experts were only influenced by anchors when they were sad. Non-experts 
who were happy showed no anchoring bias. The general robustness of anchoring in other 
studies makes this finding very surprising. Englich and Soder (2009) question whether the 
experimental environment might lead to increased anchoring effects due to the negative 
affect associated with experiments. 
A third study on anchoring and emotions found that challenge stress leads to more serial 
adjustment than threat stress (Kassam, Koslov, & Mendes, 2009). This is to say that 
participants who experience threat stress showed larger anchoring effects. Because threat 
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stress leads to feelings of inadequacy, participants who experience threat stress are likely to 
stop adjustment earlier than participants who feel challenged by the situation. This results in 
a larger bias. 
Researchers in a final study on anchoring and emotions examined the impact that the 
intensity of emotions has on the anchoring effect (Araña & León, 2008). The researchers 
propose that high emotional intensity leads to disorganised thinking patterns which make a 
rational cost-benefit analysis difficult (Eysenck, 1982; Lazarus, 1991) while low emotional 
intensity leads to insufficient attention and mental arousal (Kahneman, 1973). Both should 
thus lead to a large anchoring effect. The results supported this, with the relationship 
between anchoring and mood intensity found to be U-shaped. The strongest anchoring 
effects occurred at very high or very low levels of emotional intensity. When emotional 
intensity is moderate, researchers found the anchoring effect to be “not significantly different 
from zero at the 99% level” (p. 707). It is possible to conclude that, similar to Englich and 
Soder (2009), experimental conditions lead to an increase in emotional intensity resulting in 
the robust anchoring effect typically obtained. 
Together, these findings highlight some limitations of anchoring studies. Perhaps the most 
relevant finding for investors, however, is that emotions do very little to affect the anchoring 
bias for individuals high in expertise (Englich & Soder, 2009). While the anchoring bias in 
everyday life might be less pronounced than expected, there is no evidence that this would 
be the case for investors. It further seems likely that investors experience states of emotional 
intensity quite often, especially when making decisions. Thus, while research on emotions 
and anchoring is heartening for mo t people, it brings little good news for investors. 
2.3.4.6 Attitudes and persuasion 
The final limitation of anchoring to be investigated concerns the assumption that changes in 
attitudes would lead to changes in behaviour. Most studies to date have examined how 
anchors affect participants’ judgements. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
observed that a randomly chosen anchor affected participants’ judgements of the 
percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Researchers assume that such 
changes in judgement would lead to similar changes in behaviour. However, a meta-analysis 
by Wicker (1969) concluded that, in general, attitudes and behaviours were correlated less 
than 0.30. This discrepancy between attitudes and behaviours was highlighted in an 
anchoring study by Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz, and Bergus (2007), where significant 
changes in doctors’ and patients’ attitudes towards diseases had no effect on their predicted 
behaviours. 
While these results are very positive for investors, it is important to note that many studies 
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have shown a strong correlation between anchoring and behaviours. For example, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) showed that participants who could choose between two bets chose 
often made disadvantageous bets because of anchoring. Wansink et al. (1998) showed that 
anchors could have a significant effect on purchase quantity decisions made outside of the 
laboratory, while Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) showed that anchoring can affect 
investors’ decision behaviour. More research will need to be done to clarify interaction 
between anchoring, attitudes and behaviours (Epley & Gilovich, 2010). 
To conclude, anchoring and adjustment has five general limitations: (1) attention must be 
paid to the anchor; (2) the anchor and target judgement must be compatible; (3) individuals 
must be uncertain of the final judgement; (4) happiness and moderate emotional intensity 
can make the anchoring effect disappear; and (5) changes in attitudes do not always result 
in changes in behaviour. However, the general investment environment and the expertise of 
investors nullify many of these limitations, which make investors specifically vulnerable to 
anchoring effects. 
2.4 Investors 
As shown by the previous sections, anchoring and adjustment is a complex heuristic and its 
application to everyday situations is necessarily fraught with uncertainty. The following 
section will attempt to apply the research on anchoring and adjustment to the investment 
environment. It will begin by looking at the characteristics of the investment environment. 
These characteristics will determine the way in which the anchoring bias interacts with 
investors.  Following this will be an examination of research that has already been done on 
anchoring and adjustment in investing. Afterwards, articles related to financial decision 
making will briefly be looked at. The section will conclude with an analysis of anchors that 
are likely to affect investment decisions. 
2.4.1 The investment context 
Multiple characteristics of the investment environment affect anchoring and adjustment. As 
was highlighted in the sections on the characteristics and limitations of anchoring and 
adjustment, many of these characteristics make the investment environment particularly 
vulnerable to the anchoring bias. However, some of these characteristics also moderate the 
anchoring effect. The most significant of these characteristics are investor uncertainty, 
increased knowledge, quantitative decision-making and multiple anchors. As these 
characteristics were discussed throughout the previous sections, they will not be covered in 
detail; instead, the characteristics and their expected effects on the anchoring bias will be 
briefly discussed. 
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2.4.1.1 Investor uncertainty 
According to Sloman (1995), uncertainty is defined as an outcome, which may or may not 
occur, having an unknown probability of occurring. For investors, this describes all available 
investments: Equity investments may or may not appreciate, fixed income investments are 
affected by changes in market rates, and even hedged investments are affected by changes 
in market conditions. As a result, all investment decisions are inherently uncertain. 
Uncertainty is a precondition of all heuristic use (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), a condition 
which is clearly met in investing. As uncertainty increases, the room for behavioural biases 
to influence judgements increase, while a decrease in uncertainty results in a smaller bias 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). For investors, this implies that, in general, certain investment 
decisions, such as foreign exchange investments, will be more vulnerable to the anchoring 
bias than others (for example, variable rate bonds). 
2.4.1.2 Increased knowledge 
In order to improve investment decision making, investors rely on a large quantity of data 
and quantitative techniques. In a study by Grivillers (2007), 359 valuation methods were 
used in 100 valuations by professional investors, resulting in an average of 3.59 methods 
per valuation. Each of these methods is based on information about the firm which investors 
and analysts process, and results in more information about the firm. As such, investment 
professionals are typically very well informed about the firms they analyse or in which they 
invest. 
The effect of an increase in knowledge on the anchoring effect is two-fold. More knowledge 
makes it easier for investors to find information supporting the anchor and thus results in a 
larger anchoring effect (Chapman & Johnson, 1999). However, more knowledge also 
decreases the range of possible answers, thereby decreasing the anchoring effect 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). The exact effect is likely to depend on the content of the 
information. General information which is open to interpretation is likely to increase the 
anchoring effect while information pointing towards specific answers is more likely to 
decrease the anchoring effect. For example, general information on market conditions 
should increase the anchoring effect because participants anchored on a high anchor will 
focus on the conditions supporting a high value, while those anchored on a low anchor will 
focus on the opposite. In contrast, share valuations should diminish the anchoring effect as 
they limit the range of viable estimates. 
2.4.1.3 Quantitative decision-making 
As the research by Grivillers (2007) highlights, professional investors rely on multiple 
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valuation methods when making investment decisions. Most common of these is the 
discounted cash flow method (81%), followed by trading multiples (71%), share price (67%), 
and revalued net assets (37%). Other than share price, these techniques are quantitative 
valuations that require little subjective interpretation. This emphasis on quantitative decision 
making in the investment environment can decrease the uncertainty of investment decision-
making, thus decreasing the use of heuristics. This is most evident in the field of algorithmic 
trading where decisions are purely based on data without human intervention. However, it 
also affects non-algorithmic trading. Investors who, for example, base their decisions on the 
discounted cash-flow model will be less affected by salient anchors such as the current 
share price. 
The reliance on quantitative techniques does not however nullify the anchoring effect. 
Because investors typically rely on multiple valuation methods, investment decisions still 
require that the information provided by the quantitative valuations be integrated into a single 
valuation. By activating anchor consistent information, the anchor will still affect the way in 
which the information is integrated. However, even in such situations, the quantitative 
valuations will decrease uncertainty by providing reasonable limits to the share’s value. As 
such, the use of quantitative methods should decrease the anchoring effect. 
2.4.1.4 Multiple anchors 
A final characteristic of the investment environment is that there are typically multiple 
anchors. Past share prices, the current share price, estimated future prices, share 
valuations, and share trends can all serve as an anchor for investors. As such, any investor 
who does more than a cursory investigation of a share is likely to encounter multiple, often 
contradictory, anchors. 
While the presence of an anchor is needed for an anchoring, and multiple anchors might 
thus be expected to bias investment decisions, research has shown that multiple anchors 
can moderate the effect of any single anchor (Switzer & Sniezek, 1991). By making it less 
likely that investors will focus on any single biasing anchor and by forcing participants to 
consider information supporting a variety of positions, multiple anchors are likely to result in 
participants basing decisions on an unbiased pool of information. This is not to say that no 
anchoring effect will occur. As was shown by Northcraft and Neale (1987) and Whyte and 
Sebenius (1997), an uninformative anchor can still bias decisions even when informative 
anchors are available. However, it is likely that the bias will be weakened. 
Taken together, these characteristics suggest that while investment decisions may be 
affected by the anchoring bias, the bias is likely to be mitigated by the use of quantitative 
techniques and the presence of multiple anchors. 
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2.4.2 Five investment studies 
To date, only five studies have investigated the effects of anchoring and adjustment on stock 
market investors. The first study looked at portfolio diversification, and how investors 
assessed growth and risk (Anderson & Settle, 1996). The second investigated if investors 
would assimilate investments towards a salient past high or low on a stock chart in contrast 
to what is prescribed by the efficient market hypothesis (Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). The 
third study compared how investment professionals and students made long-term stock 
return evaluations (Kaustia et al., 2008). The fourth examined whether investors anchor on 
the price while evaluating the fundamental value of a share (Marsat & Williams, 2009) while 
the final study made use of computational algorithms to show that anchoring could lead to 
speculative bubbles (Williams, 2010).  
2.4.2.1 Analysis of: The Influence of Portfolio Characteristics and Investment Period 
on Investment Choice 
In the first study actively linking investment with anchoring and adjustment, Anderson and 
Settle (1996) investigate how portfolio allocation decisions are affected by mental biases. In 
order to test the effects of different biases, the researchers conducted five experiments. In 
most of these experiments participants relied on a mental accounts decision rule (a cognitive 
bias) to allocate their funds between risky and risk-free investments. This is to say that 
participants chose a specific distribution (e.g. 50% risky, 50% risk-free) which they stuck with 
regardless of changes in the risk and return parameters. However, the researchers also 
found a significant anchoring effect in the first experiment. 
In the first experiment participants were given the one year risk and return information for a 
risk-free and high risk investment and asked how much they would invest in each investment 
for a period of ten years (Anderson & Settle, 1996). Participants were also asked to provide 
their best estimates for the ten year performance of these investments. After participants’ 
gave their answers the researchers provided them with the ten year risk and return 
information for the same investments (although participants were unaware that the 
investments were the same) and asked them the same question. According to the results, 
participants invested considerably less in the high risk investment when given the one year 
information. This occurred because participants anchored on the risk and reward for one 
year and failed to adjust sufficiently for the dispersion of risk and the cumulative returns over 
a ten year period (Anderson & Settle, 1996). This is consistent with research showing that 
people are poorly equipped to estimate cumulative growth (Hammond & Summers, 1965; 
Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975). 
Using the data from participants predictions of future performance, the researchers 
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examined how many participants had answers adjusted from the one-year risk and return 
values (Anderson & Settle, 1996). They found that 87% of participants adjusted their 
answers from the mean, and that the adjustments were insufficient—only one participant 
came within 100% of the actual ten year growth, with the second closest participant being 
606% off of the actual growth. 
There are however significant problems with this study. For one, Anderson and Settle (1996) 
do not provide any evidence that anchoring led to the assimilation effect. The researchers 
show that participants underestimate the share growth and dispersion of risk over time, but 
they fail to show that this is caused by anchoring and adjustment. Another problem is the 
reliance on a sample of psychology students. Most participants in the study used a mental 
accounts decision rule to make decisions, something which is unlikely to be used by 
sophisticated financial decision makers. 
With these problems in mind, what Anderson and Settle (1996) do show is how anchoring 
and adjustment could affect investment decisions, both in terms of judgements (participants 
predicted the growth to be much lower than it was) and in terms of behaviours (participants 
invested more heavily in the same investment when they were given ten year predictions). 
As such, it provides important preliminary evidence for the effects of anchoring and 
adjustment in an investment context. 
2.4.2.2 Analysis of: “What Goes Up Must Come Down”—How Charts Influence 
Decisions to Buy and Sell Stocks 
The second study attempts to show that while share prices do not have a memory, investors 
do, and even experienced investors make use of stock charts when making buy or sell 
decisions (Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). To do this, Mussweiler and Schneller use salient 
highs and lows on stock charts to show how participants’ assessments of value are 
assimilated towards past prices. 
Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) hypothesise that investors who are presented with a chart 
containing a salient high or low actively search for and activate evidence supporting this high 
or low price. To investors, a clear high on a chart attunes them to positive information about 
the stock, while a clear low makes them more aware of negative information, in line with the 
selective accessibility theory of anchoring (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). The results from the 
study strongly support Mussweiler and Schneller’s hypothesis. 
Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) conducted five experiments to test the effects of salient 
past prices. In all five experiments, a sample of investors (usually business students from the 
University of Würzburg) were presented with relevant financial information on one or more 
stocks, as well as a 12 month chart for the stock, before being asked to value the shares in 
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some way. Participants manipulated the stock charts so that they showed the exact same 
recent results, apart from having either a very salient high or low in the past. 
While all five experiments followed the same basic research method they differed in a few 
significant ways—most notably in how the dependent variable was measured. In the first 
experiment (Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003), investors were asked to provide their best 
estimate of the stock’s price in twelve months. This experiment thus measured participants’ 
judgement regarding a future price. In the second experiment, participants were informed 
that they owned 100 shares of each of the stocks, and asked how many they would sell. As 
such, this study used a behavioural measure of the shares’ values. Participants in the third 
experiment were provided with 12,000DM and asked to decide on a quantity of shares to 
buy from a set of stocks. The fourth experiment was similar to the third except that 
participants only invested in one stock and were provided with a much richer description of 
the stock. The final experiment was similar to the fourth, but instead of using a sample of 
university students with investment experience, Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) used a 
sample of experienced investors. Participants were also asked to list the characteristics that 
influenced their investment decision in the fifth experiment. In line with the selective 
accessibility process, investors who were provided with a salient low in their stock chart 
purchased fewer shares, listed more negative characteristics and listed fewer positive 
characteristics (Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). The opposite occurred for investors with a 
high anchor. It is important to note that these investors were presented with the exact same 
share analysis with only a stock chart differing. Using regression analysis, the researchers 
went further to show that, if the impact of selective accessibility is ignored, the chart has no 
significant correlation with investors’ responses. 
The results from the regression analysis can, however, be questioned. By asking 
participants to justify their investment decisions, the researchers did not record which 
information was accessible to participants but rather which information participants felt 
supported their investment decisions. Participants who invested very little in a stock were 
unlikely to have listed many positive characteristics of the stock to support their decision, 
while the opposite was true for participants who invested a lot. The sample used by 
Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) is also problematic. The sample consisted primarily of 
students who were part time investors, and it could be argued that the students were not 
representative of the average investor. Only the last experiment used a sample of 
experienced professional investors, but this sample was small. A third problem with the 
study by Mussweiler and Schneller concerns the anchor. While past stock prices are 
normatively uninformative (Fama, 1965), this does not preclude investors from actively using 
them when making decisions. As the researchers did not measure how informative 
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participants found the anchor it is impossible to judge whether participants found the anchor 
uninformative.  
However, the most significant problem with Mussweiler and Schneller’s (2003) research 
method concerns the research materials. In three of the five experiments conducted by 
Mussweiler and Schneller, participants were provided with insufficient information to make 
any investment decisions. As such, decisions necessarily had to be based on a general 
feeling regarding the firms. It is clear that an anchor could affect such a vague feeling, but it 
is unclear if investment decisions would be affected by it. In the final two experiments, 
participants were provided with a richer description of the stocks. However, there is no 
evidence given that the information provided allowed participants to calculate common 
quantitative valuations, such as free cash flow to firm (Grivillers, 2007). Furthermore, even if 
participants had the information needed, it is uncertain whether participants would have 
sufficient time and be sufficiently motivated to calculate quantitative valuations. As 
professional investors, on average, rely on 3.59 valuation methods per operation (Grivillers, 
2007), by not enabling such methods to be used the ecological validity is diminished. 
The ecological validity is further hampered by Mussweiler and Schneller’s (2003) dependent 
measures. Participants were either asked to purchase or sell shares given information on a 
number of firms. While these questions were designed to show how the anchor affects 
investment behaviour, they cannot be answered without having full information on other 
investment opportunities, market conditions and the portfolio that the stock will form part of. 
This was confirmed through feedback from multiple professional investors on a pilot study 
conducted as part of the present experiment. 
Even with these shortcomings, the research by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) provides 
important evidence that anchors can affect the decisions made by stock market investors. 
Due to the similarities between the studies, the basic research method used by Mussweiler 
and Schneller (2003) will be adapted for use in the present study. 
2.4.2.3 Analysis of: How Much Does Expertise Reduce Behavioral Biases? The Case 
of Anchoring Effects in Stock Return Estimates 
The third study on anchoring and investing examines how expertise affects anchoring ad 
adjustment (Kaustia et al., 2008). As discussed previously, the effect of expertise and 
knowledge on investor behaviour is difficult to predict. Most research has shown that 
expertise does not reduce the anchoring bias (e.g. Englich et al., 2006; Northcraft & Neale, 
1987), but research by Mussweiler and Strack (2000b) provides a convincing theoretical 
perspective on how expertise and knowledge could reduce the anchoring effect.  
To measure the difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, Kaustia et 
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al. (2008) conducted three experiments. All three experiments made use of financial experts 
sampled at educational seminars, while the last two experiments also made use of students 
with stock market experience. 
In the first experiment, two experimental conditions were used: A non-disclosed condition in 
which participants were asked to estimate the mean annualised real stock return over the 
next twenty years and a disclosed condition in which participants were told the historical 
mean annualised real stock return was 4.5% before being asked to estimate the return over 
the next twenty years (Kaustia et al., 2008). The disclosed condition thus acted as an 
anchor, while participants in the non-disclosed condition served as a control group. The 
researchers also measured how relevant participants found the information on past returns. 
The results from the first experiment (Kaustia et al., 2008) showed that participants in the 
disclosed condition estimated the future real returns to be significantly closer to the anchor 
(mean = 4.62%) than participants in the non-disclosed condition (mean = 8.05%). These 
findings are consistent with those of Welch (2000) which showed that financial experts rely 
heavily on estimates of historical returns when forecasting future returns. Kaustia et al. 
obtained a similar finding: Participants in both in the disclosed and non-disclosed conditions 
stated that past returns are very important when making estimates of future returns (Kaustia 
et al., 2008). This severely undermines the hypothesised presence of an anchoring effect as 
participants purposefully based their answers on past returns. Interestingly, participants in 
the disclosure condition who reported relying very little on past returns provided the same 
answers as participants who reported a strong use of past returns. While this is more in line 
with an anchoring explanation, it seems unlikely that these participants did not use the past 
returns information at all since the past returns information was the only information they 
were provided with. That participants were not provided with any additional information 
makes the study dissimilar to typical information-rich environments in which investors would 
make decisions. 
Kaustia et al. (2008) hypothesised that participants in the no-anchor condition would make 
use of a self-generated anchor based on their knowledge of past returns. While it is true that 
more than half the participants in this condition reported that past returns is an important 
figure to use when forecasting future returns, this is not evidence of an anchor being 
generated but rather of pre-existing knowledge being actively used. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the participants who did not believe that past returns are important 
in forecasting future returns would anchor on a self-generated anchor of past returns. Epley 
and Gilovich (2001) suggest that self-generated anchors are used when participants anchor 
on an informative figure which they know to be wrong. As these participants do not see past 
returns as informative, they are unlikely to anchor on it. As such, it would be more accurate 
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to see this condition as a control condition, which would explain the disparity between its 
results and the anchor condition’s results. 
The second experiment also made use of two conditions: a high anchor condition and a low 
anchor condition (Kaustia et al., 2008). Participants in the high anchor condition were 
provided with information showing that Sweden experienced 20% annualised mean real 
returns from 1980 to 2000. Participants in the low anchor condition were provided with 
information showing that Japan only experienced 2% real returns per year during 1984–
2004. In accordance with the classic anchoring paradigm, participants were then asked to 
compare the anchor with the coming twenty year annualised mean real returns before 
providing an absolute estimate. 
The results of the second experiment showed a significant anchoring effect among both 
students and professionals (Kaustia et al., 2008). However, the anchoring effect exhibited by 
students was considerably larger than the anchoring effect exhibited by professionals. This 
finding can be best explained by Mussweiler and Strack’s (2000b) theory on probability 
distributions. Since investment decisions are inherently uncertain (Shiller, 1999), both 
professional investors and students showed a significant anchoring effect. However, 
investors had a reasonable framework which could inform their estimates. In contrast, 
students with little experience were uncertain as to what mean annualised returns could be 
and thus relied on the anchors more heavily. O  the three experiments conducted by Kaustia 
et al. (2008), the second experiment is the most relevant to the present study as it shows 
how decision making can be anchored in an investment context and also highlights how 
expertise and knowledge could mitigate the anchoring effect. 
The third experiment examined if a semantic priming activity could influence subsequent 
assessments of annualised mean returns (Kaustia et al., 2008). While the researchers 
erroneously refer to this experiment as an experiment on basic anchoring effects, no anchor 
is used, making it more similar to semantic priming experiments than anchoring and 
adjustment.  As such, the experiment will not be discussed. 
2.4.2.4 Analysis of: Does the Price Influence the Assessment of Fundamental Value? 
Experimental Evidence 
In their 2009 study, Marsat and Williams investigate whether the price of a share can act as 
an anchor in judgements of fundamental value. Fundamental value is determined by 
examining the characteristics of a firm, including its past and future assets and earnings 
(Graham & Dodd, 1951). The price of a share, although usually related to the share’s 
fundamental value (Fama, 1965), should not be used when calculating its fundamental value 
(Rutterford, 2004). As such, price can be seen as an uninformative anchor when determining 
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the value of a firm. 
To examine whether investors anchor on share price when determining a firm’s value, the 
researchers made use of three experimental conditions (Marsat & Williams, 2009). In the 
first condition, participants (students completing a master’s degree in finance or accounting) 
were provided with all the relevant information on a firm and asked to value it. Participants in 
this condition were not provided with a share price. In the second condition, the researchers 
provided participants with all the information presented in the first condition as well as with 
the share’s actual price. The final condition was the same as the second except that the 
share price was increased dramatically to serve as a high anchor. 
When asked to estimate the fundamental value of the share, participants in the no anchor 
condition provided a median estimation of 21.5. When the actual price was given as an 
anchor, the median estimation increased to 26.0, and in the high anchor condition, the 
median estimation increased to 39.1. These results show that participants assimilated 
estimates of the value of a firm towards the firm’s price, and as such, are consistent with an 
anchoring and adjustment explanation (Marsat & Williams, 2009). The study also shows how 
an uninformative anchor can bias investor’s judgements and how anchoring can occur in an 
information-rich environment. Furthermore, the information participants were provided with 
mirrored the information typically given to investors by analysts, so participants made their 
decisions using information similar to what they would use in everyday investment decision 
making. 
One limitation with Marsat and Williams’s (2009) research is its dependence on a student 
sample. Although the researchers used a sample of post-graduate students, the researchers 
do not discuss any experience that the students might have in appraising companies in real-
world contexts. As was shown by Kaustia et al. (2008), there are statistically significant 
differences between investors and finance students making it possible that participants 
higher in expertise would have shown a smaller anchoring effect. As with the research by 
Mussweiler and Schneller (2003), the researchers failed to include a measure of the 
informativeness of the anchor. As such, it is difficult to say if anchoring took place or if 
participants erroneously used the share price in their evaluation. The present study would 
like to expand on the research by Marsat and Williams by including a measure of the 
informativeness of the anchor into the experiment. 
2.4.2.5 Analysis of: Speculative Bubbles Dynamics and the Role of Anchoring 
The final study conducted in an investment context was presented as a paper at the 
European Financial Management Association Conference (Williams, 2010). As no model has 
sufficiently explained the occurrence of bubbles, Williams hypothesised that anchoring and 
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adjustment could be used to explain bubbles. More specifically, the researcher hypothesised 
that investors anchor on stock prices when evaluating the intrinsic value of a share, leading 
to small share deviations being exaggerated. That people anchor on prices when evaluating 
value was shown by Marsat and Williams (2009). 
The paper looks at whether anchoring and adjustment could lead to speculative bubbles in 
the stock market by using a series of Monte Carlo simulations (Williams, 2010). The 
simulations make use of two types of investors: Fundamental traders who are affected by 
the anchoring bias, and noise traders who invest irrationally. The strength of the anchoring 
bias, or investors’ dependence on current prices, was systematically varied between 
simulations. In the no anchoring condition, fundamental traders were unaffected by the 
current price and simply invested according to the intrinsic value of the share. In contrast, 
when anchoring was high, participants’ assessments of the value of the share were 
influenced by the price of the share, leading to biased investments. The researcher further 
manipulated the model so that the anchoring effect increases in size as the price moves 
further away from the share’s value, as he hypothesised that participants would exhibit a 
stronger anchoring effect in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).  
With a model designed on these principles, the researcher conducted 10,000 simulations 
(Williams, 2010). In the no anchoring condition, Williams found no evidence of large bubbles. 
The largest overvaluation in his tests was 20.66% while the largest undervaluation was 
16.21%. In the low anchor condition, these percentages shifted to 30.84% and 22.25%. In 
contrast, when investors were assumed to exhibit strong anchoring effects, the size of the 
speculative bubbles grew dramatically, reaching a high of 128.17% and a low of -50.84%. 
From these results, the researchers conclude that large speculative bubbles cannot be 
caused purely by noise. Instead, a large anchoring effect is required. 
Williams (2010) presents a convincing explanation for the existence of stock market bubbles. 
Investors anchor on the price which results in trends, which initially occurred due to noise, 
continuing. The further the price moves away from value, the more investors justify the price 
and the less they rely on fundamentals—the Dot Com Bubble is a good example of such 
behaviour (Shiller, 2000). As such, fundamental traders who anchor on share prices provide 
sustainability for the trends caused by noise traders, ultimately leading to long-lasting and 
substantial differences between price and value. 
While this explanation for bubbles is appealing, there are some assumptions of the research 
that require additional testing. Most notably, the researcher assumes that more implausible 
anchors lead to larger anchoring effects (Williams, 2010). While this assumption makes 
sense within the investment context where price could be seen as an informative anchor, it 
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contradicts all research done on extreme anchors (for a review, see Chapman & Johnson, 
2002). According to anchoring research, the more extreme an anchor becomes the smaller 
its proportional effect. It is unclear if Williams’ findings would be repeated without this 
assumption. This assumption becomes especially tenuous when the difference between the 
price and value becomes significant enough, as investors eventually rely almost entirely on 
the anchor to determine the value of a share. To the knowledge of the present author, no 
research has shown that anchors can have an anchoring effect this significant. 
The problem with the cognitive dissonance assumption made in the study (Williams, 2010) is 
exacerbated by the lack of an investor sample. A sample could have provided empirical 
evidence for the anchoring effect being strengthened as the anchor becomes more extreme, 
but without the sample, such an effect is pure speculation. As such, it has to be concluded 
that while Williams provides a good theoretical model for the formation of bubbles, it is not 
grounded in past research and as such requires greater empirical support. 
2.4.3 Anchoring in the market  
Outside of the experiments on investors discussed in the previous section, many 
researchers have examined the impact of anchoring and adjustment on topics related to the 
marketplace. While the findings from, for example, a supermarket cannot be applied directly 
to a stock market setting, it should give some clues as to how anchoring can affect stock 
market decisions. As such, both the findings and the implications of these studies will be 
examined. This section will be divided into studies looking at how anchoring affects 
appraisals, willingness-to-purchase (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA), and 
negotiations. 
2.4.3.1 Appraisals 
The most famous study on anchoring and appraisals, and one of the seminal studies of 
anchoring and adjustment, was conducted in 1987 by Northcraft and Neale. Northcraft and 
Neale did an experiment on the effects of anchoring and adjustment on the valuation of real 
estate. Their experiment is important today for three reasons: (1) It was one of the first 
experiments to examine the effect of anchoring and adjustment outside of a laboratory 
setting; (2) it was one of the first experiments done on professional decision makers in their 
natural decision making environment; and (3), it showed an anchoring effect in an 
information-rich environment. All these characteristics are central to the present study, 
making the work by Northcraft and Neale particularly relevant. 
In order to examine the effect of anchoring and adjustment on the decision making of real-
estate agents, the researchers invited a sample of students and estate agents to a house 
that was on the market at the time. The participants were presented with a ten page packet 
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containing all the information estate agents would need to appraise the property. Included in 
the information packet was a listing price which served as the anchor. Participants were then 
divided into four conditions: low price, moderately low price, moderately high price, and high 
price. In the two moderate conditions (moderately low price and moderately high price), the 
listing price differed from the actual listing price by roughly 4% (a significant amount 
according to experts; Northcraft & Neale, 1987), while in the extreme conditions (low price 
and high price), the price differed by roughly 12%. All other information was kept constant. 
After visiting the house, participants were asked to value the property and to list the 
information they took into consideration when choosing the values. The experiment was 
conducted twice, each time with a different property and a different sample. 
The researchers found that both experts and amateurs were significantly affected by the 
listing price when valuing the properties (Northcraft & Neale, 1987) and that the extreme 
anchors resulted in a proportionally greater bias. However, it should be noted that while 
Northcraft and Neale refer to these anchors as extreme anchors, they differed only 12% from 
the actual listing price making them plausible, rather than extreme anchors. With regards to 
the information participants took into consideration, a quarter of the amateurs mentioned the 
listing price as one of their top three concerns and only one-seventh of the professional 
estate agents did. 
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the research by Northcraft and Neale 
(1987) is that anchoring and adjustment can have an impact on everyday decisions, 
including financial decisions. At the same time, the study highlights some of the problems 
inherent in doing anchoring and adjustment research in a real world environment. For 
anchoring and adjustment to occur, participants cannot purposefully use the anchor to inform 
their decisions. In Northcraft and Neale’s experiment, 56.2% of amateurs and 24.0% of 
professionals in experiment 1 considered the listing price when valuing the house, while 
22.9% of amateurs and 14.3% of professionals listed it as one of their top three 
considerations. Any plausible anchor thus has the inherent threat of being taken seriously 
and affecting the price without the use of heuristics. However, by asking whether participants 
took the anchor into consideration when making a decision, the effect of the purposeful use 
of the anchoring information can be removed from the final results using regression analysis. 
A second important finding by Northcraft and Neale (1987) is that anchoring can occur when 
participants are provided with a large quantity of information. This finding has been repeated 
since, but this study still highlights both the strength of the anchoring effect, and its ability to 
impact real life decisions in information-rich settings. 
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2.4.3.2 Willingness-to-purchase and willingness-to-accept 
WTP and WTA are two factors closely related to the appraisal of an asset. WTA is the lowest 
price that sellers are willing to accept for a product they are selling, while WTP is the highest 
price that consumers are willing to pay for a product they wish to purchase (Simonson & 
Drolet, 2004). In an investment situation, WTP would be the price that investors are willing to 
pay for a share, while willingness to accept would be the price at which investors are content 
to sell shares at. 
In a study on valuations and WTP, Ariely et al. (2003) show how product valuations can be 
anchored by both irrelevant factors and prior valuations. The researchers conducted six 
experiments. The first experiment showed how an irrelevant anchor (participants’ social 
security numbers) could affect the bids they made on consumer products. Participants with 
social security numbers in the top quintile were typically willing to pay three times more for 
products than participants with social security numbers in the bottom quintile. That WTP is 
as sensitive as it is leads the researchers conclude that participants typically do not have a 
fixed, pre-existing price for many products. Instead, participants are likely to have a range of 
prices for products (for example, they are willing to pay between R25 and R175 for a bottle 
of wine) and anchors cause the WTP to shift within this range. This should be especially true 
in investment situations, where environmental changes can affect the prospects of a firm on 
a daily basis. 
Based on the idea of a range of prices, the researchers make three hypotheses: (1) when 
there is no precedent, people’s WTP will be very sensitive to extraneous factors; (2) past 
purchases can act as an anchor for future purchases; and (3) a series of related purchase 
decisions by a participant will be coherent. These hypotheses were tested in the next five 
experiments. 
The second experiment confirmed the first and third hypotheses (Ariely et al., 2003). 
Participants were presented with a painful experience (an annoying sound) and asked 
whether their WTA was higher or lower than either a high monetary anchor (50c) or a low 
monetary anchor (10c). The researchers found that participants in the high anchor condition 
consistently had a higher WTA across multiple trials than participants in the low anchor 
condition. The responses from participants in the two conditions never converged, showing 
strong coherence in participants’ WTA. The third experiment obtained the same results with 
higher stakes. The fourth experiment tested if market forces would make the WTA from the 
high and low anchor conditions converge. Participants were put in an auction situation where 
the painful stimulus was awarded to only the best bids. Participants from both the low and 
high anchor conditions participated in the same auction. The researchers found no evidence 
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that the WTA from the two conditions converged. In fact, the researchers found that the 
market forces increased the strength of the anchoring effect. The anchor thus shaped 
participants’ appraisal of the stimulus and participants would rather ask too much for the 
product than sell it for a price below their appraisal. The fifth experiment tested whether 
previous decisions anchored subsequent ones. The researchers used a similar design to the 
second experiment but provided participants with a new anchor after each trial. From the 
results, the researchers conclude that the first anchor had a greater effect on both the 
second and third question than the more recently presented anchors, highlighting how 
previous choices can anchor future decisions. The sixth and final experiment tested whether 
these findings held for non-monetary incentives. The results confirmed that it did. The results 
further showed that consistency in one field does not translate to other fields, which is to say 
that participants whose WTA for an annoying noise was 50c would not necessarily have a 
WTA of 50c for an equally painful but different experience. 
Even though these experiments were conducted in an unconventional market, the results 
may hold important implications for investors. First, it shows that arbitrary anchors can 
significantly affect financial decisions (Ariely et al., 2003). Second, it indicates that anchoring 
is fairly resistant to market forces, at least in uncertain markets. A third implication of the 
research by Ariely et al. is that past purchases can anchor subsequent decisions. As such, 
an investor who previously purchased SASOL shares at 35000c may use this as an anchor 
when evaluating future decisions regarding SASOL shares. If the share price dropped 
significantly, the investor evaluating the share might anchor on the past price, leading to an 
inflated expectation of value, while shares that rapidly increase in price might lead to 
investors feeling that the share is overvalued. At the same time, the research by Ariely et al. 
(2003) also highlights the need for anchoring studies to examine the effect of anchors on 
commonly traded shares. The research by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) and Marsat and 
Williams (2009) both used firms that participants did not know, as this provided more control 
over external influences. However, using such firms fails to evaluate how pre-existing 
anchors would interact with new anchors in the stock market. 
According to research by Simonson and Drolet (2004) the anchoring effect in WTA and WTP 
depends critically on participants’ uncertainty regarding their willingness to trade. The 
researchers found that anchoring had a significant effect on WTP and WTA, except when 
participants had already decided to sell their product before being presented by an anchor. 
Simonson and Drolet suggest that when participants decide to sell a product they anchor on 
the market price which then influences their appraisal of the product. As was shown by Ariely 
et al. (2003), initial anchors exert a much stronger effect than subsequent anchors. As such, 
the market price would exert a much greater effect on sellers’ WTA than any subsequent 
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anchors. On the other hand, when participants are anchored on an irrelevant anchor before 
deciding to sell the product, they appraise the product based on this anchor before looking at 
market conditions. 
Simonson and Drolet’s (2004) research suggests that investors who first look at the market 
conditions will be relatively unaffected by an irrelevant anchor (such as a company 
spokesperson’s prediction). Although some studies on anchoring did present information on 
market conditions, it is unclear how prominently information on WTP was presented. For 
example, in Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) participants were presented with a chart 
including a salient high or low, as well as information on market conditions. While the chart 
would have included the most recent closing price, and thus a good estimation of WTP, if the 
past price was more salient than the present price, it would explain why participants 
anchored on the past price rather than on the present price. 
In a final study on anchoring and WTA and WTP, the researchers found that basic anchoring 
effects can only bias judgements when the basic anchor is repeated multiple times (Wu et 
al., 2010). The researchers conclude that when the comparative question is ignored, the 
anchor has to be made salient in another way. It should be noted that this is only true for 
completely irrelevant anchors. Anchors which are salient comparison standards, such as 
past prices, are likely to have an anchoring effect even without a comparative question (as 
was illustrated by Northcraft & Neale, 1987). The results from Wu et al. (2010) do, however, 
provide assurance that semantically irrelevant and incidental numbers are unlikely to affect 
investment decisions in a systematic way. 
2.4.3.3 Negotiations 
A final economic field in which anchoring and adjustment has been researched is 
negotiations. Although stock market investing involves very little negotiating, the findings 
from negotiations research are relevant to stock market investing. Specifically, research on 
negotiations shows how anchors which are known to be unreliable can still affect asset 
valuation. In negotiations, neither party has an obligation to provide the opposing party with 
a reasonable offer (see, for example, Churchman, 1995). As such, participants in a 
negotiation have no expectation that the first offer will be either fair or representative, yet 
these offers can still act as anchors. 
In one of the first studies on anchoring and adjustment and negotiations, Ritov (1996) made 
use of a competitive market simulation to test the effect of first offers on negotiations. Most 
texts on negotiation tactics suggest allowing the other party to make the first offer. However, 
Ritov found that the outcome of negotiations was highly correlated with the first offer due to 
the anchoring effect. These findings were later repeated by Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) 
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and Galinsky et al. (2009). 
Research done by Galinsky (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 
2002; Galinsky et al., 2009) expanded on the original findings of Ritov by looking at ways in 
which the anchoring effect can be counteracted. In Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001), the 
researchers found that thinking about reasons why the opponent’s offer is unreasonable 
nullified the anchoring effect (in line with the consider-the-opposite technique; Mussweiler et 
al., 2000). This included thinking about the alternatives the opponent has available (as they 
serve as the opponent’s lower bound), the opponent’s reservation price (the maximum or 
minimum price at which they would be willing to conclude the negotiation; Raiffa, 1982) and 
information on the offer you would most prefer. In a second study, Galinsky et al. (2002) 
showed how negotiator focus affected negotiation outcomes. When negotiators focused on 
the prices they wished to achieve, rather than on their own reservation prices, outcomes 
were considerably more favourable suggesting a diminished anchoring effect. 
Together, these studies make a few important points. First, anchors which participants know 
to be deceptive and exaggerated can still lead to biased financial decision making. While this 
might be assumed from studies on extreme and implausible anchors, very few studies have 
looked at the effect of anchors that participants know from the start are intended to deceive 
and bias. Second, such anchors (and the focus of the decision maker) substantially affect 
people’s perceptions and goals. Participants in Galinsky et al. (2002) were unhappy with an 
objectively better result because the anchor affected their appraisal of the product. Finally, it 
shows how the consider-the-opposite debiasing technique (Mussweiler et al., 2000) can be 
used to improve financial decisions. 
2.4.4 Anchors in the investment context 
Most research on investors has focused on testing the role of a specific anchor, such as a 
salient past price on a stock chart (Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003), a share’s current price 
(Marsat & Williams, 2009), or past stock return estimates (Kaustia et al., 2008), on decision 
making. In order to avoid the anchoring effects present in investment decisions, it is 
important to have a good awareness of the anchors present in an investment context. 
Furthermore, the potential anchors available should inform which debiasing method is used. 
Salient past prices may be debiased by having investors list reasons why the share’s current 
price is an accurate depiction of the share’s worth, but not without anchoring participants on 
the share’s current price. The following section will look at some of the most prominent 
anchors that occur in the investment context. 
Before looking at the anchors, it should be noted that not only uninformative anchors can 
hamper investment decision making. Informative anchors can negatively influence 
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investment decisions if too much weight is given to the anchors (Chapman & Johnson, 
2002). This was specifically shown by Williams (2010) in his study on share price as an 
anchor. While many investors rely on share prices to provide an indication of the value of a 
share, Williams showed that share prices could lead to speculative bubbles when given too 
much weight. 
2.4.4.1 Opinions and conversational anchors 
One of the most direct sources of anchors is conversations. Statements like “Do you think 
SASOL will break 40,000c this year?” or “The price of Brent Crude will never go over $100 
again,” are commonly heard by investors. The investment environment is filled with opinions 
and predictions by analysts, company spokespersons, and other investors, all of which could 
serve as anchors in investment decisions. As analyst forecasts should be the most 
informative of these anchors, they will be discussed first. 
While analyst predictions are often informative (Myring & Wrege, 2009), it is prudent to note 
that analysts are as prone to the anchoring bias as investors (De Bondt, & Thaler, 1993). 
Research has also found analyst forecasts to be overly optimistic, especially during bubbles 
(Dreman & Berry, 1995; Stickel, 1990), and especially when the brokerage firm is affiliated 
with the specific share being analysed (Lin, & McNichols, 1998). Further research has shown 
that brokerage firms implicitly reward analysts for being overly optimistic, as this leads to 
increased business and trading commissions (Hong & Kubik, 2003). Both during and after 
the dot-com crash, many top analysts continued advocating the inherent value of internet 
shares (Hong, 2004). 
In contrast to analysts, company spokespersons are under no obligation to present fair or 
unbiased forecasts. Being directly affiliated with a specific firm is likely to lead to a 
systematic optimistic long-term bias (Lin, & McNichols, 1998). The effects of reporting bias, 
where people or companies are more likely to report positive news, should also not be 
discounted (Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000). Further research has shown that even something 
as objective as financial reports are often framed in a way as to lead to a more positive 
analysis of the firm’s prospects (Andersson & Hellman, 2007; Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004). 
Taken together, these biases undermine the informativeness of stock market opinions, 
especially when compared with an analysis of a firm’s fundamentals. Yet, research on 
selective accessibility implies that any salient opinion or prediction could bias investors’ 
appraisals of a share and that such a bias could last for a time period of over a week 
(Mussweiler, 2001). This remains true even when the anchor is extreme or clearly biased, as 
was shown in studies on negotiations (e.g. Ritov, 1996). However, as was indicated by the 
research of Simonson and Drolet (2004) and Ariely et al. (2003), these anchors are likely to 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
65 
 
be less effective the later they are encountered in the research process. This is to say that 
investors whose interests are piqued by an optimistic opinion are more likely to be affected 
by a conversational anchor than an investor who has followed and researched a share 
significantly before encountering the conversational anchor. Not only is the anchor more 
salient for investors introduced to the share by the analyst, but it creates a pervasive 
appraisal which is resistant to subsequent influences (Ariely et al., 2003). 
Predicting the effect of any single investor anchoring on an opinion is difficult to do as it will 
depend on content of the opinion. However, when aggregated, the majority of opinions 
should reflect the market sentiment, and anchoring on such opinions should thus lead to 
herd behaviour. 
2.4.4.2 Share prices 
With the ambiguity inherent in the value of firms, share prices serve as a prominent anchor 
when evaluating present and future value (Shiller, 1999). Northcraft and Neale (1987) 
showed how irrelevant prices affected judgements in a much less ambiguous situation which 
made the results of Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) unsurprising. 
Two theoretical approaches define the role of share price in the stock market. According to 
the theory of fundamental value, a firm’s value is determined by a combination of expected 
cash flows, its net book value, and an assessment of the firm’s intangible assets (Marsat & 
Williams, 2009). A share’s price is thus irrelevant when calculating its value, and if the value 
is higher than the current price, the share should be purchased. The second theoretical 
model, the efficient markets hypothesis, argues that all knowledge about the value of a share 
is already included in its price, and as such, past prices are irrelevant to future prices (Lo, 
2007). Although these theories have been supported in research (Fama, 1991), they are 
primarily normative rather than descriptive theories and their practical application has been 
questioned (for example, see Lo, 2004) 
According to both the theory of fundamental value and efficient markets, past prices are 
irrelevant when estimating current value and, as such, should be ignored. That investors fail 
to do so was first shown by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) before Marsat and Williams 
(2009) repeated the results. What is more, Williams (2010) provided a theoretical model of 
how anchoring on past prices could lead to speculative bubbles. Both past and present 
prices are thus irrelevant but highly salient anchors which have a strong effect on future 
decisions. This includes visual representations of past prices such as stock charts, but also 
salient milestones such as the price at which a share was originally purchased. Avoiding 
these anchors may be impossible for most investors. 
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2.4.4.3 Trends 
Fama (1965) begins his famous paper on the efficient markets hypothesis with the following 
question: “To what extent can the past history of a common stock’s price be used to make 
meaningful predictions concerning the future price of the stock?” (p. 34). He concludes his 
paper with the assertion that the stock market takes a random walk, meaning that past 
prices and trends are uninformative when forecasting future prices and trends. 
In contrast with the random walk hypothesis, and consistent with an anchoring and 
adjustment explanation, research has shown that investors tend to focus on trends when 
forecasting price movements (Case & Shiller, 1990; DeBondt, 1993). In a phenomenon 
similar to anchoring on past prices, anchoring on trends leads to herd behaviour which 
amplifies the effect of small changes in share values (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990) ultimately 
leading to volatility in the market (Lux, 1995). 
In some situations, trend-following behaviour can be efficient in stock markets (Lo & 
MacKinlay, 1988). However, these findings are typically very short term—Lo and MacKinlay 
found positive serial correlation in weekly returns. Over longer periods of time, trends are 
more likely to be negatively autocorrelated than not (De Bondt & Thaler, 1989; Fama & 
French, 1988). As such, following trends for any significant period of time is more likely to be 
harmful than beneficial to the investor. 
It should be noted that while anchoring was originally conceived as adjustment from a 
numerical anchor, a trend can just as easily be anchored on according to the selective 
accessibility model. As long as the trend is salient and activates information consistent with 
it, it can anchor future estimates. 
2.4.4.4 Previous purchase decisions 
As mentioned earlier, purchase decisions can raise the salience of a specific price, making it 
a more likely anchor. However, purchase decisions can also lead to a phenomenon called 
conservatism in which individuals, after making a decision, fail to sufficiently take new 
information into consideration (Edwards, 1968). Conservatism has been linked to anchoring 
and adjustment in the past (e.g. LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2006). People anchor on the decisions 
that they have made, leading to an increase in the accessibility of information supporting 
their decisions and thus an underweighting of new information. 
The effect of previous purchase decisions (as well as the other anchors discussed) on future 
decisions is two-fold. First, previous purchase decisions bias subsequent appraisals of the 
share. When making purchase decisions, investors activate a lot of information supporting 
their decisions. Any information that dramatically changes the value of the share will thus 
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need to compete with the already activated information when subsequent decisions are 
made. As such, subsequent forecasts, valuations, and purchase decisions will all be 
influenced by the information already activated. Second, previous purchase decisions lead to 
a status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) 
where an individual’s valuation of a share supports its purchased price, even when new 
evidence is discovered. The same bias occurs when investors anchor on popular opinions, 
as these opinions, on average, will support the status quo, and also when investors anchor 
on trends, as activated information will support the continuance of such a trend. As such, 
these anchors undermine the valuation of a share according to its fundamental value, while 
supporting factors unrelated to fundamental value. 
2.4.4.5 Risk and reward evaluations  
In their original study on anchoring and adjustment, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed 
how anchoring and adjustment leads to problems in assessing conjunctive and disjunctive 
probabilities. In investment situations, these problems can manifest as biases when 
assessing future probabilities. For example, investors anchoring on the very large possibility 
that the status quo will be maintained may underestimate the probability of unlikely but 
catastrophic events occurring, given enough time. This idea is discussed in some depth by 
Taleb (2007). Outside of affecting assessments of extreme outliers, research by Tversky and 
Kahneman shows that any situation in which conjunctive or disjunctive probabilities need to 
be calculated could be prone to the anchoring bias. 
Risk evaluations are similar to best- and worst-case anchors, where participants anchor on 
best- or worst-case scenarios (Epley & Gilovich, 2010). When investors anchor on the worst 
that could occur in the market, they are likely to activate information making such an 
occurrence seem more likely. Similarly, when participants anchor on best-case scenarios, 
they are likely to ignore important risks in the undertaking. 
Taken together, the anchors discussed here give a good idea of the prevalence and diversity 
of investment anchors. They also highlight the negative effect that anchoring could have on 
investment decisions, and the importance of finding debiasing methods. The following 
section will look at potential debiasing methods in the investment context. 
2.5 Debiasing 
Arnott (2006) defines debiasing as a “procedure for reducing or eliminating biases from the 
cognitive strategies of a decision-maker” (p. 62). According to Wilson and Brekke (1994), 
four conditions need to be met for a heuristic to be debiased: (1) Participants must be aware 
of the bias and know when it occurs; (2) participants must purposefully aim to correct the 
bias; (3) the direction and size of the bias must be known to participants; and (4) participants 
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must be able to exert control over their responses. Rather than providing researchers with a 
starting point in debiasing anchoring and adjustment, Wilson and Brekke provides 
researchers with a list of obstacles. To highlight the problems with debiasing anchoring and 
adjustment, it is worth individually looking at the conditions required for debiasing. 
The first condition listed by Wilson and Brekke (1994) is that participants must know when 
the anchor occurs. In studies using the classic anchoring and adjustment paradigm, knowing 
when a bias will occur is easy. Participants faced with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
wheel of fortune would know when to expect the anchoring bias to occur if they had been 
informed about the bias beforehand. However, few real world situations present such an 
obvious bias. In information-rich settings like those studied by Northcraft and Neale (1987), it 
may be impossible for investors to decide what the anchor is and whether it has biased their 
judgements. Similarly, in the stock market, investors are faced with an abundance of 
potential anchors such as past prices and trends, and as such, it is not plausible to expect 
investors to be aware of all biasing influences. 
The second debiasing condition listed by Wilson and Brekke (1994), motivation to correct the 
bias, is met by investors. As investors are financially rewarded for accurate and unbiased 
decisions, it can be assumed that they are motivated to overcome any bias. While incentives 
and motivation have not been enough to prevent bias in anchoring studies in which selective 
accessibility occurred (Wilson et al., 1996), they have been effective in reducing bias in 
studies on insufficient adjustment (Epley & Gilovich, 2005). As investors are likely to be more 
motivated than most experimental participants, it seems plausible that self-generated 
anchors will not lead to biases in investors, while externally-provided anchors will. 
That investors should know both the direction and the size of the anchoring bias presents 
the biggest hurdle to debiasing anchoring and adjustment. Because anchoring occurs 
unconsciously, most participants in anchoring studies are unaware of any anchoring effect 
(e.g. Englich et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 1996). Even when participants are made aware that 
an anchoring effect has occurred, participants are uncertain about both the magnitude and 
the direction of the effect. In a study by George et al. (2000), participants who were informed 
that their estimates were biased by anchoring and adjustment provided new, lower estimates 
in both the high and the low anchor conditions. Because participants were unaware of the 
direction of the bias, they increased the bias in the low anchor condition but decreased it in 
the high anchor condition. 
The final condition for debiasing, that participants must have control over their responses 
(Wilson & Brekke, 1994), poses the last problem for researchers attempting to debias 
anchoring and adjustment. While individuals affected by anchoring and adjustment do have 
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control over the decisions they make, they typically do not have control over the information 
they activate and thus the information their decisions are based on. Participants can thus 
make objective decisions based on the information at hand, but since the information 
available is often out of their control, they cannot be said to have full control over their 
responses. 
As such, investors meet only one of the conditions required for debiasing (motivation for 
change) with at least two conditions either rarely attainable or completely out of their control. 
The following section will focus on debiasing suggestions that have been made, and 
investigate how they interact with the conditions required for debiasing. As will be shown, 
because of the investment conditions discussed earlier, few debiasing strategies are likely to 
be effective. 
2.5.1 Consider-the-opposite 
One of the most common methods to overcome a distorted knowledge base is the consider-
the-opposite method where participants consider a point of view in direct opposition with 
their biased knowledge base (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). By looking at evidence in 
opposition with their knowledge base, participants activate information contradicting their 
knowledge pool allowing the subsequent judgement to be based on less biased information 
(Chapman & Johnson, 1999). The consider-the-opposite strategy has been effective in 
reducing the effects of multiple biases that result from a distorted knowledge pool, including 
overconfidence (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980) and the hindsight bias (Arkes, 
Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988). 
To test the effect of consider-the-opposite on anchoring and adjustment, Mussweiler et al., 
(2000) asked half the participants in an experiment to list reasons why the anchor was 
unrealistic while the other half served as a control group. The researchers found that listing 
information contrary to the anchor mitigates the effects of the anchoring bias with the results 
indicating a significant difference between the consider-the-opposite and control conditions. 
The findings also suggested a strong negative correlation between the size of the anchoring 
bias and the number of counter-arguments listed. Experts who considered the opposite did, 
however, still show a significant anchoring bias. These results were repeated in a second 
experiment by Mussweiler et al. (2000). However, the consider-the-opposite group from this 
experiment showed no bias, while a group of participants listing anchor consistent reasons 
showed an even stronger bias. In another experiment, Chapman and Johnson (1999) found 
that prompting targets to identify features inconsistent with the anchor debiased the 
anchoring effect, while Chandon and Wansink (2007) found similar results in an ecologically 
valid setting. Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) found consider-the-opposite to be effective at 
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decreasing the anchoring effect in financial decisions. 
Multiple conclusions can be drawn from these experiments. First, the consider-the-opposite 
technique is effective at mitigating the effects of anchoring and adjustment. However, when 
anchor-consistent reasons were generated, the anchoring bias was strengthened. 
Participants asked to generate anchor-consistent reasons thus consider new information 
which is added to the already biased knowledge pool. As such, it can be concluded that the 
consider-the-opposite effect is additive with the anchoring effect, as the information it adds to 
the knowledge pool directly adds to or subtracts from the bias (Mussweiler et al., 2000). 
When participants list anchor-consistent information, the anchoring bias is strengthened, 
while anchor-inconsistent information debiases the knowledge pool.  
The additive nature of the consider-the-opposite effect presents a concern for investors. 
Rather than strictly decreasing the effect of the bias, the consider-the-opposite technique 
adds biased information that, hopefully, contradicts the initial information to participants’ 
knowledge pool. However, as investors are often unaware of the anchor—and thus the 
direction and magnitude of the anchoring effect—it is difficult to consider knowledge 
contradicting the anchor. Participants are thus as likely to increase the anchoring bias by 
considering new reasons as they are to diminish it. For example, in Mussweiler et al.’s 
(2000) second experiment, participants in the high anchor group that produced anchor-
inconsistent reasons provided final judgements very near to those in the low anchor group 
that did not provide any reasons. Similarly, Chandon and Wansink (2007) found that 
participants often overcorrected when using the consider-the-opposite technique. As such, 
the consider-the-opposite technique can lead to a semantic priming bias in the opposite 
direction. It is thus important to identify situations in which consider-the-opposite can 
effectively be used in an investment environment. A potential example is when investors 
anchor on a salient trend. As the anchors and its direction are known in these situations, 
consider-the-opposite could be an effective debiasing technique. 
2.5.2 Decision support systems 
A decision support system (DSS) is a “computerized aid designed to enhance the outcomes 
of an individual’s decision-making activities” (Singh, 1998, p. 145). Decision support systems 
are often effective at debiasing decisions makers (Bhandari, Hassanein, & Deaves, 2008; 
Evans, 1989), especially when judgements are systematically and predictably biased. 
In a study on decision support systems and anchoring, George et al. (2000) duplicated the 
research method used by Northcraft and Neale (1987) but added a computerised warning 
message when participants provided answers too close to the original anchors. As with other 
studies on forewarnings (e.g. Wilson et al., 1996) the researchers found no significant 
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reduction in the anchoring bias. Instead, participants in both the high and low anchor 
conditions who received warnings decreased their estimates. This highlights the problem 
with using decision support systems to debias the anchoring effect. As participants were 
unaware of the direction and magnitude of the anchoring bias, a warning message forced 
participants to adjust blindly. As the values in an investment market are inherently uncertain, 
and the anchors typically ambiguous, researchers have no way of providing accurate 
information on the size or direction of the bias. 
Decision support systems might, however, be useful in situations where the anchor is clear 
and objective markers are readily available, specifically when used in conjunction with other 
debiasing strategies. For example, investors intent on purchasing shares at a price 
significantly removed from the firm’s fundamental value (or a rough computerised estimate of 
it) might be prompted to list reasons why the current share price is too high, or why the 
fundamental value of the firm is an accurate portrayal of the share’s worth. However, as with 
the consider-the-opposite debiasing strategy, decision support systems will only be efficient 
at debiasing the anchoring effect in a very limited range of situations. 
2.5.3 Decreasing uncertainty 
In a study on credit card repayments, Stewart (2009) suggested that participants should be 
provided with a table showing the effect of different repayments, reducing the uncertainty 
and thus participants’ dependence on the minimum repayment as an anchor. As the use of 
anchoring and adjustment only occurs in situations of uncertainty, removing some of the 
uncertainty should mitigate the anchoring effect. While it is difficult to remove uncertainty 
from most investment situations, there may be a few situations in which such a strategy 
could be useful. Anderson and Settle (1996) showed that participants underestimated the 
effects of cumulative risk and returns over long periods of time. In situations where such 
forecasts can be made with relative certainty, providing participants with estimates of 
cumulative returns should reduce the anchoring effect. Similarly, it was shown by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) that anchoring and adjustment affects judgements of conjunctive and 
disjunctive probabilities. Providing investors with a best estimate probability for conjunctive 
and disjunctive events might also be effective. However, as with the other debiasing 
techniques, reducing the uncertainty will have limited uses. 
2.5.4 Avoid the anchor  
Epley and Gilovich (2005) suggest that an effective debiasing strategy might be to avoid the 
anchor altogether. While extreme on the surface, avoiding the anchor might be the easiest 
way to avoid an anchoring bias. Many anchors found in investment situations (such as stock 
charts) are considered irrelevant by normative theories of investing. Investors are actively 
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advised against using them. As such, these anchors could be removed from private 
investment firms without hampering decision making. 
There are, however, two limitations to avoiding the anchor. First, the prevalence of these 
irrelevant anchors might make them difficult to avoid outside of controlled environments. For 
example, stock charts are often used in discussions of firms. Because of the durability of 
anchors (Mussweiler, 2001) these could have a significant impact on decisions made much 
later. The second limitation is that only irrelevant anchors can be avoided. Anchors which 
are informative but tend to be overweighted, such as share price, cannot be avoided. 
In conclusion, the literature suggests that investors might be specifically vulnerable to the 
anchoring bias. Not only is anchoring very robust, the characteristics of the investment 
environment make investment decisions susceptible to an anchoring bias. There are multiple 
prominent anchors that investors will encounter in an investment context, and these anchors 
are expected to have a substantial effect on future decisions. Finally, no debiasing technique 
is expected to work for all anchors and these techniques are often as likely to introduce bias 
as they are to reduce it. The most promising news for investors comes from the work of 
Simonson and Drolet (2004) and Ariely et al. (2003) whose cumulative findings suggest that 
irrelevant anchors may not have as significant an effect on investors as expected. 
3. Research method 
3.1 Introduction 
The research method used for the present study will be described in terms of seven 
elements: The (1) research design, (2) sampling method, (3) data collection, (4) hypotheses, 
(5) data analysis, (6) threats to validity and (7) ethical considerations of the study. 
The research method was based on the research of Mussweiler and Schneller (2003). 
Participants were first presented with a content-rich description of a stock. After reading the 
stock’s description, participants were asked to value the stock. All participants were given 
the same description of the share except for the stock chart which was manipulated to 
include either a very salient past high or low. This salient high or low acted as an anchor. 
The research expands on the work by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) in three significant 
ways: First, a considerably larger sample of students was used. As research on anchoring 
and adjustment often has significant variance, increasing the sample size was seen as a 
way to improve power of the test (Muchengetwa, 2010). Second, the study provided 
participants with the information required to make use of quantitative valuation techniques, 
including the valuations calculated using the dividend discount, free cash flow to equity and 
free cash flow to firm models. In a survey from 2007 it was found that 81% of experts rely on 
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discounted cash flow models to calculate intrinsic value (Grivillers, 2007). These methods 
are thus important to include if the experiment is to be ecologically valid. Finally, a measure 
of the informativeness of the anchor was included. 
In the following pages, the research method will be discussed in greater depth. 
3.2 Research design 
A quantitative research strategy was used to examine the prevalence of the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic in investors. Quantitative research focuses on obtaining numerical data 
which are statistically analysed to determine the strength of certain relationships (Gravetter 
& Forzano, 2008). As the purpose of this study is to build on the research by Mussweiler and 
Schneller (2003), it is important that a similar research design is used. The use of a 
quantitative design is also better at establishing causality (since only one variable differs 
between the two conditions) and eliminates subjective interpretation to a large extent, 
allowing the results to be compared more readily (McVilly, Stancliffe, Parmenter, & Burton-
Smith, 2008).  
The experiment made use of two conditions: A high anchor condition and a low anchor 
condition. Participants in the high anchor condition answered a questionnaire in which the 
stock chart contained a salient peak (Figure 1) while participants in the low anchor condition 
answered a questionnaire in which the stock chart had a salient low (Figure 2). Although 
these graphs are not identical to those used by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003), the 
differences are cosmetic and not believed to be significant. Only one independent variable, 
the anchor, was thus manipulated in the experiment. Both the high and low anchors were 
plausible as the goal of the research was to examine the anchoring effect in a realistic 
investment situation. Since the anchor is embedded in the information and participants are 
never actively asked to compare it to the target, the research makes use of a one-stage 
anchoring design. 
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Figure 1: The high anchor stock chart 
 
Figure 2: The low anchor stock chart 
The dependent variable was an assessment of value made by investors. Specifically, 
investors were asked to provide their best estimate of the firm’s fundamental value. This 
differs from the measure of value used by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) who had 
participants either estimate the future price of a share or decide on a number of shares to 
purchase or sell. Feedback from the pilot study showed that many investors felt that these 
questions could not be answered without extensive knowledge of the market. To determine 
how many shares to purchase or sell investors would need information on their portfolio of 
shares as well as a comprehensive list of other investment opportunities. By asking investors 
to provide their best estimate of intrinsic value, these problems were avoided. 
Because there is only one independent variable and one dependent variable, an experiment 
design is the most suitable r search design. Experimental designs allow researchers to 
“demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship between two variables” (Gravetter & Forzano, 
2008, p. 221). However, the level of control needed for experimental designs often 
decreases the ability of the research to be generalised beyond the experimental setting 
(Gravetter & Forzano, 2008). 
3.3 Sample 
A between-subjects research design was used for the experiment, with each participant only 
taking part in one research condition. Gigerenzer (1996) criticised heuristics and biases 
research for relying too heavily on between-subjects designs which fail to show that 
individual decisions are biased. However, a within-subjects design could not be used in the 
present article for the three reasons: First, presenting participants with the same questions in 
different conditions would have revealed the intent of the researcher which could lead to 
participants adjusting their responses. Second, a within-subjects design would allow 
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participants to detect and correct inconsistencies within their work (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1996). Finally, the durability of anchoring effects (Mussweiler, 2001), as well as the 
coherence of preferences (Ariely et al., 2003), means that the anchor in the first condition 
would have an undue effect on the estimate provided in subsequent conditions. Thus, in 
order to eliminate testing effects (Gravetter & Forzano, 2008) a between-subjects research 
design was used. While the between-subjects design prevents the study from showing that 
any single participant’s choices were biased (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), it will reveal 
significant differences between the two conditions. 
Two attempts were made to procure a sample of professional investment decision makers. A 
request was made to the Investment Analysts Society of South Africa (IASSA) for the use of 
their mailing list. Access was initially granted but the decision was changed at a later stage 
and the researchers were denied access to the IASSA members. Once the request was 
denied, the heads of multiple investment firms’ equity departments were contacted and a 
request for access to their employees was made. Although two firms (Old Mutual and 
Prescient) acceded, the response rate was insufficient for the purposes of the study. Instead, 
the participants who provided feedback were contacted and the information they provided 
was used to improve the research instrument. 
As a sample of sufficient size could not be obtained from professional investors, conveners 
of fourth year finance and actuarial students at the University of Cape Town were contacted 
and permission to use their students was obtained. The classes were chosen in such a way 
that no student attended both courses. Both the finance and actuarial science students had 
completed courses on equity valuation and were expected to be comfortable with the 
information provided on the questionnaire. 
Because of the use of a student sample, sampling bias poses a threat to validity. A sample 
of students might systematically differ from the target population of professional investors. 
Specifically, it could lead to a sample which is less informed and experienced than the 
average professional investor. However, as research on anchoring has shown, both experts 
and amateurs are significantly affected by the anchoring bias (e.g. Englich & Mussweiler, 
2001; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). Furthermore, the anchoring bias remains largely unaffected 
by general expertise (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Englich et al., 2006). As such the use of a 
student sample was considered appropriate and is also concordant with most studies on the 
anchoring bias in investors (Anderson & Settle, 1996; Marsat & Williams, 2009; Mussweiler 
& Schneller, 2003).  
A second threat to validity inherent to the sampling method is volunteer bias. As 
convenience sampling was used and participation was completely voluntary, volunteer bias 
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could not be avoided. However, the general robustness of anchoring makes it unlikely that 
the typical characteristics of the volunteer (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975) would 
significantly affect the research findings.  
Participants were not offered any monetary inducements for taking part in the research. 
Because the experiment took minimal time and the results were directly relevant to the 
participants, participants were expected to participate voluntarily and out of an interest in the 
topic. Furthermore, research has shown that selective accessibility anchoring is unaffected 
by monetary inducements (Wilson et al., 1996). As Simmons, LeBoeuf and Nelson (2010) 
state in their article on accuracy motivation in anchoring and adjustment, the belief that 
individuals who are motivated by inducements would provide more accurate responses in 
the anchoring paradigm “has been contradicted by decades of research” (p. 918). 
Inducements would therefore only be useful in increasing the sample size and not the 
accuracy of answers. As the sample size was expected to be sufficient, no monetary 
incentives were offered. 
3.4 Data collection 
Participants were provided with the questionnaires during two compulsory lectures (Financial 
Economics and Applied Investments). At the start of the lectures the students were 
addressed briefly and informed of the purpose of the research. Participants were also 
informed that the survey was not expected take longer than fifteen minutes and that the 
questionnaires had to be completed under test conditions. Finally, in line with the APA code 
of ethics (section 8.02; American Psychological Association, 2010), participants were 
informed that participation in the survey was not compulsory. While the students were being 
addressed, research assistants handed questionnaires out. The questionnaires were 
shuffled in such a way that a low anchor questionnaire was always followed by a high anchor 
questionnaire and vice versa. 
Dillman (2007) suggests starting questionnaires with questions which are both interesting 
and easy to answer even if these questions are not necessitated by the research. As such, 
each questionnaire was started with four questions on the perceived importance of 
information on biases in stock market investing. After answering the introductory questions, 
participants received the following instruction: Please read through the following description 
of a share before providing your best estimate of intrinsic value. Participants were then 
presented with a full docket of information on a fictional share (AB Foods) which included the 
company’s background, an analysis of its financials, four fair value estimates calculated 
using the financials, and a stock chart containing the high or low anchor (the full 
questionnaires can be found in Appendix A). 
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The information participants were provided with was based on the professional equity 
analyst reports of four prominent retailers. The content was designed to be ambiguous and 
thus contain information supporting both low and high anchors. A pilot study conducted on 
professional investment analysts revealed that the information provided by Mussweiler and 
Schneller (2003) would be insufficient for investment decisions. Based on the feedback 
provided by the analysts, the information required for three quantitative valuations was 
added to the survey. These valuations were the dividend discount model, the free cash flow 
to firm model and the free cash flow to equity model. The arithmetic mean of these three 
valuations was also included. Because of the time limit, and because quantitative valuation 
methods require a more effortful analysis, it was uncertain if students would be motivated to 
use these methods. As such, the valuations as well as the data required to calculate the 
valuations were provided to students. According to the feedback provided, these valuations 
typically constitute the first step in calculating fundamental value and would thus be needed 
for participants to provide an ecologically valid estimate of fundamental value. 
While the large pool of information might be expected to dilute the impact of the anchor, 
Chapman and Johnson (1999) found that information-rich settings increased rather than 
decreased the anchoring effect, as participants had a larger pool of information from which 
to find evidence confirming their hypotheses. 
After reading through the information docket, participants were presented with the following 
question: What is your best estimate of AB Foods's intrinsic value? Once the question was 
completed, participants could turn to the next page where they answered a question on the 
perceived effect of the share chart on their judgement. After answering these questions, 
participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed about the research. They were 
also presented with an e-mail address to which they could direct any questions or concerns. 
The questionnaires from the student sample were collected after fifteen minutes. 
3.5 Hypotheses 
The research investigated one primary hypothesis and two secondary hypotheses. The 
primary research hypothesis states that participants in the high anchor condition will invest 
more money in the share than participants in the low anchor condition, while the null 
hypothesis states that the mean investment for the two conditions are equal. Formally: 
               
               
This is the primary hypothesis for most research on anchoring and adjustment: That 
estimates are assimilated to the anchor, and thus that high anchors lead to higher 
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judgements and low anchors to lower judgements (for a summary, see Chapman and 
Johnson, 2002). The hypothesis is one-sided because the anchoring effect specifies that low 
anchor group will have lower valuations than the high anchor group. If the research 
hypothesis is supported, it will confirm the findings of Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) and 
show that stock market investment decisions are significantly affected by anchors in the 
investment environment. The research hypothesis will be rejected if there is no significant 
difference in the sample means. The pervasiveness of anchoring and adjustment leads the 
present study to expect the research hypothesis to be confirmed. 
The first secondary research hypothesis states that the informativeness of the anchor will be 
positively related to the magnitude of the anchoring effect. Participants who consider the 
anchor informative are thus more likely to provide answers assimilated to it. While this might 
be considered self-evident, no anchoring research in the investment environment has tested 
the relationship between the informativeness of the anchor and the magnitude of the 
anchoring effect. If rho is defined as the correlation between the informativeness of the 
anchor and the magnitude of the anchoring effect, the hypotheses can be defined as: 
        
        
The final hypothesis states that participants who did not find the anchor informative will show 
a significant anchoring effect. This is to say that participants in the high condition who rated 
the anchor as uninformative will have a higher mean than participants in the low condition 
who did not find the anchor informative. Formally: 
                                           
                                           
As with the primary hypothesis, it is important to note that the hypothesis is one-sided. 
A statistically significant difference in means between participants in the two conditions when 
the anchor was rated as uninformative would be indicative of an anchoring process affecting 
investor decision making. This would be in line with the research by Northcraft and Neale 
(1987) who found that participants still showed an anchoring effect, even when the anchor 
was rated as irrelevant. It should be noted, however, that this hypothesis does not state that 
participants who consider the anchor unimportant will show an equal bias to those who 
consider the anchor important, it simply states that they will show some anchoring bias. 
3.6 Data analysis 
The first step of the data analysis was the removal of significant outliers. Due to the open-
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ended nature of questions on anchoring and adjustment significant outliers regularly occur. 
As a result, many anchoring studies include some procedure for removing outliers (for 
example, Mussweiler, 2002; Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf & Brewer, 2007; Simonson & Drolet, 
2004). The Grubbs’ test (Grubbs, 1969) was used to detect outliers. Because the Grubbs’ 
test is iterative, it prevented highly influential outliers from hiding less significant outliers. 
The difference between the means of the high and low anchor samples was tested using an 
unpaired, one-sided two-sample t-test (Keller, 2009). In order to see if an equal variances t-
test could be used, an F-test was conducted on the ratio of the two variances. Further tests 
were conducted to ensure that the assumptions of the t-test were not violated. Specifically, a 
normal quantile plot was drawn and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conducted to test the 
normality of the samples (Muchengetwa, 2010). The assumption of independence was not 
tested as there was no reason to suspect that the answers provided by different individuals 
would not be independent. The same tests were run on the data provided by participants 
who rated the anchor as uninformative. 
In order to test for the correlation between the magnitude of the anchoring effect and the 
informativeness of the anchor, participants’ valuations were normalised. The absolute value 
of the normalised valuations was then used to determine the magnitude of the anchoring 
effect. Because informativeness is an ordinal variable while the magnitude of the anchoring 
effect is a continuous variable, Spearman’s rank correlation (a non-parametric test) was 
used to determine the correlation between the variables (Lehman, 2005). 
3.7 Threats to validity 
Research validity can be divided into two forms of validity: internal validity and external 
validity. Internal validity is the degree to which the experiment tests the research hypotheses 
(Bordens & Abbott, 2011). Any factor which undermines the research’s ability to test its 
hypotheses is considered a threat to the internal validity. External validity refers to the 
degree to which the results of an experiment can be generalised beyond the experimental 
setting (Campell & Stanley, 1963). Results which hold true in an experimental setting but fail 
to do so outside of the laboratory have a low external validity. In most experiments, 
researchers must find a compromise between internal and external validity (Gravetter & 
Forzano, 2008)—the more controlled an experiment is, the higher its internal validity but the 
lower the external validity. Alternatively, experiments conducted in real world situations are 
often high in external validity but low in internal validity. 
3.7.1 Threats to internal validity 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) identified seven general threats to internal validity: History, 
maturation, testing effects, instrumentation, statistical regression, selection biases and 
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experimental mortality. The following section will briefly discuss the relevance of these 
threats to the present study. 
History effects occur when an unrelated event between two measurements affects the 
results (Campell & Stanley, 1963). In a within-subjects research design where the same 
participant takes part in multiple different tests, this can be problematic. However, since a 
between-subjects research design was used for the present study, history effects were not 
considered a threat to validity. 
Maturation refers to any change within participants due to the passage of time (for example, 
participants growing older or more tired; Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Experimental mortality 
is an extreme form of maturation where there is a difference in the number of participants 
that are lost from each condition over time. Since the duration of the present study is limited 
to fifteen minutes, and participants in both groups share these conditions, neither of these 
threats are expected to affect the results. 
A testing effect is a “possible change in performance caused by participation in a previous 
treatment” (Gravetter & Forzano, p184, 2008). Although there were no previous treatments 
in the present study, it is possible that the questions on heuristics in the first section of the 
questionnaire made participants aware of the threat of biases and thus less likely to show an 
anchoring effect in the second section of the questionnaire. Testing effects are not 
considered to be a significant threat to the present study, however, as anchoring has proven 
to be remarkably robust. In a study by Wilson et al. (1996), participants had the anchoring 
effect explained to them and were informed of the presence of the anchor but continued to 
show a strong anchoring effect. As such, it is not believed that the mere mention of 
heuristics and biases would debias the anchoring effect. 
In instrumentation, changes that occur to the testing instrument or the calibration of the 
testing instrument between measurements provide an alternative explanation for the results 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). This was not expected to be a problem in the present study 
since the measurements took place at the same time. 
Statistical regression occurs when participants with extreme scores are selected for an 
experimental group (for example, students who perform poorly on an academic test; 
Bordens & Abbott, 2011). If these scores are coincidental rather than the result of an 
underlying difference, the extreme score group’s second measurement should return to the 
mean regardless of any intervention. Similar to the previous concerns, statistical regression 
was not considered a threat to the current design. 
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Finally, the biased selection of participants is a threat to internal validity that occurs when 
participants in one condition are selected in such a way that they systematically differ from 
participants in another condition (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). In the present study the same 
group of students were used for both conditions. In order to ensure that no differences 
between these students affected the results questionnaires were handed out in alternating 
order. By doing this, the threat of biased selection was minimised. 
One threat to internal validity specific to the present study concerns the research instrument 
that was used. In the questionnaire participants received, the information needed to provide 
an estimate of fundamental value was included along with four fair value estimates. If these 
fair value estimates acted as alternative anchors (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997), they could 
distort the anchoring effect and thus make the dependent variable less reliable. With this 
threat in mind, the fair value estimates were included for two reasons: First, the stock 
decisions made by professional investors are almost always made when fair value estimates 
are available and visible to the decision maker. As such, the inclusion of fair value estimates 
was considered important for the external validity of the research. Second, the experiment 
had limited time available and it was decided that participants’ time would be better spent 
considering the available information rather than calculating fair value estimates. 
3.7.2 Threats to external validity 
As with threats to internal validity, the present study faces some threats to external validity. 
The aim of the study was to investigate if anchors would affect stock market decisions. 
However, due to difficulties in obtaining a significant sample of professional investors, a 
sample of finance students was used. As Campbell and Stanley (1963) highlight, it is 
logically impossible to generalise findings from a very specific sample to a broader 
population in any situation. However, by relying on laws that are identified by the 
researchers, generalisation can be attempted. In the present study, the literature review 
showed that experts should display an anchoring effect similar to that of non-experts (for 
example, Englich et al., 2006). As such, it is believed that the results can reasonably be 
generalised to an expert population. However, due to the difference between the sample and 
the target population the sample will always be a threat to external validity. 
A second threat to external validity concerns the lack of incentives. While the literature 
suggests that incentives have little to no effect on the anchoring bias (Simmons, LeBoeuf & 
Nelson, 2010), it should be noted that the incentives present in stock market decisions are of 
a different magnitude than those typically offered in experiments. It is precisely for this 
reason that incentives could not be offered in the present study. Small financial (and non-
financial) incentives are ineffective (see, for example, Wilson et al., 1996), while the 
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incentives present in every day stock market decisions cannot be matched in an 
experimental setting. However, due to the pre-existing literature on incentives and 
anchoring, the lack of incentives is not considered to be a significant threat to validity. 
3.8 Ethical considerations 
In order to obtain a student sample, a full research proposal was submitted to the University 
of Cape Town’s Commerce Faculty Ethics in Research Committee. The research proposal 
was approved by the committee. Furthermore, the university’s Director of Student Affairs 
gave approval for the use of students in the sample. 
Participation in the study was entirely voluntary and participants were free to withdraw from 
the study at any time. The questionnaire was also anonymous and there was no risk of 
psychological harm being caused by the questionnaire. As such, a consent form was not 
necessary according to the APA Ethical Principles (section 8.05; American Psychological 
Association, 2010). 
Although participants were not explicitly told which cognitive bias the study examined, they 
were informed that the purpose of the study was to examin  the effect of cognitive biases on 
stock market investing. It was felt that deception regarding the broad purpose of the study 
was unnecessary as multiple studies have shown that the effects of anchoring and 
adjustment remain unchanged even when participants are aware of the purpose of the 
research (Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Wilson et al., 1996). As such, the ethical guidelines 
regarding deception are not relevant to the study. 
4. Data analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The present research paper sets out to answer one question: Does the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic affect the investment decisions made by stock market investors? In 
order to answer this question, it is important to show not only that participants are affected 
by anchors but also that they do not consider these anchors informative. As such, a 
secondary research question was asked: Are stock market investors affected by anchors 
even when they consider them uninformative? To answer these questions, the research 
method used by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) was modified to include a measure of the 
informativeness of the anchor. Furthermore, the information presented to participants was 
more closely aligned with the information used in everyday investment decisions. These 
changes will allow the present study to answer its research question more accurately. 
The findings will be separated into three subsections in order to present the complex results 
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from the present study in an intelligible fashion. The first section will introduce the sample 
and describe the treatment of the data. In the second subsection, the data will be analysed 
as a whole and after being grouped into distinct subsets. By analysing the full data set, the 
effect of the anchor on the share valuations can be analysed, while subdividing the data set 
will allow more specific questions regarding the anchoring effect to be answered. The 
section will be concluded with a brief analysis of the questionnaire’s introductory questions 
on the importance and prevalence of information on behavioural economics.  
4.2 Sample 
Two hundred and ninety-five students from the University of Cape Town’s faculty of 
commerce participated in the survey. All students were undergraduates completing their 
fourth and final year of finance or actuarial science degrees. Two hundred and thirty-eight 
students from the Applied Investments (FTX4056F) course completed the questionnaire 
while fifty-seven students from the Actuarial Science III: Financial Economics (BUS4028F) 
course completed the questionnaire. This was approximately all attending students in both 
classes. All students had completed multiple courses on equity valuation and were expected 
to be comfortable with the quantitative valuation models used in the questionnaire. 
Before the data could be analysed, the data were entered into a spreadsheet and imported 
into the JMP statistical analysis software. Any questionnaires with unclear or illegible 
answers were entered at a later date by an assistant with no knowledge of the hypotheses. 
All two hundred and ninety-five participants completed the questions relating to the 
importance and prevalence of information on behavioural economics. Twenty participants 
failed to answer the share valuation question and were excluded from the primary research 
question’s data set. An additional three participants were excluded from the data set 
concerning the informativeness of the anchor as they failed to complete the question 
measuring the informativeness of the anchor. 
Once the data were entered, outliers were identified and excluded. Most research on 
anchoring and adjustment has used a sigma approach to identify outliers, with values that 
differ from the mean by more than two (Englich & Soder, 2009; Mussweiler & Epstude, 
2009), two and a half (Kassam et al., 2009; Kaustia et al., 2008), three (Englich & 
Mussweiler, 2006; Mussweiler & Englich, 2005) or three and a half (Oppenheimer et al., 
2007) standard deviations being excluded. This was not possible in the present study, as the 
value of a few extremely high outliers (67975.29, 10151.61, 5500, 2417.97) and one 
extremely low outlier (6) resulted in a distribution where only two values were more than one 
sigma away from the mean (M = 840.32). The four high outliers were removed after a visual 
inspection of the data. 
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Figure 3: Significant outliers 
An adaptation of the Grubbs’ test, the generalised ESD test (NIST/SEMATECH, 2012), was 
used to identify further outliers. The Grubbs’ test examines, at a given significance level, 
whether all the observations in a sample comes from the same population (Grubbs, 1969). 
This is tested by calculating the probability of the largest or smallest value in the sample 
coming from a different population than the rest of the sample. The test is run iteratively. 
Once an outlier is detected, it is removed from the sam le and the test is repeated until no 
statistically significant outlier is detected. The generalised ESD test improves on the Grubbs’ 
outliers test by adjusting the critical values appropriately for the number of outliers that are 
tested for (NIST/SEMATECH, 2012). For the generalised ESD test to accurately identify 
outliers the data must be approximately normally distributed. While the data for the present 
study were not normally distributed, it suggested approximate normality, providing 
justification for the use of the generalised ESD test. The generalised ESD test (        ) 
identified ten low outliers (6, 36.81, 177.87, 215, 248, 300.23, 372.4, 385, 446, 448) and five 
high outliers (67975.29, 10151.65, 5500, 2417.97, 1000). The sixteenth value tested by the 
ESD test (615.86) was found to not be a significant outlier (                       ). 
A distribution-free method of identifying outliers confirmed the findings of the generalised 
ESD test. Tukey (1962, 1977) suggests creating a “fence” by multiplying the interquartile 
range by 1.5 and subtracting the resulting value from the first quartile while adding the 
resulting value to the third quartile. The probability of an observation falling outside of this 
range is 0.003 (Blakenship, Wegener, Petty, Detwiler-Bedell & Macy, 2008) and can thus be 
considered an outlier. Using Tukey’s method, sixteen outliers were detected: The sixteen 
observations tested by the generalised ESD test. As the sixteenth observation (615.86) fell 
just outside the upper bound of the fence (615.785), and was not considered an outlier by 
the generalised ESD test, it was included in the data set. The other fifteen outliers were 
excluded. 
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4.3 Identifying the anchoring effect 
In order to decide which test to run on the difference between two means, the normality of 
the sample had to be investigated. As the histogram shows, the data came from a roughly 
normal population. However, visual inspection of the histogram reveals a few significant 
deviations from a normal distribution. The data set is bimodal with an unexpected number of 
observations in the 520-530 and 580-590 ranges and a lack of observations in the ranges 
surrounding them. This abnormality is explained by participants defaulting to the quantitative 
valuations provided to them (522.81, 546.23, 552.10 and 587.27) for their estimate of the 
share’s value. Seventy-three of the participants defaulted to one of the four valuations for 
their estimate. Out of the eighteen participants who provided an answer between 580 and 
590, thirteen gave an answer of 587.27 and one gave an answer of 587. The quantitative 
valuations also explain the slight elevation in responses between 540 and 560 although this 
elevation is less apparent as it falls in the middle of the histogram. These deviations are 
clearly shown on the normal quantile plot as horizontal lines. 
 
Figure 4: Histogram of the full sample with a normal distribution overlay 
 
Figure 5: Normal quantile plot 
The sample also has abnormally fat tails. While the histogram suggests that there are more 
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observations at the tails than expected, excess kurtosis is not significant at 0.183 (critical 
value        ; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). When the outliers removed by the Grubb’s test 
are included into the data set, the distribution is incredibly leptokurtic (excess kurtosis 
       ). This could be a characteristic of share valuation which is exacerbated by the lack 
of direct investment experience of the sample. As is evident from stock market bubbles, 
investors’ perception of value can often differ significantly from calculations of fundamental 
value (Williams, 2010) which could potentially explain why a few participants chose values 
considerably higher or lower than suggested by the valuations. This disparity between 
investors’ valuation and quantitative valuations could increase if participants, who lack target 
specific knowledge and experience, have a highly dispersed probability distribution for 
answers (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). 
A Shapiro-Wilk test (a goodness-of-fit test for normality) confirmed what the histogram 
suggested: It cannot be assumed that the observations come from a normal distribution 
(        ). As such, a non-parametric test was used to test whether the values given in 
the high and low anchor samples differ significantly. Nonparametric tests are tests which do 
not require interval data and do not make use of paramet rs (Gravetter & Forzano, 2008). 
This is to say that a nonparametric test would not test if the means of two populations 
differed (since the means are parameters) but rather if the locations of the observations from 
the two populations differed. Importantly, nonparametric tests are also called distribution-free 
tests because they can be used when the distribution requirements of parametric tests are 
not satisfied (Keller, 2009). As such, a nonparametric test can be used to determine whether 
the high and low anchor conditions in the present study differ significantly even if the data 
are not normally distributed. This requires that the hypotheses are restated as follows: 
                                          
                                                                                           
                             
The Wilcoxon rank sum test is the nonparametric test which should be used to compare two 
populations when the normality requirement necessary to perform a t-test is not met (Keller, 
2009). The only requirement of the Wilcoxon rank sum test is that the observations are 
independent. Independence can be assumed in this study as valuations made by different 
participants who could not communicate cannot reasonably be expected to be related. In 
order to compare two non-normally distributed populations the Wilcoxon rank sum test ranks 
each value in the combined population from smallest to largest. The test statistic is the sum 
of either one of the two populations’ ranks which is then compared with a critical value in 
order to determine statistical significance. 
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A one-sided Wilcoxon sum rank test found no significant evidence that the low anchor 
condition produced valuations lower than the high anchor condition (        ). A p-value 
of 0.16 implies that the probability that low anchor group came from the same population as 
the high anchor group is 16%, a value not low enough to conclude that an anchoring effect 
occurred. As such, there is not enough evidence to state that anchors in the stock market 
environment result in an anchoring bias. The primary null hypothesis could thus not be 
rejected. 
In order to test if a specific segment of the population showed an anchoring bias, the 
population was subdivided into the courses the students were obtained from. It is possible 
that students from the finance course used different methods to reach their valuations than 
students from the actuarial science course, resulting in an anchoring effect in one population 
but not in the other. Observations from the finance class (     ) were not normally 
distributed (        ) and, as such, the sample was tested using a one-sided Wilcoxon 
sum rank test. No significant difference between the low anchor and high anchor condition 
was found in the finance class with the result mirroring that of the full sample (        ). 
Visual inspection suggested that the actuarial scienc  class (    ) was normally 
distributed and this was confirmed with a goodness-of-fit test (        ). An F-test for the 
equality of variances was performed and no evidence of unequal variances was found 
(                                   ). As such, the variance of the high and low 
anchor conditions could be pooled. A pooled variance t-test showed no anchoring effect in 
the actuarial science class ( ̅              ̅                      ). The similarity 
between the two conditions can clearly be seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of means in the actuarial science class 
In order to test if the informativeness of the anchor affected the anchoring bias, responses 
were divided into three groups based on their answer to the question on the informativeness 
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of the anchor: Uninformative (participants who responded “Not at all”;     ), slightly 
informative (participants who responded “Slightly”;     ), and informative (participants who 
responded “Moderately” and “Significantly”;      ). Two participants who provided a share 
valuation but did not answer the question on the informativeness of the anchor were 
excluded from the analysis. 
While an analysis of the distributions found no significant evidence that the populations were 
not normally distributed (        ,          and          respectively), the low p-
value for the uninformative group, combined with a visual inspection of the histogram 
suggested that the uninformative group might not be normally distributed. As such both a t-
test and a Wilcoxon sum rank test were performed on this data set. F-tests of unequal 
variances found no significant difference between the high and low anchor conditions of any 
of the populations (        ,          and          respectively). 
 
Figure 7: Histogram of the uninformative anchor sample with a normal distribution overlay 
In the uninformative anchor group, no anchoring effect was found with either the pooled 
variance t-test ( ̅              ̅                               ) or the Wilcoxon 
sum rank test (                ). This is to say that when participants did not consider 
the past share price a relevant source of information there was no difference between the 
low and high anchor conditions. The same result was obtained in the slightly informative 
anchor group with a pooled variance t-test finding no evidence of an anchoring effect 
( ̅              ̅                               . In both these groups, the 
difference between the mean of the low and high anchor conditions was roughly 0.5c. This is 
to say that the share’s value differed by only 0.092% when participants did not consider the 
anchor relevant. There is thus not enough evidence to reject the second secondary null-
hypothesis. In the informative anchor group, a difference was found between the means of 
the low and high anchor conditions. A one-sided pooled variance t-test resulted in a p-value 
of 0.0681 ( ̅              ̅                     ) suggesting that participants who 
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found the anchor informative provided answers closer to the anchor. Together with the 
evidence that has been presented so far, this strongly suggests that no subconscious 
anchoring effect occurred in the present experiment. Rather, any difference that exists 
between the low and high anchor conditions can be explained by the conscious use of the 
anchor. 
Spearman’s rank correlation found no correlation between the magnitude of the anchoring 
effect and the informativeness of the anchor (       ,        ). Since no anchoring 
effect was detected, this was the expected result. This result held true when the high and 
low anchor groups were tested individually (         and          respectively). 
Neither of these correlations were statistically significant (        and         
respectively) 
The third and final way that the data were grouped was into participants who gave one of the 
four experimenter-provided valuations (    ) and participants who did not give one of 
these valuations (     ). For simplicity, these groups will be respectively referred to as the 
unmodified and modified groups. The unmodified group includes participants who gave the 
exact value provided by one of the quantitative valuation techniques (    ) as well as any 
of these valuations rounded upwards or downwards to the nearest cent (   ). If these 
groups show different levels of anchoring it might highlight what kind of investment decision 
making results in an anchoring effect. 
Because the unmodified group’s observations consisted of only four valuations the data 
were not normally distributed (        ). A Wilcoxon rank sum test showed a highly 
significant anchoring effect                   ). As Figure 6 shows, the low anchor 
condition has more valuations of 522.81 than the high anchor condition (     compared 
with     ) and fewer valuations of 587.27 (    compared with     ). 
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Figure 8: Comparative histograms of the low and high anchor conditions 
In contrast with the unmodified group, no anchoring effect was found in the modified group. 
Visual inspection of the histogram (Figure 7) suggested approximate normality but this was 
contradicted by a Shapiro-Wilk W test (        ). As such, both a Wilcoxon sum rank test 
and an equal variances t-test were run. Neither test found an anchoring effect (         
and         ). 
 
Figure 9: Histogram of the modified sample with a normal distribution overlay 
4.4 Auxiliary questions 
Participants were asked four auxiliary questions concerning the importance and prevalence 
of education on behavioural economics at the start of each questionnaire. While these 
questions were not related to the hypotheses, they offer an interesting perspective of 
students’ perception on behavioural biases and are worth examining.  
The first question asked was “How much do you believe investment decisions are affected 
by psychological biases?” with answers ranging from “1. Not at all” to “4. Significantly.” As 
the bar graph shows, no participants said “Not at all” and only twenty-eight participants said 
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“Slightly.” In contrast, one hundred and twenty-nine participants said psychological biases 
moderately affect investment decisions while one hundred and thirty-eight participants said 
psychological biases significantly affect investment decisions. As such, more than 90% of 
participants (267 out of 295) believed that psychological biases have a strong effect on 
investment decision making. 
 
Figure 10: Bar graph measuring the perceived influence of behavioural biases 
In the second question, participants were asked how informed they believed the typical 
investment analyst was regarding psychological biases in the investment context. The 
answers ranged from “1. Uninformed” to “4. Well informed.” For this question, most 
participants judged that investment analysts were either “Mostly uninformed” or “Somewhat 
informed” with only 7% of participants considering analysts “Uninformed” or “Well informed.” 
 
Figure 11: Bar graph measuring perceived knowledge of analysts regarding behavioural biases 
The third question asked participants how important information on psychological biases was 
to them. Answers ranged from “1. Not important” to “4. Very important.” As can be seen in 
Figure 10, most participants considered information on investment biases to be either very 
important or moderately important to them. Less than 10% of participants considered 
information on investment biases unimportant. 
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Figure 12: Bar graph measuring the importance of information on psychological biases. 
The final question asked if participants believed investment analysts were provided with 
enough information regarding behavioural biases, to which they could answer either “1. No” 
or “2. Yes.” Two hundred and thirty-five participants said “No” while sixty participants said 
“Yes.” 
 
Figure 13: Bar graph measuring whether enough information on psychological biases is provided to 
analysts 
Together, these results strongly suggest that students consider research on behavioural 
economics important to financial decision makers and that not enough information on 
behavioural economics is provided to students. 
5. Discussion of findings 
5.1 Introduction 
The conducted survey shows that stock charts are unlikely to bias investment decisions 
when presented together with a comprehensive analysis of the firm. An analysis of the data 
set did not find enough evidence, over the entire sample, to suggest a systematic difference 
between investors presented with a stock chart that included a salient peak and investors 
presented with a stock chart that included a salient trough. This is not to say that an 
anchoring effect cannot or does not exist in investors, but rather that a stock chart, when 
presented together with comprehensive quantitative information, is insufficient to result in an 
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anchoring effect. 
It was further shown that investors may consciously use stock charts to assist in share 
valuations. When extended to other research on anchoring and adjustment, this finding 
highlights the importance of including a measure of the informativeness of the anchor. Even 
anchors which are normatively uninformative may be relied on by participants for 
information. The lack of such a measure is a serious shortcoming of most research on 
anchoring and adjustment, both in the investment environment and in general. Without a 
measure of the informativeness of the anchor, it remains unclear whether participants in 
anchoring and adjustment studies show an anchoring effect, base their judgement on 
conversational inferences (Grice, 1975), or consider the anchor informative and its use 
rational. 
The following section will interpret the aforementioned results in terms of the literature 
discussed. Specific emphasis will be placed on explaining the lack of an anchoring effect 
when past research strongly suggests that an anchoring effect would occur. 
5.2 Anchoring process 
The most significant finding of the present survey was that no anchoring effect occurred. 
This result is in stark contrast with studies showing the general robustness and durability of 
anchoring (e.g. Ariely et al., 2003; Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Mussweiler, 2001; Wilson et 
al., 1996) and specifically with studies showing significant anchoring effects in the stock 
market environment (e.g. Kaustia et al., 2009; Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). In order to 
explain the anomalous finding, four aspects of the research will be focused on and it will be 
shown how each aspect contributed to the overall results. These aspects are the 
informativeness of the anchor, decreased uncertainty, multiple anchors and elaboration. 
5.2.1 Informativeness of the anchor 
The strong correlation found between the informativeness of the anchor and the magnitude 
of the anchoring effect, combined with the lack of a measure of informativeness in most 
anchoring studies, suggests that the magnitude of the anchoring effect may often be 
explained by the conscious use of the anchor by research participants. This is especially true 
when the anchor is theoretically uninformative but realistic (such as a house’s listing price or 
a share’s past price; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). With such 
anchors, participants might not be aware of the normative theory, or they may only partially 
agree with the theory, resulting in the conscious use of the anchor. 
However, the present study’s results cannot be explained solely by the informativeness of 
the anchor. For one, if we assume the anchoring effect found by Mussweiler and Schneller 
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(2003) is purely the result of the anchor being consciously used it would necessarily imply 
that almost all participants found the anchor to be either moderately or significantly 
informative. There is no evidence to suggest that this would be the case. The present study 
used a student sample similar to the sample used by Mussweiler and Schneller, and only 
38% of students considered the anchor moderately or significantly informative. Furthermore, 
the informativeness theory fails to explain why no anchoring effect occurred when 
participants considered the anchor uninformative. As far back as Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1974) wheel of fortune, there has been evidence that anchors which participants consider 
uninformative exert a powerful effect on subsequent judgements and this finding has only 
been reinforced in recent years (e.g. Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 
2000b; Simonson & Drolet, 2004). 
As a result, the informativeness of the anchor explains the magnitude of the anchoring effect 
in some studies on anchoring and adjustment but it fails to explain the lack of an anchoring 
effect in the present study. 
5.2.2 Decreased uncertainty 
One of the preconditions for anchoring to occur is uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
When participants know or have a way to calculate the answer, heuristic use is unlikely to 
occur (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). As significant quantitative data were provided to 
participants, including three commonly used valuations, it is possible that participants in this 
study relied on this information and their knowledge of share valuation methods to obtain an 
‘objective’ valuation, thus nullifying the anchors. It should be noted that it is not important 
whether the firm’s fundamental value was uncertain, but rather whether participants were 
uncertain about the answer. Participants who followed simple rules such as “DDM provides 
the most accurate share valuations” would have had a certain answer even if the firm’s 
actual value was uncertain. It should further be noted that the presence of the quantitative 
valuations would not be enough, on its own, to mitigate the anchoring effect as participants 
who need to choose between four valuations would still be influenced by selective 
accessibility anchoring. Instead, the presence of both valuations and simplifying rules would 
be needed. 
While this theory explains the lack of an anchoring effect, it is contradicted by the results 
from the modified and unmodified valuation groups. Participants whose estimate of share 
value were unmodified from the quantitative valuations provided to them should, according 
to the theory of decreased uncertainty, have shown the smallest anchoring effect as they 
were the participants most likely to have relied on their knowledge of valuation methods to 
make a decision. Participants in the modified group who chose values not provided to them 
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should have felt more uncertainty and thus showed a larger anchoring effect. An analysis of 
the data found the opposite result with participants from the unmodified group displaying a 
significant anchoring effect (        ) while participants from the modified group displayed 
no anchoring effect (        ). As such, it is unlikely that the lack of an anchoring effect 
was caused by decreased uncertainty. 
5.2.3 Multiple anchors 
The present study’s most significant deviation from the experiment conducted by Mussweiler 
and Schneller (2003) is the inclusion of quantitative valuations in the research materials. 
These valuations were included in order to align the information provided to participants 
more closely with the information analysts use to determine fundamental value. These 
values also have the potential of serving as anchors. Since only one of the anchors (the 
peak or trough on the stock chart) was manipulated to differ between the conditions and the 
other anchors were held constant, an anchoring effect was expected. However, as 
suggested by Whyte and Sebenius (1997), if the quantitative valuations acted as salient 
comparison standards they could have diminished the anchoring effect by decreasing the 
chance of the manipulated anchor being used, diluting the effect of the manipulated anchor 
and resulting in information inconsistent with the manipulated anchor being activated. 
Since there were multiple quantitative valuations, anchors inconsistent with both the 
manipulated trough and peak on the stock chart were present. Furthermore, and in contrast 
with the research on multiple anchors, these anchors were more intuitive comparison 
standards than the trough or peak on the stock chart. As a result, it is likely that the process 
Whyte and Sebenius (1997) suggested whereby the anchoring effect is diminished through 
dilution and contradictory anchoring information completely mitigated the anchoring bias. As 
the investment environment is filled with anchors, these findings suggest that any anchoring 
effect would be diminished in many investment situations. 
The results can further be interpreted based on research by Ariely et al. (2003). According to 
Ariely and colleagues, people show coherent arbitrariness: People coherently interpret 
information around an arbitrary starting point. The starting point is determined by the first 
anchor participants use, while each subsequent anchor is coherently interpreted based on 
this starting point. As such, the initial anchor is significantly more impactful than subsequent 
anchors. While the manipulated anchor was presented first in the present study, it was not 
necessarily as intuitive a comparison standard as the current stock price or the quantitative 
valuations and as such may not have been used immediately. Even though non-initial 
anchors still result in an anchoring effect (Ariely et al., 2003), this effect is small and, given 
the variance of the dependent variable and the variety of potential initial anchors, might not 
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be detectable. 
It should further be noted that, by manipulating the stock chart to include a peak or a trough, 
another anchor with implications contrary to the manipulated anchors was created. De Bondt 
(1993) found that non-expert investors often rely on price trends, which they expect to 
continue. By creating stock charts with an equal closing price, the peak on the price chart 
necessarily resulted in a downwards trend toward the current price, while the trough resulted 
in an upwards trend. Students who noticed these trends along with the manipulated anchor 
would have inadvertently used the consider-the-opposite technique, mitigating some of the 
anchoring effect (Mussweiler et al., 2000). Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) found the 
assimilative effects of the price peak and trough to be stronger than those of the trend, but in 
the present study, where the price peak and trough was not necessarily the initial anchor, 
this might not be true. 
The presence of multiple anchors best explains the lack of an anchoring effect in the present 
study. As Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) did not include quantitative valuations (which are 
natural comparison standards) it also explains the results differing between these studies, 
and while the anchoring effect found in the unmodified group cannot be explained by the 
theory of multiple anchors, the unmodified group’s results do not contradict the theory either. 
5.2.4 Elaboration 
An intuitive explanation of the modified and unmodified results is that participants who 
modified the valuations engaged in a more thorough analysis of the information and thus 
relied less on heuristics (Edwards & Weary, 1993). While elaboration results in a smaller 
bias for most heuristics, it is generally not true with anchoring and adjustment. In fact, 
Chapman and Johnson (1999) found that increased elaboration resulted in a larger 
anchoring bias, and this was confirmed by Bodenhausen, Gabriel and Lineberger (2000) and 
Epley and Gilovich (2005). Epley and Gilovich’s (2005) research mentions an important 
caveat, however: If elaboration and effortful thought is “systematically different in both its 
content and implications” (p. 202), it would reduce the anchoring effect by activating anchor 
inconsistent information. As the researchers point out, this typically does not occur. 
However, there are multiple plausible comparison standards in the present study. 
Participants who engage in more effortful thought are more likely to test these valuations as 
possible answers, and since there are both high and low valuations, participants who 
analyse the valuations will activate information consistent and inconsistent with the provided 
anchors, resulting in a balanced knowledge pool. In contrast, participants in the unmodified 
group are likely to engage in less effortful thinking. For these participants, the anchor creates 
a biased knowledge base which affects the valuation method chosen and, since participants 
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rely purely on the valuation method to value the firm, the anchor affects participants’ 
estimates of fundamental value. 
The data thus suggest that a significant number of participants in the unmodified group relied 
on a biased knowledge pool to choose a valuation method without considering the other 
valuations in greater depth. However, as with other experiments on the anchoring effect, it is 
impossible to state that all participants in one condition used a specific cognitive process. 
While this theory therefore provides a convincing explanation for the difference between the 
modified and unmodified groups, more research on the cognitive processes used to reach 
modified and unmodified valuations is needed. 
5.3 Findings for investors 
Research on anchoring and adjustment suggests that professional investors might be 
specifically vulnerable to the anchoring bias. Anchoring is unaffected by general expertise or 
by the richness of information available (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler & Strack, 
2000b; Northcraft & Neale, 1987), so investors high in expertise who make decisions in an 
information-rich environment are unlikely to show a diminished anchoring effect. The 
anchoring bias is more pronounced in situations of high emotion (Araña & León, 2008; 
Kassam et al., 2009) and occurs when decisions are uncertain (Chapman & Johnson, 2002). 
Since investment decisions are inherently uncertain (Shiller, 1999), and often has the 
potential for substantial financial loss, investment decisions should be vulnerable to the 
anchoring bias. 
What the present study shows is that the situation might not be as dire for investors as 
expected. Over the full sample, no significant anchoring effect was found and the means of 
the low and high anchor conditions differed by only 0.58%. Since the coefficient of variation 
is 4.52%, it can be seen that the difference between the two conditions is not only 
statistically non-significant, it is also incredibly small when compared with the variance 
present in any share valuation. It is thus clear that the high and low anchor had no practical 
effect on participants’ investment decisions. 
Of specific import to investors is that effortful thought and increased elaboration decreased 
the anchoring effect. This contradicts earlier findings on the correlation between anchoring 
and adjustment and effortful thought (e.g. Epley & Gilovich, 2005). For investors, it means 
that the anchoring bias can be mitigated, or even removed, by considering all the information 
available on a firm. Since a thorough analysis of a firm is likely to generate multiple anchors, 
an analysis of this information should result in an unbiased pool of activated information. 
Further good news for investors is that the anchoring effect in other studies on anchoring 
and adjustment in the research environment (e.g. Marsat & Williams, 2010; Mussweiler & 
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Schneller, 2003) might be overstated. A significant difference between the high and low 
anchor was detected in the present experiment when participants made conscious use of the 
anchor. However, this effect clearly differs from the unconscious anchoring effect since it can 
be controlled by participants. As other studies in the field did not include a measure of 
informativeness, how much of the difference between the conditions was caused by an 
anchoring effect and how much was caused by the conscious use of the anchor should be 
questioned. This is not to say that other studies did not show any anchoring effect but rather 
that the effect might be weaker than stated. 
The present study also provided participants with more comprehensive information than in 
many studies on the anchoring effect in an investment environment (for example, Anderson 
& Settle, 1996; Kaustia et al., 2008), and based on the feedback from the pilot study, with 
information more useful to investors than other experiments (e.g. Mussweiler & Schneller, 
2003). As a result, the information provided to participants is most similar to the information 
used in real world decision making. The fact that no anchoring effect occurred when realistic 
information was used is heartening for investors. 
Perhaps the most encouraging finding for both investors and decision makers in general is 
that the anchoring effect can be debiased automatically in certain situations. No specific 
effort was made to debias the anchoring effect in the present study, yet participants did so 
automatically by considering all the information at hand. If this finding can be replicated, it 
would suggest that the anchoring bias is less robust outside of the experimental setting than 
previously believed. 
While undoubtedly positive for investors, these findings do not show that the anchoring bias 
does not affect investors. The results from the unmodified group reinforces past research 
that investors are affected by anchoring and adjustment (Kaustia et al., 2008; Marsat & 
Williams, 2010; Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). Instead, these findings show that investors 
who engage in careful analysis of the data when multiple anchors are available debias the 
anchoring effect. This leaves a large number of investors and investment situations 
vulnerable to bias. For one, not all investors make use of multiple different valuation 
methods (although research by Grivillers, 2007, suggests that expert investors use 3.59 
valuation techniques on average). Reliance on one valuation technique might create an 
anchoring bias, as the result from the valuation creates an anchor which biases participants’ 
search procedure, resulting in participants activating more evidence in support of the 
valuation than is warranted. Similarly, a cursory examination of investment opportunities 
would still be affected by the anchoring bias. As a result, strong investment opportunities 
with low anchors might be screened out while poor investment opportunities with high 
anchors are considered for further research. There are thus many situations in which an 
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anchoring effect could still occur, while it is only when a detailed analysis is conducted and 
multiple contrasting salient comparison standards are present that an anchoring effect would 
not occur. 
It is also unclear whether all anchoring effects in the investment environment would be 
debiased by the presence of multiple anchors or if this finding is restricted to the specific 
anchors present in the questionnaire. As Ariely and colleagues (2003) discovered, the first 
anchor encountered has a proportionally larger impact than any subsequently encountered 
anchors. The results from the present study were largely unaffected by this finding because 
the valuations were very significant comparison standards while the manipulated anchor was 
comparatively subtle. However, if the initial anchor is a more important comparison standard, 
such as the share’s current price (Marsat & Williams, 2010), it is unclear if less significant 
comparison standards would still debias the anchoring effect. 
A further concern for investors and investment analysts is that the anchor affected which 
valuation method participants chose (as evidenced by the unmodified group’s results). When 
participants were provided with multiple valuation models, most participants did not show an 
anchoring effect. However, in many situations participants will not be presented with these 
models beforehand and will need to make a decision about the valuation method to use. In 
such situations, evidence from other studies in the field (such as Mussweiler and Schneller, 
2003) suggests that participants would be significantly affected by the anchor, resulting in 
valuation techniques supporting the anchor being chosen. 
Taken together, these findings paint a complex picture for investors. Anchoring can be 
debiased automatically in a situation with multiple contradictory anchors. This is not to say 
that anchoring does not take place; there is strong evidence to suggest that anchoring does 
takes place in the investment environment but is debiased. However, the exact conditions 
required for debiasing to take place are unclear.  
5.4 Limitations of the study 
Although every effort was made to limit threats to validity and make the research as 
applicable as possible to investors, the study is not without limitations. As mentioned 
previously, the primary limitations of the present study are: 
1. A sample of finance students was used rather than professional investors, limiting the 
external validity of the research. 
2. Participants were provided with fair value estimates which potentially acted as 
additional anchors. 
3. Participants were not incentivised to make accurate decisions. 
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Especially significant is the inclusion of fair value estimates. Future research should 
investigate whether an anchoring effect will occur when fair value estimates are excluded. 
A further limitation of the study is the inability of the results to be compared with those of 
Mussweiler and Schneller (2003). Although the present study did not attempt to replicate the 
research method used by Mussweiler and Schneller, their research method was used as the 
basis for the current study. Three changes were made to Mussweiler and Schneller’s 
research method to make it more consistent with the professional investment environment: 
(1) participants were asked to provide an estimate of fundamental value rather than a future 
price, (2) participants were provided with more detailed and quantitative share descriptions, 
and (3) fair value estimates were included. While it is believed that these changes 
successfully improved the ecological validity of the research, the simultaneous 
implementation of all three changes makes it impossible to identify the underlying cause (or 
causes) of the different results. 
An explanation of the contrasting results would provide anchoring researchers with valuable 
information on both the anchoring and adjustment process and how the anchoring effect can 
be debiased. However, in order to identify the primary cause of this difference, the 
aforementioned changes would need to be implemented in a controlled manner so that only 
one variable is altered between the new research method and the method used by 
Mussweiler and Schneller (2003). This would result in at least eight experimental conditions 
with more conditions needed to identify any interactions between the variables. 
Unfortunately, this research design was not feasible in the present study due to the large 
sample it requires. As such, the experimental disentanglement will need to be conducted in 
future research. 
5.5 Behavioural economics education 
According to the four auxiliary questions answered at the start of each questionnaire, 
participants strongly believe that insufficient information on behavioural biases is available to 
students and investment professionals. Participants gave answers strongly supporting the 
importance of behavioural economics and training regarding behavioural economics on three 
of the four questions. The only question in which participants gave an answer not supporting 
an increase in education on behavioural economics asked how informed participants 
believed the typical investment analyst is about psychological biases. Most participants 
considered investment analysts to be either “Mostly uninformed” or “Somewhat informed.” 
These results will not, however, be interpreted in any depth. Participants consisted of only 
students at the University of Cape Town and, as such, cannot be considered representative 
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of the overall population. Furthermore, while the University of Cape Town does offer courses 
on behavioural economics, for the students surveyed those courses could only be taken in 
the second semester while the survey was conducted in the first semester. As such, the 
findings are not surprising. The results were most likely further skewed by a demand effect, 
since the purpose of the questionnaire was not hidden from participants. 
While these problems undermine the external validity of these questions, it is not considered 
a problem since the questions were only intended to draw participants’ attention to the 
questionnaire and provide participants with easy questions to answer before answering the 
research question. 
6. Conclusion 
Research has shown that anchoring and adjustment is a remarkably robust bias. From the 
earliest experiments by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) to more recent research (e.g. Englich 
& Soder, 2009; Galinsky et al., 2009), anchoring has shown itself to be remarkably pervasive 
and resistant to change. This has included research both inside the laboratory (e.g. Epley & 
Gilovich, 2001) and outside of it (Mussweiler et al., 2000; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). Multiple 
processes have been proposed to explain these findings but it was only with the theory of 
selective accessibility (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) that the robustness of the anchoring 
phenomenon was explained. A better understanding of the anchoring process resulted in the 
development of the first successful debiasing technique (Mussweiler et al., 2000) and 
subsequent research found unexpected limitations which could only be explained by 
semantic priming (e.g. Englich & Soder, 2009). Even so, most research continued 
discovering significant anchoring effects in widely varied situations, including the investment 
environment (Anderson & Settle, 1996; Kaustia et al., 2009; Marsat & William, 2009; 
Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003). 
It is in this context that the present study is situated. The research set out to examine the 
presence of anchoring and adjustment in a realistic investment context. A further goal was to 
examine if investors who considered the anchor uninformative would still display a significant 
anchoring bias. The most significant finding to emerge from the present study was that 
anchoring may not be as pervasive as previously expected as no significant anchoring effect 
was found in the sample. This is in contrast with the findings of Mussweiler and Schneller 
(2003) who found a significant anchoring effect using a similar research design. However, 
five key differences exist between the present study and the research by Mussweiler and 
Schneller: 
1. The present study asked participants to provide an estimate of intrinsic value rather 
than a one year target price. 
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2. The present study used a larger sample. 
3. Share descriptions were more detailed and provided the financial information 
analysts would need to estimate fundamental value. 
4. Fair value estimates were included in the present study. 
5. The present study included a measure of the informativeness of the anchor. 
These changes were intended to make the questionnaire a more realistic representation of 
the everyday decisions of stock market professionals. While it is impossible to definitively 
state which of these changes led to the difference in results, evidence from research on 
multiple anchors suggests that the presence of detailed financial information and fair value 
estimates might have debiased the anchoring effect in the present study. Furthermore, 
results from the question on the informativeness of the anchor in the present study shows 
that a significant part of the anchoring effect described by Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) 
may have been caused by the conscious and active use of the anchor. 
It was further discovered that participants who considered the anchor uninformative showed 
no anchoring effect. The only participants who showed answers biased towards the anchor 
were participants who consciously used the anchor and participants who relied on the 
experimenter-provided valuations. That participants who defaulted to the experimenter-
provided valuations showed an anchoring effect implies that all participants were anchored, 
but that some participants were debiased while others were not. As mentioned, the most 
likely cause of this debiasing is the presence of multiple anchors which has been linked to a 
diminished anchoring bias (Switzer & Sniezek, 1991). 
Together, these findings sugg st that the anchoring effect might be less pervasive in the 
investment environment than previously believed. As conflicting anchors are common in the 
investment environment, this process of debiasing is likely to occur naturally. More broadly, 
the results suggest that anchoring can be debiased naturally and automatically and that 
effortful thought can improve decision making. 
However, a number of important caveats must be noted. For one, the sample consisted of 
finance and actuarial science students rather than professional investors. While this is 
consistent with most studies on anchoring and adjustment in the investment environment 
(e.g. Anderson & Settle, 1996; Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003) and while research on 
expertise suggests that professional investors would be affected similarly (Englich et al., 
2006), not using a sample of professional investors does decrease the external validity of the 
research. A further limitation of the present study is that participants were provided with 
multiple quantitative valuations rather than asked to calculate them. While this information 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
103 
 
would ideally be included in any analysis of intrinsic value, it is unlikely that it always is, and 
the fewer valuation techniques that are used the fewer anchors are available to debias the 
anchoring effect. Furthermore, analysts who use the information available on a firm to decide 
on the most accurate valuation technique might have this decision biased by an anchor 
found in the initial information. 
Even with these limitations, the research findings make significant contributions to our 
understanding of decision making in the investment environment and the anchoring process. 
For investors, these findings suggest that anchoring is less likely to bias their decisions than 
previously believed. While this finding is important, as no practical debiasing technique has 
been discovered for investors and no steps are currently taken to avoid the anchoring bias in 
investment situations the immediate implications for investors are small. Perhaps the most 
significant contribution for investors is that the focus of future research is shifted away from 
research on debiasing the anchoring effect in investment situations to research examining 
the presence and mechanisms of the anchoring bias in realistic investment situations. For 
social scientists, these findings are more important. Firstly, the research highlights many 
shortcomings in our current understanding of the anchoring process. Secondly, the research 
provides important information on the anchoring mechanism, specifically with regards to 
effortful thought and the presence of multiple anchors. As such, and in line with the 
exploratory nature of the study, the present research provides an important platform for 
future research. 
As the findings from the present study contradict the findings from other, similar experiments 
(e.g. Mussweiler & Schneller, 2003), the most important topic for future research is a repeat 
of the present study. By repeating the study, researchers will be able to see whether the 
results were caused by the given factors or by extraneous variables. While it is possible for 
the sample and research conditions to have affected the results, this explanation seems 
unlikely as an anchoring bias has been found consistently, regardless of the conditions or 
sample used. Should a repeat of the present study obtain similar findings, it would highlight 
the need for additional research into the anchoring process. 
An important way in which the anchoring process should be examined is regarding the 
interaction between the anchoring process and multiple anchors. To date, few studies have 
examined how anchoring affects judgements when multiple anchors are present. Ariely et al. 
(2003) tested the effect of multiple anchors but their anchors were presented consecutively 
instead of concurrently. Closer to the present study was research by Switzer and Sniezek 
(1991) where participants were provided with two anchors concurrently. The researchers 
found a significantly decreased anchoring effect. According to Switzer and Sniezek (1991), 
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this decrease could be caused by a decrease in the probability of participants anchoring on 
the manipulated anchor and through a dilution of the anchoring effect due to the multiple 
anchors. However, these mechanisms have not been tested. Should they be shown to exist, 
it would imply that many anchoring effects are automatically debiased due to the volume of 
anchors encountered in everyday life. Further studies should focus on determining how the 
quality, rather than the quantity, of additional anchors affect anchoring and adjustment 
(Whyte & Sebenius, 1997). As was argued in the present study, the quantitative valuations 
might be considered higher quality anchors than the salient past share price and, as a result, 
might nullify the anchoring effect. However, to date no research has tested the effect of the 
quality of an anchor on the anchoring effect. Future research should play an important role in 
clarifying the relationship between the quality and quantity of anchors and the anchoring 
effect. 
The interaction between effortful thought on the anchoring effect also requires additional 
research. Most research on anchoring and adjustment has suggested that effortful thought 
and increased elaboration are positively correlated with an anchoring effect (Chapman & 
Johnson, 1999; Epley & Gilovich, 2005). However, this only appears to be true when 
increased elaboration does not enable participants to narrow the range of possible answers 
or lead to new information inconsistent with the anchor. For example, Wright and Anderson 
(1989) found that participants who were motivated to consider a question in greater depth 
showed a smaller anchoring effect. Their questions lent themselves more to systematic 
calculation in which case effortful thought could reduce the potential range of answers. It is 
believed that in the present study, participants who showed greater elaboration were more 
likely to evaluate all anchors, thus debiasing the anchoring effect. In order to test this, more 
research on the relationship between effortful thought and the anchoring bias should be 
conducted. 
As the present study highlights, experimental findings cannot always be applied directly to 
non-experimental settings. This is especially important for investors, where the complexity of 
investment decisions differs significantly from the controlled environment maintained in 
experiments. As such, more research should be done testing the anchoring effect in a 
realistic investment environment. An important addition to the anchoring research on 
investors would be the inclusion of a large sample of professional investors. To date, no 
study has had a significant sample of investors and a realistic investment setting: Mussweiler 
and Schneller (2003) used only twenty professional investors for their research while Kaustia 
et al. (2008) had a large investor sample but tested them using the classic anchoring 
paradigm. While most research on expertise suggests that the results would be unaffected 
by sampling professional investors (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001), it is possible that students 
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use naïve processes that differ significantly from investors (as suggested by Anderson and 
Settle, 1996). Furthermore, research by Moody and Soder (2009) argues that experts might 
show a larger anchoring effect than participants low in expertise. This could prove significant 
in studies, such as the present one, where no anchoring effect was detected. Unfortunately, 
obtaining a large sample of professional investors has proven to be difficult and very time 
consuming. 
The effect of different types of anchors found in the investment environment should also be 
researched. Current share price has been shown to act as an anchor (Marsat & Williams, 
2010) but this was done without including a measure of informativeness. As the present 
study showed, the anchoring effect can often be explained by the conscious use of an 
anchor even when the anchor should be normatively uninformative. To add to this, different 
types of anchors have different properties which could affect the anchoring bias. For 
example, the current share price would be a more relevant comparison standard than a past 
share price and might thus result in an anchoring effect even when multiple other anchors 
are presented. A share trend, on the other hand, might not result in an anchoring effect even 
when no other anchors are included, as a result of anchor-target incompatibility (Tversky, 
Sattath & Slovic, 1988). Research on these topics would do more than simply test the limits 
of anchoring in the investment environment—it would provide valuable information on the 
anchoring process and its limitations in general. 
A final topic for further research is debiasing techniques in the investment environment. As 
was argued in the literature review, the techniques designed to debias anchoring and 
adjustment would not be useful in the investment context (for example, Mussweiler et al., 
2000). In order to improve investment decision making, viable debiasing techniques should 
be investigated. However, it is felt that debiasing techniques should be secondary to testing 
the presence of the anchoring bias in investment situations and the anchoring process. Until 
it can be shown conclusively that an anchoring effect occurs in a realistic investment 
situation with a sample of professional investors, doing research on debiasing methods 
might prove redundant.  
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Appendix A – Investors’ Questionnaires 
Low anchor questionnaire 
 
Share valuation questionnaire 
Expected duration: lG-lS minutes 
Number of questions: 6 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for participating in thi s study. TIle research is be ing conducted as part of a Master's thes is at the 
Uni versity of Cape Town. 
The aim of the research is to examine the prese nce of behavioural biases in professiona l investors in South 
Africa. TIle presence of these biases has been demonstrated intemationally, but 110 t in South Africa. Being 
aware of these biases in investment situations will allow researchers to identify ways to ameliorate their 
effects. 
The survey consists of six questions: Four on the importance of behavioural finance education in South 
Africa and two related to share valuation . In order to answer the valuation questions you will need to read 
through the infonllation from a sell-side analyst's share report befo re providing your best estimate of the 
share's future value. TIle survey is expected to take between ten and fifteen minutes. 
All responses to thi s survey arc completely anonymous and will not be used for any purpose outside of the 
present study. Participation in thi s study is vo luntary, and the survey has been approved by the Faculty of 
Commerce Ethics in Research Committee. 
I fyou have an y questions about the surveyor the research, please send them to stefan@2sparrows.co.za. 
Sincerely, 
Stefan Eis 
Page J of5 
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Share valuation questionnaire 
Section A 
1. How much do you believe investment decisions are affected by psychological biases? 
(a) Not at all 
(b) Slightly 
(c) Moderately 
(d) Significantly 
2. How informed or uninformed do you think the typical investment analyst is about behavioural biases in 
the investment envirornnent? 
(a) Uninformed 
(b) Mostly uninformed 
(c) Somewhat informed 
(d) Well informed 
3. How important is information on investment biases to you? 
(a) Not important 
(b) Slightly important 
(c) Moderately important 
(d) Very important 
4. Do you believe that finance students are provided with enough information on biases in the investment 
environment? 
(a) No 
(b) Yes 
Page2of5 
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Share valuation questionnaire 
Section B 
Please read through the following descriptioo of a share before providing your best estimate of intrinsic 
value. 
AB Foods 
Company Background 
AB Foods is a coosumerpackaged-goods company. It is an important player in the South African food sector 
and has expanded its business to include personal care products. AB Foods' products are mostly distributed 
through major retail stores, but some products a"e distributed through exclusive health stores. Products are 
sold primarily in South Africa (SA) with a few products being distributed in emerging mrukets. 
While the South African economic recovery has been slow, growth in disposable income, chie to current and 
expected future real wage increases, should support continued growth in earnings in the future, especially in 
health foods and personal care products. The current low interest rate envirooment has also contributed to 
snperior earnings growth. However, earnings growth in the food sector will be negatively affected by food 
inflatioo coming off of recent highs. Unless rising operating costs can be controlled or passed on by AB 
Foods it will further depress margins. AB Foods has come off arecent low of 446c. 
'" 
...... "" 
FIgure 1: AB Foods Price History 
At face value companies in this sector appear expensive. They are trading above their historical average PIE 
rating (c15x compared to the historical average of cllx) and at a premimn to the market. However, the very 
strong perfocmance over the last 12 months has led to a re-rating of the sector. A further rerating could be 
justified given the lower risk free rate and the continued acceleration in earning momentmn in the coming 
months. Food processors have tended to outpeIfonn the mruket in a do\Wtum, but show weaker 
perfonnances relative to the market in an upturn. 
Page 3 cf5 
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Share valuation questionnaire 
Analysis of financial data 
The following data, based on the information from AB Foods and the food processors sector, was used in the 
valuation of AB Foods: 
Summary of Valuation Data 
PIE ratio - trailing 14.01 
Historical average share PIE ratio - trailing 1l.24 
Current sector average PIE ratio - trailing 15.27 
EPS - current 40.18 
DPS - current 10.01 
Risk free rate - current 10 yr SA Govt Bond Yield 8.25% 
Beta - Food Processors Sector 0.44 
Market Risk Premium - estimate 5.6% 
Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) - trailing 9.91 
Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) - trailing 7.09 
Table 1: Financial data used in share valuation 
For the Dividend Growth model, a long run rate of growth of dividends of 8.7% was obtained by the 
averaging of two separate estimates: A top-down growth rate estimate of 9.1 % derived from an expected 
inflation rate of 5.5% and a real GDP growth rate of 3.4%; and a bottom-up sustainable growth rate of 8.3% 
which is calculated as the product of the company's retention rate of75% and seven-year average return on 
equity of ILl %. 
Fair Value Estimates 
Dividend Growth Model 546.23 
FCFF Method 587.27 
FCFE Method 522.81 
Average valuation 552.10 
Table 2: Valuations provided by different models 
5. What is your best estimate of AB Foods's intrinsic value? Give your answer in cents. 
Page 4 0/5 
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Share valuation questionnaire 
6. How much did the past price peaks and troughs on the stock chart affect your estimate of intrinsic value? 
(a) Not at all 
(b) Slightly 
(c) Moderately 
(d) Significantly 
Thank you for participating in our survey. If you have any further questions or comments, please send them 
to stefan@2sparrows.co.za 
Page 5 0/5 
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High anchor questionnaire 
 
Share valuation questionnaire 
Expected duration : 10- 15 minutes 
Number of questions: 6 
Dear Partic ipant, 
Thank you fo r participating in thi s study. The research is being conducted as part of a Master"s thesis at the 
University of Cape Town. 
The aim of the research is to examine the presence of behavioural biases in profess i nal investors in South 
Africa. The presence of these biases has been demonstrated inte rnationally, but not in South Africa. Being 
aware of these biases in investment situations will allow researchers to identify ways to ameliorate their 
effects. 
TIle survey consists of six questions: Four on the importance of behavioural finance education in South 
Africa and two related to share valuation. In order to answer the valuation questions you will need to read 
through the information from a se ll-side analysfs share report before providing your best estimate of the 
share's future value. The survey is expected to take between ten and fifteen milllltes. 
All responses to thi s survey arc completely anonymous and will not be used for any purpose outside of the 
present study. Parti cipation in this study is voluntary, and the survey has been app roved by the Faculty of 
Commerce Ethics in Research Comminee. 
If you have any questions about the surveyor the research, please send them to stefan@2sparrows.co.za. 
Sincerely, 
Stefan Eis 
Page/of5 
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Share valuation questionnaire 
Section A 
1. How much do you believe investment decisions are affected by psychological biases? 
(a) Not at all 
(b) Slightly 
(c) Moderately 
(d) Significantly 
2. How informed or uninformed do you think the typical investment analyst is about behavioural biases in 
the investment envirornnent? 
(a) Uninformed 
(b) Mostly uninformed 
(c) Somewhat informed 
(d) Well informed 
3. How important is information on investment biases to you? 
(a) Not important 
(b) Slightly important 
(c) Moderately important 
(d) Very important 
4. Do you believe that finance students are provided with enough information on biases in the investment 
environment? 
(a) No 
(b) Yes 
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Share valuation questionnaire 
Section B 
Please read through the following descriptioo of a share before providing your best estimate of intrinsic 
value. 
AB Foods 
Company Background 
AB Foods is a coosumerpackaged-goods company. It is an important player in the South African food sector 
and has expanded its business to include personal care products. AB Foods' products are mostly distributed 
through major retail stores, but some products a"e distributed through exclusive health stores. Products are 
sold primarily in South Africa (SA) with a few products being distributed in emerging mrukets. 
While the South African economic recovery has been slow, growth in disposable income, chie to current and 
expected future real wage increases, should support continued growth in earnings in the future, especially in 
health foods and personal care products. The current low interest rate envirooment has also contributed to 
snperior earnings growth. However, earnings growth in the food sector will be negatively affected by food 
inflatioo coming off of recent highs. Unless rising operating costs can be controlled or passed on by AB 
Foods it will further depress margins. AB Foods has come off arecent high of 632c. 
'" 
FIgure 1: AB Foods Price History 
At face value companies in this sector appear expensive. They are trading above their historical average PIE 
rating (c15x compared to the historical average of cllx) and at a premimn to the market. However, the very 
strong perfocmance over the last 12 months has led to a re-rating of the sector. A further rerating could be 
justified given the lower risk free rate and the continued acceleration in earning momentmn in the coming 
months. Food processors have tended to outpeIfonn the mruket in a do\Wtum, but show weaker 
perfonnances relative to the market in an upturn. 
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Share valuation questionnaire 
Analysis of financial data 
The following data, based on the information from AB Foods and the food processors sector, was used in the 
valuation of AB Foods: 
Summary of Valuation Data 
PIE ratio - trailing 14.01 
Historical average share PIE ratio - trailing 1l.24 
Current sector average PIE ratio - trailing 15.27 
EPS - current 40.18 
DPS - current 10.01 
Risk free rate - current 10 yr SA Govt Bond Yield 8.25% 
Beta - Food Processors Sector 0.44 
Market Risk Premium - estimate 5.6% 
Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) - trailing 9.91 
Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) - trailing 7.09 
Table 1: Financial data used in share valuation 
For the Dividend Growth model, a long run rate of growth of dividends of 8.7% was obtained by the 
averaging of two separate estimates: A top-down growth rate estimate of 9.1 % derived from an expected 
inflation rate of 5.5% and a real GDP growth rate of 3.4%; and a bottom-up sustainable growth rate of 8.3% 
which is calculated as the product of the company's retention rate of75% and seven-year average return on 
equity of ILl %. 
Fair Value Estimates 
Dividend Growth Model 546.23 
FCFF Method 587.27 
FCFE Method 522.81 
Average valuation 552.10 
Table 2: Valuations provided by different models 
5. What is your best estimate of AB Foods's intrinsic value? Give your answer in cents. 
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Share valuation questionnaire 
6. How much did the past price peaks and troughs on the stock chart affect your estimate of intrinsic value? 
(a) Not at all 
(b) Slightly 
(c) Moderately 
(d) Significantly 
Thank you for participating in our survey. If you have any further questions or comments, please send them 
to stefan@2sparrows.co.za 
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